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 With the rise of the New Religious Right in American politics, same-sex marriage 
and abortion emerged as the seminal political issues in a burgeoning culture wars 
narrative.  While previous literature in the sociology of religion and political science 
fields has examined conservative evangelical political mobilization around these issues, 
this literature has not adequately considered the primacy of theology in determining these 
critical political commitments of the evangelical right.  This dissertation utilizes aspects 
of James Wellman’s concept of moral worldview, Ann Swidler’s ideas on the cultural 
toolkit, and Christian Smith’s subcultural identity theory to explore the formation of 
conservative evangelical social identity.  In contrast to other works, however, this project 
asserts that theological orthodoxy directly dictates the most salient issues of political 
mobilization for members of the evangelical right.  Key evangelical theological themes 
distill into three ideological frames that govern the conservative evangelical moral 
worldview and their political issue priorities.  These ideological frames of moral 
purity/innocence, personal responsibility, and obedience to authority filter and limit the 
range of cultural tools available to conservative evangelicals in their experience of the 
world.  Using content analysis to show how evangelical right leaders utilize these frames 
in their rhetoric, this project demonstrates how same-sex marriage and abortion emerge 
as the pivotal issues in the conservative evangelical mind.  It argues that conservative 
 iii 
evangelicals do not sort their sense of tribal identity into two categories of us and them, 
but rather three discrete categories of us, them, and potentially us, bringing the 
redemptive aspect of evangelical theology into their classification, reclassification and 
engagement with “the Other.”  Combining the use of ideological frames with factors of 
threat and taboo, this dissertation demonstrates how evangelical theology directly 
produces moral claims and explicates how same-sex marriage and abortion have become 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 In the summer of 2014, in the midst of swelling momentum for LGBTQ rights in 
America, the Texas Republican party embraced “ex-gay therapy,” a discredited 
psychological approach, in their party platform.  The platform explicitly stated: 
“Homosexuality must not be presented as an acceptable alternative lifestyle, in public 
policy, nor should family be redefined to include homosexual couples.  We believe there 
should be no granting of special legal entitlements or creation of special status for 
homosexual behavior, regardless of state of origin” (Wolfson 2014, par. 3).  Declared 
invalid or harmful by the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Medical 
Association, the World Health Organization, and many other major medical 
organizations, the move was largely viewed in other parts of the country as reactionary 
and out of touch with the overall direction of the country.  However, the heel-digging 
stance of the Texas Republican party provides a good example of the increasingly 
embattled and defensive stance of the “evangelical right” in American politics, especially 
on their signature issues:  same-sex marriage and abortion.  The evangelical right has 
waged an almost four-decade crusade to protect what they define as moral values in 
American culture.   
 What would motivate members of the evangelical right to continue their battle 
against certain moral changes when the momentum is so large?  Why is there so much 
resistance to science and to the perspectives of the medical community on things like ex-
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gay therapy?  Why has the social change that has swept America not permeated this 
subculture as rapidly as other portions of the society?  What is it that cements the cultural 
vision of protestant conservatives and how do they sustain the cultural views with the 
next generations?  Will they succeed?  What is it that animates the passionate 
perspectives of true believers in the conservative evangelical world? 
 While there has been considerable literature relating to the rise of the New 
Religious Right and conservative evangelical influence, the current scholarship has not 
been sufficient to answer certain questions.  Much of the literature has focused either on 
the theological commitments of conservative evangelicals (and understanding how those 
commitments reinforce subcultural boundaries within the community), or, separately, on 
the political commitments of the evangelical right and how these play out in American 
society.  Though they have given credence to the importance of theology in the 
evangelical moral worldview, scholars have not taken the role of theology seriously 
enough in its influence on the key political commitments of the evangelical right.  They 
have not sufficiently explored certain questions on the relationship between evangelical 
theological orthodoxy and the political orthodoxy of the New Religious Right.  How do 
theological commitments and moral politics directly interact?  How does private theology 
become public policy?  The previous literature also has not addressed why certain issues 
have mobilized evangelicals and other moral issues have not.  How are the theological 
precepts of conservative evangelicals directly connected to a moral “pecking order” 
which emphasizes same-sex marriage and abortion beyond all other political issues?   
Theology is central to the evangelical mind, and, for the evangelical right, 
political commitments flow directly from the centrality of theological orthodoxy.  My 
	
 3 
central argument is that crucial tenets derived from evangelical theology form ideological 
frames that govern issue choice and activism in the political arena and are the 
determinative factors in the selection of same-sex marriage and abortion as the two key 
political issues for the evangelical right.  I will propose a structural framework that 
demonstrates how this theology directly translates into political ideology.  Where the 
literature has not sufficiently explained this process, my framework will offer a different 
approach that builds on some of the previous ideas.  I will describe the network of 
connections between evangelical theology and evangelical moral politics, articulating 
how the pieces of the evangelical moral worldview fit and work together to create a 
cohesive political ideology.  This interdisciplinary framework can help scholars in the 
fields of sociology of religion, political science, and religious studies to better understand 
the moral worldview of conservative evangelicals, while also speaking to the curious 
educated public at large. 
 The worldview of the evangelical right is multi-dimensional, and I will explore 
this worldview through the lenses of political science, sociology, and psychology in this 
chapter.  The evangelical world brings a unique milieu of social processes, political 
motivations, and psychological orientations.  Always at play in these processes is a blend 
of boundaries between individual and collective identities.  Whether examining the social 
structures, political motivations, or psychological inclinations, the interweaving of 
individual and collective identity complicates the picture for explication.  While social 
identity, with in-groups and out-groups, can dictate behavior, individual motivations 
depend on the cultural toolkit the individual has to draw from (Swidler 1986).  Though 
there is significant overlap in the toolkit of conservative evangelical individuals, the 
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increasing diversity of the surrounding culture makes it hard to maintain complete 
hegemony of the evangelical right worldview, especially with younger followers. 
The moral worldview of the evangelical right is complex, but revolves around 
certain symbolic boundaries and values that are absolute in the minds of believers.  In 
order to understand this worldview, scholars have attacked the issue from a variety of 
directions.  Some have looked at psychological orientations of groups or individuals, 
including authoritarian tendencies, the group psychology of cohesion, or the 
psychological implications of certain views of sexuality related to religion.  Political 
scientists have taken a different tack, looking at regional differences, ideological 
polarization, or political utility in trying to explain the attitudes toward same-sex 
marriage and abortion.  Sociologists have looked more closely at relationships between 
tension and collective identity or explanations relating to social capital.  Political 
scientists and sociologists have overlapped in looking at the importance of purity, 
segmented gender roles, and regional differences in how the evangelical right’s influence 
is dispersed.   
In looking at the literature related to evangelical right identity in this chapter, I 
will trace sources from the fields of sociology of religion, political science, and 
psychology of religion.  I will begin by looking at the sociological literature on the 
construction of evangelical identity and the formation of subcultural boundaries, 
particularly looking at the strength of the evangelical subculture within the public sphere 
in American society.  Next, I will look at political science literature on the culture war 
hypothesis, focusing on increasing political polarization as well as grievances, 
victimhood, collective defense, and values.  Finally, I will examine sources from 
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psychology of religion focusing primarily on authoritarianism and the authoritarian 
personality.  All of these elements may play a role in the political choices and 
commitments of the evangelical right, but throughout this overview, I highlight the 
primary role of theology in the mind of the evangelical and the rhetoric of conservative 
evangelical leaders, while I fit together many of these concepts with that theological 
commitment to tell a story of political mobilization.   
I will begin by examining sociological thinking on the nature of subcultural 
identity and boundary setting within and between groups.  A large part of this discussion 
is over secularization and whether American culture would follow the direction of 
European culture in secularizing.  Conservative evangelicals have provided an apt 
example of how secularization has not taken hold in the same way in America that it has 
overseas.  
 
SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION AND THE EVANGELICAL SUBCULTURE 
One of the principal issues to explore in understanding the influence of the 
evangelical right in the political arena is why the evangelical subculture has been so 
strong and resilient in the face of cultural change in the United States.  Different theories 
have emerged to try to explain the essence and durability of the evangelical subculture. 
Christian Smith and Michael Emerson provide an overview of Smith’s 
“subcultural identity theory” of religion in American Evangelicalism: Embattled and 
Thriving (1998).  Using a mixed methods approach, Smith’s team conducted a three-year 
national-level study.  They began with 130 semi-structured interviews, categorizing 
respondents accordingly, before connecting these findings to a subsequent national phone 
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survey of evangelicals as well as key observations by researchers in congregational visits 
(Smith & Emerson 1998, 221-224).  The resulting subcultural identity theory is 
principally a response to what the authors refer to as the “sheltered enclave theory” 
(1998, 75) – the prevailing theory of secularization prevalent for much of the late 20th 
century and based largely on Peter Berger’s classic work from 1967, The Sacred Canopy.  
Berger held the view that religion was declining in the modern world, and that modernity 
and religious faith were hostile and negating to one another.  He also held that pluralism 
undermined the very nature of religion, and therefore, in an increasingly pluralistic and 
modern cultural milieu, religion would eventually die out. 
 One of the earliest and clearest counter-arguments that emerged to challenge 
Berger’s thesis came from Rodney Stark.  Stark labels Berger’s secularization theory the 
“old paradigm” and presents a “new paradigm” based on rational choice theory and the 
concepts of rational action based on “other-worldly” rewards (Stark & Finke 2000).  
Stark’s theory relies heavily on the concepts of tension and competition in “the religious 
economy” model in understanding how religions come to thrive:  “Rather than eroding 
the plausibility of all faiths, competition results in eager and efficient suppliers of 
religion, just as it does among suppliers of secular commodities, and with the same 
results: far higher levels of overall ‘consumption’” (2000, 36).   
Christian Smith embraces Stark’s focus on tension, and used the idea of a “mixed 
economy,” but articulates the concept of tension through a slightly different vernacular, 
particularly focusing on felt needs.  In seeking to better understand the conservative 
evangelical movement in America, Smith lays out a theory that seeks to explain the 
relative strength of evangelicalism within American culture.  Smith and Emerson (1998) 
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provide a clear alternative to Berger’s secularization theory, claiming that perceived 
conflict lies at the heart of evangelical purpose: 
American evangelicalism, we contend, is strong not because it is shielded against, 
but because it is – or at least perceives itself to be – embattled with forces that 
seem to oppose or threaten it.  Indeed, evangelicalism, we suggest, thrives on 
distinction, engagement, tension, conflict, and threat.  Without these, 
evangelicalism would lose its identity and purpose and grow languid and aimless 
(89). 
 
In Smith’s theory, “collective identity is socially constructed through intergroup 
distinctions marked by cultural boundaries” (1998, 97).  Cultural boundary-setting allows 
a religious group or movement to portray the prevailing culture or another group as a dire 
threat to its existence, thus necessitating strong cohesion and corporate action to “defend 
the faith.”  Smith explains that collective identity is formed and reinforced through 
processes of social interaction, in which “identity-signifying symbols are collectively 
generated, displayed, recognized, affirmed, and employed to mark differences between 
insiders and outsiders” (1998, 92).  From this perspective, customs, worldviews, 
theologies, cultural peculiarities, rituals, and other social occurrences take on great 
importance as a way of creating and setting boundaries with outgroups.  This boundary-
setting exercise builds subcultural unity and strengthens the cause.  Socially-constructed 
boundary markers allow and embolden groups to “fight back” from their embattled (or at 
least the perception of embattled) position against those “negative reference groups” 
(Smith & Emerson 1998, 105) who would dare to differ from and challenge them.  In this 
way, out-group conflict builds in-group strength (1998, 115).  This subjective tension 
allows religious groups to construct potentially fictitious portrayals of the world, crafting 
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narratives that mobilize the troops.  This theory points to homosexuals and abortion 
providers as the critical negative reference groups for conservative evangelicals. 
James Wellman (1999) utilizes Christian Smith’s subcultural identity theory in 
order to argue that denominational religious elites try to mobilize members of 
conservative religious denominations against homosexuality, and particularly against 
allowing homosexuals to be ordained within their traditions.  He contends that 
“homosexuality may be the ideal object of tension for evangelicals and fundamentalists 
within religious organizations” (Wellman 1999, 187). 
 Gay, Ellison, and Powers (1996) also talk about subcultures, tying the concept of 
subcultures to specific religious denominations in American religious life.  Seeking to 
identify particular denominational subcultures, they focus their research on attitudes 
related to “pro-family” issues such as gender roles, abortion, and homosexuality (3).  
Gay, et al. (1996) began by analyzing differences in central tendencies specifically 
related to attitudes on “pro-family” issues in different denominations in order to 
hypothesize specific subcultures (6).  Their findings confirm two clear core 
denominational subcultures:  conservative and liberal.  They establish that conservative 
evangelical denominations (such as Southern Baptist) had significantly more 
heterogeneity on issues such as gender roles than they did around issues such as abortion, 
homosexuality, or extramarital sex (1996, 12-13).  They recommend further study of the 
roles of elites in enforcing conformity through fellowship ties and social network 
dynamics in conservative congregations (1996, 14).  
 James Wellman (2008) also probes the relative homogeneity of the evangelical 
subculture (as compared to the liberal subculture) in Evangelical vs. Liberal.  He 
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conducted qualitative interviews of congregants in both liberal and evangelical churches 
in the Pacific Northwest.  He looks at how “liberal laypeople are a less homogeneous 
group than evangelicals are…Evangelicals are preaching to congregations in which they 
perceive greater moral consensus” (Wellman 2008, 78).  Wellman (2008) attempts to 
explain a cultural model based on the metaphor of an onion.  He hypothesizes that core 
allegiances make up the core of the onion, moral values make up the next layer, then 
comes moral projects and eventually aesthetics.  The onion image provides for moral 
continuity with core allegiances to certain political issues, but does not allow for the 
myriad individual differences we see in actions, particularly in non-evangelical, non-
ideological settings, thus only working in the case of conservative congregations.  It 
seems to have limited scope in explaining why particular issues are so important. 
Another extremely important theory of culture in the field of sociology of religion 
is Ann Swidler’s theory of the “cultural toolkit” (Swidler 1986).  Swidler claims that 
people have different cultural tools from the different experiences they have and cultural 
fields they reside in.  They can choose the tools that best fit a situation because culture is 
not “a unified system that pushes action in a consistent direction…both individuals and 
groups know how to do different kinds of things in different circumstances” (Swidler 
1986, 277).  Swidler’s theory works well for most cultural settings and allows for the 
complexity of action we see in moderate settings.  Swidler also makes a key distinction in 
her article.  She says that the cultural toolkit model works differently in different time 
periods.  In times of settled lives, “cultural resources are diverse…and normally groups 
and individuals call upon these resources selectively, bringing to bear different styles and 
	
 10 
habits of action in different situations” (Swidler 1986, 280).  However, when times are 
“unsettled” and tumultuous, she describes what happens in culture differently: 
Bursts of ideological activism occur in periods when competing ways of 
organizing action are developing or contending for dominance.  People formulate, 
flesh out, and put into practice new habits of action.  In such situations, culture 
may indeed be said to directly shape action…These explicit cultures might well 
be called “systems.”  While not perfectly consistent, they aspire to offer not 
multiple answers, but one unified answer to the question of how human beings 
should live.  In conflict with other cultural models, these cultures are coherent 
because they must battle to dominate the world-views, assumptions, and habits of 
their members (Swidler 1986, 279). 
 
This important distinction of unsettled cultures connects back to Christian Smith’s 
subcultural identity theory, bringing in the idea of competition and direct action in times 
of unsettledness.  This would seem to have important implications for evangelicals who 
feel embattled by social threats. 
In addition to cultural theories that seek to explain conservative evangelical 
obsession with “pro-family” issues, other sociologists have also looked at the topic from 
the point of view of politics and how religion itself functions politically in shifting 
cultural sands.  Robert Bellah (1967) originated a concept of American “civil religion” 
that other scholars have widely explored and critiqued.  Based on the term originally 
coined by Jean Jacques Rousseau, Bellah described the symbols, beliefs, and ritual 
expressions of patriotism in the United States in religious terms, similar yet distinct from 
Christianity or other religions.  Bellah (1980) also speaks of the resemblance of the 
concept of civil religion to the ideas of public piety or “political religion.”  Robert 
Wuthnow (1988) accepts Bellah’s concept of civil religion in American society, but 
argues one must further divide this concept into two forms:  conservative civil religion 
and liberal civil religion.  Wuthnow states that American civil religion is deeply divided:  
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Like the religion found more generally in the nation’s churches, it does not speak 
with a single voice, uniting the majority of Americans around common ideals.  It 
has instead become a confusion of tongues speaking from different traditions and 
offering different visions of what America can and should be.  (1988, 244)   
 
Conservative civil religion seeks to reify an American countermemory of Christian origin 
and divine legitimacy, placing the United States in a place of profound privilege within 
the “kingdom of God,” a special place within God’s divine order (Wuthnow 1988).  
Conservative civil religion places a high emphasis on Christian evangelical beliefs as 
well as conservative religious values.  In a sense, American conservative civil religion 
wraps divinity in the American flag, privileging militaristic, nationalist, and Christian 
(particularly Protestant) discourses about a purported “Christian nation.” 
 
POLITICAL ACTION – AND REACTION:  THE CULTURE WARS 
From the views of political scientists, much of what makes the evangelical right 
so interesting is its ability to motivate and mobilize passionate political activism among a 
large number of politically conservative, white voters in the United States.  The rise of 
the evangelical right has been a relatively recent development, only really appearing 
since the late 1970s – largely as a reaction to the social change of the 1960s.  The factors 
relating to the rise of the movement are complex; there is not one simple reason for the 
movement’s emergence.  The evangelical right has mobilized people through the use of 
symbolic boundaries, creating categories that transcend the theological into the political. 
Very few groups have been as successful at motivating activists as evangelicals on the 
right have been over the last four decades or so.   
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 In addition to conservative civil religion, political scientists have particularly 
focused on the “culture wars” in American society.  A term originally coined by James 
Davison Hunter (1987), the culture wars thesis acknowledged the ongoing polarization of 
American politics around social issues such as abortion and homosexuality.  Though the 
culture wars idea has been disputed by some (Fiorina 2006), many political scientists 
continue to look at American conservative evangelicals through the culture war lens.  A 
particular interest for them has been the idea of authoritarianism among religious 
conservatives. 
Mockabee (2007) proposed a new approach for looking at cultural conflict that 
not only encompassed the traditional moral issues of abortion and sexuality, but also 
included issues related to patriotism and group effect (221).  Mockabee embraces the 
theories of increasing polarization in the American electorate (Abramowitz & Saunders 
1998; Hetherington & Weiler 2009), further explicating James Davison Hunter’s (1987) 
description of the role of authority in an evolving culture war.  He used a set of data 
relating to child-rearing practices in order to look at the relationship between authority, 
religion, and political attitudes.  Mockabee used data from the 2000 and 2004 American 
National Election Study (ANES), hypothesizing that measures of authority would be a 
key factor in shaping political behavior (230).  The analysis of social groups focused on 
the concept of “outgrouping” and its important role in all kinds of cultural identity 
politics (Mockabee, 230).  The research also found that the authority-mindedness variable 
was a statistically significant factor in hostility toward gays and lesbians and abortion 
(231-234).  Mockabee took this data and proposed a different approach that combined 
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religiosity and authoritarianism as a strong predictor of attitudes on moral issues, party 
identification, vote choice and social groups (221). 
 
GRIEVANCES, VICTIMHOOD, AND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 
In To The Right, Jerome Himmelstein summarizes approaches that have been 
employed in order to explain the mobilization of groups:  
Usually they rely on some combination of three causes:  an increase in a group’s 
grievances; an increase in a group’s resources, organization, and opportunities for 
collective action; and heightened mobilizing efforts by social-movement 
professionals or entrepreneurs outside the group. (1990, 98) 
   
“Grievances” provides an excellent description of the cultural ideology that surrounds the 
values-laden rhetoric of the evangelical right.  As has been described, the rhetoric of the 
right mobilizes activism by playing on a constant sense of grievance, loss, and attack.  
One of the ways collective movements generate energy for the cause is by talking about 
the threat of opposing movements.  Tina Fetner (2008) looks at the similarity between the 
rhetorical strategy of the religious right and the rhetorical strategy of the lesbian and gay 
community.  She states: “Rather than referring to a potential to discriminate, the opposing 
movement pointed to people and rhetoric that actively attacked gay rights.  Furthermore, 
the presence of anti-gay activism increased the sense of urgency of movement claims” 
(38).  The evangelical right uses the specter of constant attack, constant depreciation of 
cultural values, to trumpet the message of alienation and embattlement.  The movement is 
under attack, and adherents are kept in a constant state of readiness by the right’s 
rhetorical strategy.  This strategy gives deep power to keep a movement base in motion 
even during times of apparent political setbacks (Diamond 1998, ix).  There is an inherent 
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power of oppositional symbols that fuels movements and makes them almost unassailable 
- the more they are attacked, the stronger they can become - at least to a point.  Leaders 
on the right highlight besiegement and the rhetoric of “special” rights for lesbians and 
gays (Diamond 1998, 172).  Opposition to the granting of special rights becomes a huge 
mobilizing factor, as conservative evangelicals find a way to portray themselves as 
cultural victims.  A loss of political and moral dominance then becomes a rallying cry of 
righteous victimhood (Watson 1997).   
Perhaps nothing captures the sense of grievance experienced by evangelical 
conservatives better than their claiming of the tradition of the American Jeremiad.  In this 
tradition, preachers and politicians have scolded an America “chosen” by God for 
breaking a covenant with “Him”; the sin and apostasy of Americans is bemoaned, 
bringing a call for repentance, forgiveness, and restoration of the covenant with God 
(Bercovitch 1978).  The Evangelical Right has latched on to this narrative, offering their 
own interpretation to both the sins and the path of social salvation for America (Morone 
2003, Noll 1990, Watson 1997, Wills 1990).  With a message of “bringing the nation 
back to God,” conservative evangelical elites bemoan the broken covenant with God 
(Bellah 1975), pushing a revival of family values in order to gain God’s blessing for the 
nation again as a type of “New Israel” (Marsden 1980).  In this narrative, the nation must 
return to God, turning from its wicked ways and repenting of its sinful nature - as defined 
by conservative evangelicals and their moral priorities.  The Jeremiad reinterprets historic 
expressions of sin and redemption found throughout American history.  The idea that 
sacred history reached its zenith in the “discovery” of the “New World” and the founding 
of America taps into a myth of American exceptionalism (Bercovitch 1978).  In this 
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conceptualization, the ritualization and sacralization of the American Revolution makes 
the purpose of the nation inseparable from the purposes of God (133-34).  The tradition 
provides a canvas for frequent reinterpretation of the nation’s sins and creates a ripe 
atmosphere for social justice movements, witch-hunts, and moral crusades.  The Jeremiad 
rhetoric provides religious and political leaders with much flexibility to continually 
redefine the moral “problem” - and the groups to blame for it.  Whether it was the cause 
of prohibition, the supposed white slavery of young girls1, or the abolition or civil rights 
movements, the Jeremiad has provided ample opportunity for claiming divine power and 
purpose behind a group’s cause in American history (Morone 2003). The revivalism of 
the mid 19th-century taught Christians to be sanctified and perfected in their individual 
salvation and in their activism for God, telling them the moral imperatives they should 
follow (Noll 1990).  Connecting to the moral traditionalism of the Puritan heritage 
(Liebman et al. 1983; Marsden 1990; Morone 2003) and the revivalism of the Great 
Awakenings, the Evangelical Right creates a new symbolic morality politics that reacts to 
20th-century post-industrial society and post-materialist values (Himmelstein 1990).2 
The emphasis in Protestantism on the individual person reinforces messages of 
individual liberty found in the Founders’ modernistic worldview.  There is chronic 
                                                
1 Morone (2003) describes the “white slave panic” of 1909-1910, where Americans 
conjured up the idea that innocent white girls were being grabbed off the street by 
villainous Eastern European immigrants who were forcing them into prostitution. 
 
2 Liebman, Wuthnow, and Guth (1983) argue that the New Religious Right has three 
major sets of themes:  economic libertarianism, militant anti-communism, and social 
traditionalism.  I make the case that the ideology around this moral and social 
traditionalism is the most central of these three themes in understanding the primary 
motivations of the Religious Right, especially considering the decline of communism in 
the last couple of decades and the shift in RR rhetoric toward other “foreign thems.” 
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tension between a view of sin as only found in the individual and a view of sin as a 
systemic problem in the structures of society (Emerson & Smith 2000, Green 1996, 
Hertzke 1988, Howard-Pitney 2005, Morone 2003, Watson 1997).  The evangelical right 
continually interprets social ills as consequences of individual sins and failings, and the 
sins and failings of particular groups of people.  In this interpretation, they have found 
multiple dangerous “others” on which to blame the social problems in America.  The 
reactionary rebellion of the evangelical right against individual sinners essentially 
becomes a response to a half-century of structural societal changes driven by the social 
gospel and culminating in the civil rights movement of the 1960s (Morone 2003).  
Morone points to four “moral flaws” historically recurring in the demonization of groups 
in America:  violence, substance abuse (or drink), sloth, and sex (2003, 452).  From this 
historical perspective, the evangelical right’s construction of the other hearkens back to 
the Puritan heritage of finding the fearful “them”: “The Puritans groped back to the tried 
and true - they found terrible new enemies to define them.  The saints constructed their 
“us” against a vivid series of immoral “them”:  heretics, Indians, witches.  Each enemy 
clarified the Puritan identity” (33).  These categories have been used to “other” particular 
groups, especially in racializing the identities of immigrants coming into American 
society (Fredrickson 2002; Omi & Winant 1994; Winant 2004), perhaps driven partially 
by status anxiety and the fear of further loss of cultural and economic hegemony (Morone 
2003).  By drawing on a sense of resentment and frustration, conservative evangelical 
leaders attempt to restore a kind of “countermemory” (Burlein 2002) of America’s lost 
glory and holiness.  This resentment and contempt toward the rest of society emerges 
from the loss of Protestant cultural hegemony in American society and leads to an 
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attitude of grievance, embattlement, and victimization (Noll 1990; Smith & Emerson 
1998; Watson 1997).  While others such as Fetner have observed the force of the 
aggressive rhetoric toward the enemy, it is this loss of cultural hegemony that truly 
creates the sense of fear among grassroots members of the evangelical right. 
The particular grievances of the Evangelical Right take on a variety of symbolic 
causes that speak to deeper social structural and cultural descriptors of the religious 
conservative subculture (and especially the conservative evangelical subculture).  The 
Puritan heritage of “responsible self-control” lends itself to the narrative of constraint 
and order versus the chaos and irresponsible behavior framed around the non-Christian 
elements of the culture (Himmelstein 1990, 105-6).  This concept of defending a natural, 
responsible order is prevalent in evangelical messaging.  Sara Diamond looks at the 
distinctive messages of conservative evangelical leaders like Chuck Colson - and how 
these leaders frame marriage as a fundamental structuring social institution.  The change 
in the definition of marriage to include members of the LGBTQ community is not a legal 
and technical process, then, but rather an affront to a central organizing social structure:  
heterosexual marriage.  In this view, there is one order, one structure, and only one way 
to be responsible within the culture.  (Diamond 1998, 171).  Religious orthodoxy is 
paramount to the evangelical right - the epistemic authority of right belief in the 
authoritative Scriptures towers over and above denominational loyalty (Hunter 1987; 
Hunter, 1991; Jelen 1991; Wilcox 1992).  Largely because of the shift from 
denominational loyalty to a loyalty to a particular political worldview, there has been 
realignment of religious identity along conservative and liberal ideological lines 
(Wuthnow 1988).   
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THE LANGUAGE OF VALUES AND DUALISM 
Ted Jelen discusses Samuel Huntington’s theory of American political culture, 
where he describes three distinct approaches to understanding the political traditions in 
American society (1991, 8-17).  Jelen outlines the paradigms of The One (the perspective 
that American political culture generates a consensus of values), The Two (a dualistic 
perspective where an advantaged class tries to maintain that advantage), and The Many (a 
pluralistic perspective where the particularist aspects of a myriad groups come to the fore 
and compete in their activism).  Wuthnow’s and Hunter’s arguments connect with “The 
Two” dualistic perspective in that they contend there has been a polarizing, dualistic shift 
along conservative and liberal lines in American religious and political identity with the 
rise of the Religious Right and evangelicals as a large subset of this movement (though 
Wuthnow is more nuanced in his approach).3  
Regardless of the paradigm of political culture one holds, the central battleground 
rhetoric for the evangelical right has centered on the language of values.  One of these 
central values for evangelical conservatives is the centrality of the Scripture, or the Bible.  
The Scripture is seen as a blueprint for family values and as the source of the appropriate 
structure and order for shaping everything from families to politics.  Beyond the 
commitment to order and scriptural authority, evangelical conservatives have asserted 
multiple other key grievances against shifting American society: “family” issues around 
                                                
3 Wuthnow later moved away from his polarization thesis in The Quiet Hand of God 
(2003), where he noted that a majority of mainline Christians tended to identify more as 
moderates, acknowledging that previous survey research methodology conducted had 




which to mobilize activists.  In this, they move toward the afore-mentioned demonization 
of the other.   Central to all of these value-based arguments are the concepts of group 
ideology and subcultural identity.  Soper describes group ideology as “the set of values, 
ideas, and beliefs which gives meaning to the social experiences of adherents, defines 
group objectives and legitimates group formation” and that religious ideology is the 
“primary impulse for evangelical activism” (1994, 1-2).  Group ideology calls for a 
strong commitment to place the values and norms of the ideology above everything else, 
promoting deep moral claims about how the world should be.  This connects with Smith 
and Emerson from the sociological world, who as we previously discussed, focus on the 
forging of collective identity through embattledness and how evangelicals sustain 
ideological unity.   
 
THE POLITICS OF GENDER AND EXISTENTIAL THREATS TO MORALITY 
Framing arguments against feminism, evangelicals have attacked the shifting 
gender roles in society as the breakdown of God’s will for the traditional family (Balmer 
1989; Diamond 1995; Diamond 1998; Himmelstein 1990; Hunter 1991; K. Luker 1984; 
Marsden 1980).  Sara Diamond identifies the “moral order of behavioral norms and 
hierarchies on the bases of race and gender” as one of the central unifying themes of 
evangelicals and the New Religious Right (1995, 6).  The connection to moral 
traditionalism continues with the themes of sexual purity, sexual self-control and 
maintaining innocence that infuse the rhetoric of leaders of the evangelical right (Balmer 
1989; Diamond 1998; Morone 2003; Wills 1990).  Evangelical conservatives also 
villainize the “secular humanists” in society, using secularism as a symbol for 
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godlessness and irresponsible immorality that does not have to be accountable to God 
(Diamond, 1989), and some have argued that there has been a deep increase in 
polarization between the religiously devout and the irreligious (Hunter 1991).  By 
opposing gay rights, conservative evangelicals bring together attacks on sexual impurity, 
shifting gender roles, chaotic social structures, secular morality, and “irresponsible” 
behavior in a single hot-button issue that mobilizes members to political and social 
action.    Abortion is the other key area of mobilization for the New Religious Right as a 
whole and evangelical conservatives in particular.  Bringing together narratives of 
“rights” for “unborn children,” the defense of “innocent” life, and the protection of 
victims of irresponsible sexual behavior, the Religious Right, including evangelicals and 
Catholics, has mobilized an effective crusade around this highly polarizing topic (Balmer 
1989; Diamond 1989; 1995; 1998; K. Luker 1984; Morone 2003; Reed 1996; Watson 
1997; Wills 1990). 
For evangelical groups that combine an “end-times” perspective with their 
exclusivist views, apocalyptic inclinations can lead to an even more extreme position.  In 
connection with conforming orthodoxy, exclusivist cultural systems demand moral 
purity.  Religious delineations of moral purity frequently revolve around expressions of 
sexuality (Armstrong 2000; Douglas 1966; Lifton 1999; Marsden 1980; B. Moore 2000; 
R. I. Moore 2007).  In Moral Purity and Persecution in History (2000), Barrington 
Moore examines the important connection between certain forms of Christianity 
(particularly Calvinism), sexuality, and persecution.  Moore compares this to Catholic 
understandings (in the Hugenots), identifying similar discourse around moral purity and 
how this discourse encourages hatred and persecution of those identified as impure. But 
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strains of the threat to moral purity can be seen passing down in American history to the 
current generation of evangelical culture warriors.  Ultimate threats become the 
animating principle of motivating action by adherents. 
Ultimate threats weave together with cultural narratives as elites attempt to garner public 
support.  In Lift High the Cross (2002), Ann Burlein traces the connection between white 
supremacy and the American Christian Right, particularly focusing on the Christian 
Identity movement (in this case, in contrast to Focus on the Family).  Utilizing Foucault’s 
(1977b) idea of countermemory, Burlein illustrates how the religious conservatives 
construct fictional historical narratives of innocence that serve their political purposes in 
mobilizing adherents to their movements.  Burlein summarizes the concept of 
countermemory as “an alternative way of remembering history and empowering people 
to stand up” (4).  In The History of Sexuality, Foucault (1978) focuses on how social 
power produces desire, and Burlein builds on this insight by illustrating how conservative 
religious leaders seek to determine what should be valued and cared about by followers 
(25).  She describes how conservative leaders engender commitment, disseminating   
countermemories that converge through reading the national present within 
biblical narratives of cultural trauma…(disseminating) countermemories that act 
less by prohibiting the pleasures of the modern world and more by engendering 
desire for the “Bible-based family.”  (Burlein 2002, 24-25)   
 
Cultural leaders are able to forge myths of origin which ignore historical failings and 
rewrite alternative histories in a sort of “paradoxical postmodern politics” (25).  By 
constructing fictional histories, elites can emphasize whatever ideas they want to 
reconstruct a nationalistic or culture mythos that guides future action.  Cosmoganies and 
other myths of origin become tools for erasing historical mistakes and papering over 
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injustices, bigotries, or other shameful acts within the cultural system.  Countermemories, 
then, become powerful tools for movements to build social capital and unquestioned 
loyalty from a credulous public, especially in apocalyptic conditions. 
In addition to conforming orthodoxy and moral purity, the scapegoating of the 
marginalized other functions as a key cultural tool for exclusivist cultural systems.  
Exclusivist systems tend to demonize certain groups in society, dehumanizing members, 
portraying them as enemies of the nation, group, or cult, and blaming societal ills on 
members of these marginalized groups.  Once a collective identity has been 
dehumanized, all acts of violence are legitimated, as Barrington Moore describes: “To 
create this moral approval (for cruelty) it is necessary to define the polluting enemy as 
nonhuman or inhuman, that is, outside the range of human beings to whom one owes the 
slightest obligation as fellow creatures” (2000, 57).  Rene Girard describes what he 
describes as the scapegoating mechanism, the human inclination to blame a minority 
group for social problems or catastrophes: “Ultimately, the persecutors always convince 
themselves that a small number of people, or even a single individual, despite his relative 
weakness, is extremely harmful to the whole of society” (1986, 15).  Girard gives 
examples of how the mechanism has operated in major historical epidemics such as the 
Black Death: “Thanks to the mechanism of persecution, collective anguish and frustration 
found vicarious appeasement in the victims who easily found themselves united in 
opposition to them by virtue of being poorly integrated minorities” (1986, 39).  Lifton 
sees this scapegoating dehumanization as a form of demonization that will “press toward 
the dispensing of existence, an absolute division between those who have a right to exist 
and those who possess no such right” (1999, 26).  Juergensmeyer labels this process as 
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the satanization of “the faceless collective enemy,” (2003, 178) constituting a polemic of 
cosmic war against evil, and Goldhagen (2009) refers to the demonization and 
dehumanization present in eliminationist political ideologies.   
The most extreme of evangelical rhetoric tends to run toward the eliminationist 
language of scapegoating and blaming groups for the ills of society.  As mentioned, 
secular humanists, the LGBTQ community, Satanists, abortion doctors, and other groups 
are singled out as existential threats to the culture.  Constant attention is given in how to 
combat these threats in the culture.  Most of the time this is not through violence, but as 
abortion clinic bombings and other acts have shown, the rhetoric is not without effect on 
individuals who are inclined to violence.  The connections between dehumanizing and 
embattled rhetoric and acts of violence are frequently debated.  Most conservative 
evangelicals do not resort to acts of violence or eliminationist attitudes - they tend to use 
the political process to try to enact change through peaceful means.  Cults and other more 
marginal groups tend to advance the rhetoric more in the direction of apocalyptic 
violence.  However, as conservative evangelicals feel that they are losing more and more 
power in the culture, some of the rhetoric can tend to advance toward more existential 
terms.  Sara Diamond (1989, 1998) has explored the Christian Right movement in 
general (with strong emphasis on the evangelical aspects) at the intersection between 
sociology and political science.  Examining issues of gender, race, dominion thinking, 






AUTHORITARIANISM, MOTIVATION, AND THE EVANGELICAL MIND 
 In addition to the interlaced arguments of sociologists and political scientists, 
psychologists have also weighed in on the workings of the evangelical mind and 
proposed explanations for political and cultural perspectives.  Psychologists such as 
Gordon Allport (1967) have examined the purpose for religious identity.  Allport 
discussed the difference between intrinsic religious motivation and extrinsic motivation.  
Intrinsically oriented persons see religion as an end in-itself, while extrinsically oriented 
persons see religion as a means to an end (Allport & Ross 1967, as cited in Wulff 1991).  
Religion can be seen as a means to a political end as one example.  Evangelicals may be 
all over the spectrum of orientations on this, or perhaps the extrinsic goals of political 
leaders in the churches override any intrinsic instincts of parishioners. 
In the field of political psychology, Robert Altemeyer and Bruce Hunsberger 
(1996) look at religious fundamentalism as a motivation for political activism, and 
particular the role of authority in general for deeply conservative protestant activists.  
They propose authoritarianism as the central cause of prejudice and correlate a religious 
fundamentalism scale to a new Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale.  They 
measure fundamentalism in terms of the militancy and dogmatism of religious attitudes 
rather than as a direct measure of religious literalism or orthodoxy.  In some ways, this 
idea connects to embattledness and tension in the formation of group identity, but is 
looking at the individual’s psychological state in the midst of this tension.  In The 
Authoritarian Specter, they directly criticize the extrinsic and intrinsic categories of 
Allport, claiming that the questions in the intrinsic scale do not really measure what 
Allport is defining as intrinsic religious motivations.  They see authoritarian religion 
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(including the content of particular religious belief systems) as the driving force behind 
religious prejudice rather than looking at the two types of motivations. 
This seems to connect to the work of Erich Fromm that Kenneth Pargament 
(1995) alludes to.  Pargament proposes two forms of religion – authoritarian religion and 
humanistic religion.  From this perspective, where there is authoritarian religion, it 
projects human qualities onto God and people worship out of human weakness.  Where 
there is humanistic religion, it is about achieving the greatest human strength rather than 
the greatest human powerlessness.  Conservative evangelical theology highly emphasizes 
the authoritarian themes of human weakness and reliance on the all-powerful God.  
Obedience to God is one of the central animating ideas of the theology of the evangelical 
right, so it would seem to lend itself to the psychological tendency toward 
authoritarianism, whether it be the political authoritarianism of Altemeyer and 
Hunsberger or the authoritarian religion of Pargament. 
 
WEAVING THE DISCIPLINES 
While Christian Smith’s (1998) subcultural identity theory (and the related work 
in the field) provides an excellent framework for understanding the intensity of 
embattledness and the formation of “the other” by conservative evangelicals, the theory 
does not clearly explain exactly how evangelicals have come to select particular “pro-
family” issues to mobilize around politically.  Political theories centered around civil 
religion and political mobilization also shed some light on the militancy and moral code 
of conservative evangelicals, but the dualistic emphasis of all of these theories leaves 
much to be explained.  Authoritarianism in the psychological identity of individuals can 
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be linked to religious fundamentalism and dogmatism in religious distinction, but does 
not explain much of how theology links to the content of political passion.  
I hope to explore not only the “in-group” and “out-group” designations so 
common in evangelical circles, but also the potentiality factor of conversion that seems to 
permeate their thinking in the political realm as well.  This “potential conformity” has 
been largely ignored in the literature, and I suspect that it plays a considerable role in 
evangelical thinking – even to the point of being a separate category about some of the 
“others” in the evangelical mind.  Also, I hope to shed more light on how evangelicals 
actually have chosen the particular issues of abortion and homosexuality for political 
activism and how this is related to the ideal family norm in the minds of evangelicals.  
The primary goal of the evangelical right is to transform the culture through the 
transformation of family to its idealized state.  They see family as the primary social 
structure for social change.  My research will focus on uncovering the possible reasons 
for the prioritization of the issues of same-sex marriage and abortion and how 
theologically driven narratives may expand on the existing research, illuminating new 
understandings of the conservative evangelical mind. 
In the coming chapters, I will trace a different explanation for the political 
commitments and passion of the evangelical right.  Understanding the theology of the 
evangelical right means understanding some of the personalities and the history of the 
movement.  In chapter 2, I explore a bit of the historical emergence of the movement, the 
cultural context for its growth, and the major theological themes that animate evangelical 
life.  These themes provide key ideas for understanding how theology can transform into 
ideological lenses for political life.  Chapter 3 puts forward a new theory, shifting 
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conformity theory, which describes how conservative evangelicals classify others and 
draw boundaries.  I will describe how theological elements transform into ideological 
frames, which fit closely to an ideal archetype of family itself.  This family archetype 
drives a cycle of political mobilization that produces passionate commitment to a limited 
number of moral and political issues.  In chapter 4, I provide a more detailed exploration 
of the hypothesized ideological frames present in the conservative evangelical moral 
worldview and look at how a sense of threat and social tension empower these frames in 
the evangelical world.  In chapter 5, I examine the findings from my content analysis of 
the rhetoric of particular prominent conservative evangelical leaders and describe how 
these findings match up to the proposed model.  In chapter 6, I consider how the revised 
model is mobilized, asking questions about related issues and why they have not 
mobilized evangelicals in the same way.  I also assess two other key political issues for 
evangelicals (capital punishment and healthcare reform) and ask key questions about how 
(and whether) these relate to my model.  Finally, in chapter 7, I conclude by looking at 
the limitations and significance of the project as well as the implications for future study 










CHAPTER TWO:  CRISIS, CROSS, AND CONVERSION  
As subcultures define themselves, they create and maintain boundaries that 
delineate the guiding principles for the subculture and what makes “us” us, but also 
define themselves against other groups- and what makes “them” them.  The conservative 
evangelical subculture is no exception to this demarcation.  Clearly the evangelical right 
forms principles around religious belief and theology that determine us and them in the 
religious sphere within the broader American culture, but there has been much discussion 
and debate about how perspectives from conservative evangelicals’ religious sphere 
actually affect perspectives in the political sphere.  I believe that the theological tenets 
that underpin private evangelical thought are the central factors in shaping their public 
identities as well.  Understanding the evangelical right in America means understanding 
how American morality shapes and is shaped by the movement.  In Hellfire Nation, 
James A. Morone describes how the political intertwines with the moral and theological: 
“Political life constantly gets entangled in two vital urges – redeeming ‘us’ and reforming 
‘them’” (2003, 3).  In exploring how it shapes the molding of American citizens, he 
continues:  
But morality helps Americans answer those subversive questions at the heart of 
every community:  Who are we?  Who belongs?  Here’s where liberalism, 
community, and morality reach their American symbiosis.  Moral images set the 
boundaries around the liberal political process, around the American “us.”  (11) 
 
Through the eyes of some scholars, however, the theological distinctions of 
conservative evangelical church-goers stop at the congregational walls and these 
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perspectives do not flow directly into political and social commitments of conservative 
evangelical citizens.  These citizen activists are motivated more by pragmatic concerns 
and some sort of vulnerability to unexamined devotion to conservative political leaders’ 
agendas.  While I agree there may be some validity to the pragmatic motivations of 
conservative voters, it is my contention that for members of the evangelical right, 
theology is the center of their lives and is the heart of all they do and this theology shapes 
the entirety of their moral worldview.  For conservative evangelical believers, I argue that 
theology not only delineates us and them in the religious sphere, but also directly defines 
us and them in the political sphere.  While I will explore political mobilization, social 
boundaries, regional influence, and other factors in the rise of evangelical political 
influence, the exploration of theology will be central to my argument about how and why 
group boundaries are formed and mobilizing political issues develop.  I will argue that 
the moral worldview of politicized evangelical America emerges directly from many of 
these theological themes.  In this chapter, I will outline many of the central theological 
themes of conservative evangelicalism and describe how these themes overlapped with 
the emergence of evangelical leaders and their message in the rise of the New Religious 
Right. 
 Conservative evangelical theology truly centers around the word evangelical- it is 
based in “evangelizing” other people.  The English connotation of the original Greek root 
of the word is “good news”.  Good news about what?  Essentially, it is good news 
because the news is presented as a universal solution to a universal problem: the issue of 
human sinfulness.  In conservative evangelicalism, sinfulness is seen as a complete 
corruption of human nature by the imperfection of vices and disobedience to God, 
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especially those vices that violate historical Protestant piety in the sexual arena.  At its 
most base form, Protestant evangelism is about creating urgency about the totalizing 
crisis of human sin, a crisis identified and emphasized by a group of people through the 
Christian scriptures- and then presenting a universal solution to that problem.  David 
Bebbington summarizes the four elements of evangelical theology the best. He identifies 
four key elements of evangelical theology:  1) Biblicism; 2) Crucicentrism; 3) 
Conversion, and 4) Missionary Activity (Wellman 2008, 11).  Two of these elements 
(biblical authority and crucicentrism) build the intellectual case for the need for good 
news.  The other two elements (conversion and missionary activity) are about what to do 
with the good news once it is understood and intellectually accepted.   
Biblicism is the concept that the Christian Scriptures serve as sole authority for 
both belief and action.  Crucicentrism is the central focus on the belief in the sacrificial 
death of Jesus Christ on the cross as an atonement for the sin of humanity. Conversion 
entails the necessity for each person to make a personal choice to “follow” Christ in his 
or her full life.    Missionary activity brings the responsibility to share the pressing need 
for conversion with other individuals.  These four concepts encapsulate a moral 
worldview that ultimately hinges on the moral emergency of human sin and the need to 
eliminate this crisis in order to restore relationship with the purity and innocence of God.  
The cross is the strongest symbol of this two-sided message of crisis and solution.  As 
James Wellman notes: “What is the meaning of the cross?  What is the core consequence 
of Jesus’ life and death?  For evangelicals, the truth of Christ is the recognition of sin, the 
need of repentance, and the hope of salvation through the cross” (2008, 120).  In order to 
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understand the implications of Bebbington’s four themes for the moral worldview and 
political positions of evangelicals, I want to walk through each of them more fully. 
 
THE AUTHORITY OF THE BIBLE 
 The centrality of the Scripture was a central element of the Protestant 
Reformation, and evangelicals tend to hold to a very literal version of this doctrine of the 
central authority of the Bible.  For evangelicals, the Bible becomes a historical, factual 
document that is authoritative not only in matters of meaning, purpose, and philosophy, 
but also in matters of history, science, and reason.  George Marsden describes well this 
doctrine of the “final authority of Scripture” which emphasizes the “real, historical 
character of God’s saving work recorded in Scripture” (1984, ix-x).  These adjectives 
capture a lot of the sentiment in conservative evangelical culture: a personal commitment 
not only to God, but to the Bible being the final word in matters of moral authority in 
one’s life.  The Bible’s words are authoritative for guidance for moral ethics, and should 
extend into every area of one’s life.  Even though conservative evangelicals see these 
words as literally authoritative, they are in fact engaging in a process of interpretation 
that takes large parts of the Scripture literally, but not all of it.  They can acknowledge the 
poetic language in Psalms or Song of Solomon, and they can apply symbolism to textual 
analysis, particular in books like Revelation.  But they take Genesis and other chapters 
much more literally than other traditions, and they hold other evangelicals to a strict 
conformity to their method of interpretation.  Conservative evangelical insistence on 
adherence to “biblical” teachings (as interpreted by evangelical leaders and doctrine) 
make the belief system virtually unquestionable within the community.  As Randall 
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Balmer states, evangelicals tend to “define their position as ‘Christian’ or ‘biblical,’ and 
every other view as somehow less so” (2000, 7).  Other terms for this conservative 
evangelical worldview of the hyper-reliability of the Scriptures include the “inerrancy” or 
“infallibility” of the Bible- the perspective that it is a document that is (at least in its 
original form) without error regarding matters of faith, life, and salvation (Gallagher 
2003, 50).   Holding to a particular view of biblical authority is the first absolute among 
absolutes for evangelical life and leadership.  It is the initial distinguishing mark of us 
and them for the community, and the epistemic foundation for all of the other theological 
principles.  As Mark Noll notes in his chapter in the George Marsden edited book 
Evangelicalism and Modern America, “Evangelical Bible scholars live in Christian 
communities where fidelity to Scripture is both a badge of honor and an excuse for 
recrimination” (1984, 109).  Christian Smith tempers this slightly, saying that 
evangelicals “appeal primarily to the Bible and secondarily to their personal relationship 
with God” (Smith 1998, 24).  Smith does stress the absolute importance of theological 
orthodoxy for the evangelical population: a “right view of the Bible is the lynchpin of all 
theological orthodoxy” (25).   
 Biblical authority and theological orthodoxy work hand in hand to create an 
atmosphere where alternate points of view are not acceptable, and are in fact rejected 
actively and disciplined within the community.   In this sense, conservative evangelical 
interpretations of the scriptures serve as ways to enforce a particular order in both 
thinking and action.  It is no longer the leaders telling people how to act and what to think 
– it is God telling people how to act and what to think.  This transference of authority 
back and forth creates a devotion to orthodoxy among evangelicals that is passionate and 
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difficult to question intellectually.  By stating that certain biblical interpretations are 
absolute, the center of authority is very literally moved externally- to the Scriptures, and 
by extension to the spiritual leaders and to God.   
 External authority is very important to the evangelical mind and culture.  Morality 
needs to be grounded in something other than human reasoning – a reasoning from a 
human nature that they see as fully corrupted by human sin and prone to shifting on a 
whim.  They see God’s order – and the Bible as representative of this order – as eternally 
unchanging.  Throughout American history in times of cultural change and turmoil, the 
reflexive desire to hold on to the values of the past has emerged as a central theme in 
evangelical rhetoric.  From the Great Awakenings to the political activism of the New 
Religious Right, the call to return to the stability of God’s authority and order has found 
its clearest expression through appeals to the Scripture. 
How does the intense focus on biblical literalism affect the themes that 
evangelical right tends to emphasize?  The doctrine of biblical authority is particularly 
important because the moral worldview of the evangelical right tends to flow directly out 
of the narrative generated by a selection of literally-interpreted texts.  This textual 
literalism leans heavily on the numerous passages about the consequences of human 
imperfection and disobedience to God.  The conservative evangelical narrative 
selectively traces this theme of human sinfulness that is not acceptable to God.  The story 
of depravity and sin drives the worldview- and is unassailable by other sources of 
knowledge because the Bible is held as the ultimate and only authority.  Sin is the next 




THE CONCEPT OF SIN 
 If the Bible is the central authority for the evangelical right, then sin is the central 
theme derived from that authority.  Christian Smith points out in his research that 
evangelicals tend to be the “least likely to believe that humans are entirely good…and 
most likely to take the very strong view that humans are entirely sinful” (1998, 22).  
Sinfulness grounds the conservative evangelical understanding of humanity and what it 
means to be human.  It is a story told about the “problem” of the corruption of human 
nature- and one that is focused on individual decisions and responses to that problem.  
Morone highlights the Puritan – and neo-Puritan – emphasis on “controlling thyself” 
(2003, 17).  This emphasis on self-control is most clearly expressed in conservative 
Protestant (and particularly evangelical) obsessions with unacceptable expressions of sex 
as the most powerful sin.  As he says, “In short, neo-Puritans have always saved the 
hottest jeremiads for pelvic matters – carnality, gender roles, the well-regulated family, 
and the sex-race tangle” (Morone 2003, 17).  Wellman points out that evangelicals tend 
to approach sin from a place of individual shame and guilt – as opposed to more liberal 
Christians, who see sin as a problem of justice in social institutions (2008, 118).  For 
these evangelicals, then, the shame and guilt over sin translates to shame and guilt about 
sex, since sin tends to be viewed primarily through that lens. 
As the evangelical right re-emerged as the New Christian Right in the 1970s and 
1980s, their theological center was shaped around the sinfulness of the nation and 
protecting the family and “family values”.  Evangelical identity rooted itself in an 
ideology of sin and orderliness around the family – especially “a narrowly defined sexual 
morality, support for traditional gender hierarchies, and belief in the superiority of the 
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male-headed, nuclear family” (Fetner 2008, 8).  Sara Diamond echoes this, describing the 
Christian Right as a “social movement focused fairly narrowly on questions of proper 
family structure and ‘moral,’ that is, sexual behavior” (1998, 7). 
 The problem of sin is juxtaposed against the execution of Jesus as the perfect, 
sinless human being (and fully God as well) who was punished unjustly.  This all-or-
nothing juxtaposition of totally sinful humanity against totally innocent God shapes the 
theological worldview of evangelicals toward all human beings who have not chosen to 
accept the salvation narrative.  In other words, it defines “us” and “them” in a way that is 
entirely based on acceptance and adherence to the evangelical account of human guilt 
versus godly innocence.  Purity and innocence weave together in this narrative, especially 
in the sexual realm.  God’s purity and innocence are placed over the all-defining guilt of 
human nature, but only for those that accept the evangelical story about the nature of 
humanity and God.   
  In contrast to more liberal forms of Protestant Christianity, so much of the 
conservative evangelical concept of sin centers around individual responsibility for self-
purity and for taking care of one’s family, and not for corporate social responsibility to 
the community.  The concept of sin is about the individual’s choice to be disobedient to 
his or her God.  Group “thems” are about groups of individuals whose common 
commitments are to something that is seen as an individual sin in and of itself (e.g. 






THE NECESSITY OF PERSONAL CONVERSION 
 The problem of individual sin leads to the solution of atonement theology for 
conservative Protestants, and especially for evangelicals.  Guilt and shame lead to a need 
for salvation – a saving of the individual from the consequences of sin itself.  These 
premises demand from evangelicals a theology of payment for sin:  the death of Jesus on 
the cross substitutes for the death of the individual sinner (Wellman 2008, 118).  
Atonement theology is all about the response of the individual to the narrative of 
salvation.  In this sense, it is a focus on personal responsibility – or “response ability” to 
the salvific message and to God.  This is how the theme of personal responsibility wraps 
into the themes of biblical authority and theological orthodoxy.  For evangelicals, 
personal responsibility is not about thinking for oneself and challenging ideas in order to 
be responsible; the responsibility is completely centered around responding to Jesus’ 
sacrifice and the crucicentrist narrative. 
 The need for conversion is inseparable from the acceptance of the evangelical 
narrative about human sin.  It represents two sides of the same coin; the acceptance of the 
reality of sin and the cross is represented by the action to convert to a different worldview 
that should transform an individual’s entire life.  As Christian Smith comments: 
“distinction with the world is something more consistently lived and breathed by 
evangelicals, than consciously contemplated” (1998, 125).  The question is no longer 
what you want to do in life: it is a question of what God’s will for your life is.  
Evangelicals see themselves as called by God to convert from the former ways and 
follow a completely new path.  In many ways, this is why those individuals who have 
lived some of the most “sinful” lives in the past but converted to evangelical Christianity 
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are most celebrated in the community.  It is the contrast with the past human nature (now 
them) and the new identity (now us) that is most appreciated and most magnifying of the 
crucicentric narrative.  From personal conversion comes the need for more public and 




 The evangelical narrative of personal salvation comes together in the previous 
three themes: the universally-applicable message of the cross demands a personal 
response from every human and is cemented by a theologically orthodox interpretation of 
the Bible.  Once these propositions have been fully embraced by the evangelical mind, 
the need to make these beliefs public is just an extension of the message itself.  Wellman 
summarizes this well: “The evangelical moral worldview obligates those who believe in 
this core relationship to Jesus Christ to share this news with others – because it is the 
truth and it is the only truth that will save one’s soul” (2008, 200). 
 With the emergence of the New Religious Right, the private world of sin and the 
sinner became much more of public interest once again- just as it has in different times in 
American history.  Morone talks about this aspect of the “redeemer nation” and American 
politics: “moral politics rush into the private sphere, denying the boundary between 
public and private.  The lawgiver suddenly has everything to do with vice and virtue.  
Private behavior becomes a public problem” (2003, 10).  This interweaving of public and 
private spheres is essentially missionary activity as social action – a form of missionary 
activity intent on transforming the cultural landscape rather than just converting 
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individuals to be believers.  This two-pronged approach of personal evangelism 
interwoven with cultural change is central to the evangelical right resurgence in 
American politics.  Moral politics seems to work this way in the mindset of the 
evangelical right; they are simply an extension of the personal commitment to God and 
fighting against sin in the world.  This attitude of “pietism gone public” is very different 
from the social justice focus of liberal Christians.  The mentality is really applying 
individual moral expectations publicly, rather than reforming institutions to be more just 
in some fashion.   
 The shift toward a bold and unashamed partnership between personal evangelism 
and political advocacy has really come about as the evangelical subculture has become 
more embattled in the throes of cultural change.  The four elements of evangelical 
identity come together closely in symbolic markers with other groups, including other 
types of Christians.  As Christian Smith points out, “Evangelical boundaries with other 
types of Christians are most often drawn using the all-important symbolic markers of a 
‘personal relationship’ with Jesus Christ and obedience to the authority of the Bible” 
(1998, 124). 
 Building on biblical authority to make the case for the theology of sin and the 
cross, evangelicals easily transition to calls to action- conversion, evangelism, political 
advocacy, and cultural change.  It is seen as an extension of the call to take the good news 
into the world and transform it for God’s purposes.  The call is to purity, responsibility, 
action, and God’s order.  This order – and the implications for appropriate gender 




GENDER ROLES AND CONSERVATIVE EVANGELICALISM 
 Gender roles and the organization of families (and congregational leadership roles 
as well) in a more traditional Puritan fashion is a particularly important aspect for 
conservative evangelicals, and worth some additional attention.  Sally Gallagher points 
out that family has become a “central metaphor for evangelical identity” (2003, xi).  I 
agree strongly that family is at the center of the evangelical mind.  The ideal family 
archetype is a central symbol that animates evangelicals and their concept of social 
change as well as the preservation of their values.  She continues: “Ideas not only of the 
church as family but of a gendered order that resonates through all creation run deep 
within this tradition…it also reflects deep beliefs about the nature and person of God, the 
order of creation, and personal identity” (xi).   
 The authority and headship of the man in the household is one of the central 
organizing principles for conservative evangelical family structure.  Psychologist and 
author James Dobson is one of the principal figures shaping the theological positions on 
the subject.  Dobson has focused on financial responsibility, family decision-making, 
direction and supervision for all family members, and spiritual guidance for children as 
key roles to be carried out by the father.  As Gallagher notes, “Dobson unambiguously 
affirmed men’s leadership and authority.  Hierarchy is necessary for both the 
psychological and social well-being of the family” (2003, 54).  Dobson’s early works 
focused even more on the financial responsibility of the man for his family; but 
pragmatically, as more and more households have turned to two working parents due to 
income needs, Dobson has somewhat softened this position and turned attention to other 
aspects of male headship and leadership in the home.   
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 Gallagher summarizes the key responsibilities of this model of masculine home 
leadership: 
Although a small number of evangelicals reject the notion of husbands’ headship 
for a model of marriage based on egalitarian partnership, most evangelicals talk 
about a husband’s responsibility for family leadership as the foundation of 
evangelical family identity.  The cornerstone in that foundation is his 
responsibility for decision making.  In practice, husbands were described as being 
responsible for initiating and moderating family discussions, making final 
decisions, being primary decision makers, or casting the tie-breaking vote on 
difficult decisions.  (Gallagher 2003, 97) 
 
Sara Diamond identifies a moral order around hierarchies, especially gender hierarchies, 
as one of the key themes of conservative evangelicals (1995, 6).   
 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW RELIGIOUS RIGHT 
 So much of cultural change is about the cycle of action and reaction to perceived 
shifts in the cultural milieu.  The rise of the New Religious Right (largely led by 
evangelical leaders) is no exception.  The rise of the Right is in large part a reaction to the 
shift in sexual mores and the messages of personal liberation from traditional standards – 
and sources – of morality that emerged in the late 1960s.  As sexual exploration 
increased, both in bedrooms and in the public eye in the media, religious conservatives 
hunkered down in their moral bunkers and began to plan a counterattack to shore up the 
“family” values that they saw as under assault.  As they lost hegemony and perceived 
cultural power in the American landscape, they pushed back against shifting sexual 
mores and emphasized the permanence of puritanical biblical interpretations against the 
deluge of cultural change.  Much of the narrative highlighted events of social unrest and 
tried to fully identify cultural change in general with social chaos and a lack of order, 
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stoking fear in evangelical adherents who value order and propriety as a reflection of 
God’s purposes in society.  As the New Religious Right formed and grew, it centered 
around a new clarion call of the American Jeremiad- a call to repentance in the nation 
which identified chaos as a turning of God away from blessing a previously chosen 
nation (Bercovitch 1978, Morone 2003).  As previously discussed, this call came from a 
distinctly individual point of view- not a call to social justice or a change to structural 
inequities that one might see on the left; but rather, a call to individual purity and 
obedience to God that would allow God to forgive a nation as a whole for the sins of the 
time.  This narrative took every act of disorder, tumultuousness, and moral exploration or 
redefinition in the cultural landscape and redefined each of these events or perspectives 
as a reflection of God’s judgment on the nation for increasing levels of sinful living and 
rebellion against God’s ways.  This totalizing narrative found fertile psychological 
ground in the fears of individual evangelicals looking for certainty and stability in the 
midst of the seismic epistemic and moral shifts of modernity in the early 1970s.  As 
ethical values shifted to a more internal source, conservative evangelicals felt the need to 
buttress the bulwark of biblical authority against the rising tide of anti-authoritarian 
thinking. 
 As the media provided accounts of shifting morality and resistance to events like 
the Vietnam War, religious conservatives began to develop antipathy toward the 
individuals and groups represented in this pushback against traditional morality and the 
status quo.  While the primary identity for religious conservatives (and evangelicals in 
particular) had been a religious one, the call emerged to engage in political action to 
counter the moral slippage fueled by the perception of a leftward moving political sphere.  
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Since the cultural moral shift was framed as the consequence of a new threat – an 
assertive and unashamed political liberalism – religious leaders felt compelled to call for 
an equally assertive and unashamed political and moral response.  Leaders emerged 
(particularly leading evangelical pastors) to forge the message and lead a counter-
offensive campaign against the social change.  The conservative movement as a whole 
was caught up in this moral response to the winds of political change.  As Himmelstein 
notes, “The resurgent radicalism of the 1960s – black rebellion, the student movement, 
the counterculture, the opposition to the war in Vietnam – shattered the easy consensus 
that had dominated American politics since the mid-1950s” (1990, 70).  Particular 
theological and political leaders took the lead in shaping the moral agenda and message 
of the movement.  Some of the most influential leaders in the movement were Jerry 
Falwell, Pat Robertson, James Dobson, Ralph Reed, D. James Kennedy, Phyllis Schafly, 
Edwin Feulner, Jr, and Chuck Colson.  Falwell, Kennedy, and Robertson were all 
ministers who projected their messages toward transforming American politics and moral 
culture.  In addition, influential new leaders such as Richard Viguerie, Paul Weyrich, 
Howard Phillips, Jesse Helms, and John Terry Dolan spearheaded the overall rise of a 
new and more vibrant and influential political right (Himmelstein 1990).  The more 
political-minded wing of the New Right helped to forge populist political fervor together 
with evangelical political fervor for the beginnings of a potent coalition.  Turning the 
rhetoric of personal evangelism to the redemption of the public sphere, each of these 
figures helped to propel the movement forward.  The election of Ronald Reagan as US 
President in 1980 also emboldened the New Religious Right, as they gained more 
influence over potential Supreme Court picks and had a president who would give them 
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an audience.  Many evangelical leaders and followers switched allegiance from historical 
commitments to the Democratic party over to new commitments to the Republican party 
as the Republicans began to take up the mantle of evangelical social issues.  Himmelstein 
points out that the “broader moral resonances” of the social issues provided the most 
fertile environment for the New Religious Right to really take hold (1990, 108). 
 Through the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, the influence of the evangelical right grew, 
as figures such as Southern Baptist leader Al Mohler, presidential candidate Mike 
Huckabee, and President George W. Bush were endearing figures to evangelicals.  From 
direct mail strategies and mobilizing techniques, evangelicals set a pattern that liberals 
began to learn from as they organized to promote progressive social change (Fetner 
2008).  The mobilization efforts of evangelicals were remarkable and helped to propel the 
movement forward at a rate previously unseen.  What made the political mobilization 
ultimately successful?  In The Restructuring of American Religion, Robert Wuthnow 
states:   
At the same time that many influential elements in the mainline denominations 
were moving to the left, religious conservatives were quietly marshaling their own 
resources.  During the 1950s and 1960s an infrastructure was built that gave 
religious conservatives a strong set of interdenominational ties, a growing body of 
skilled leaders trained in evangelical colleges and seminaries, and increasing 
access to the media.  Much of this growth was made possible by the fact that 
evangelical leaders repudiated the earlier separatism and sectarianism of 
fundamentalism and its tendencies toward militancy and anti-intellectualism.  By 
the early 1970s, evangelicals had emerged as a distinct segment of the American 
religious community and had attracted an increasing number of persons who were 
dissatisfied with the trends at work in the more established denominations.  
However, this growth also subjected the evangelical community to influences 
from the larger culture.  And it responded in ways that were to alter its public role 




By using new techniques being developed in the broader secular culture, religious and 
political leaders harnessed the power of grassroots change in order to promote the agenda 
of a return to Judeo-Christian values.  Fledgling organizations such as James Dobson’s 
Focus on the Family grew exponentially and were able to use their mailing lists to 
coordinate grassroots contacts by members to all levels of state and national government 
on specific legislation.  This highly effective technique magnified the influence of the 
movement regardless of their actual numbers, even though these were substantial. 
 
THE RHETORIC OF SOCIAL CHANGE 
 The rise of the New Religious Right – and the evangelical influence within it – 
flowed out of a fear of cultural change, framed around the idea of the destruction of the 
family (or their idealized version of it).  Conservative evangelicals responded to this fear 
by returning to themes embedded in their theology:  the authority of the Bible, a public 
pietism, a call to personal responsibility, and a reclamation of God’s order (and 
obedience to this order).  In the next chapter, I will put forward a hypothesis of what 
these themes are and how they connect directly to the principle animating social issues 
for conservative evangelicals:  same-sex marriage and abortion.  I will make an argument 
that these themes form ideological frames that guide the political worldview of the 
evangelical right, and I will trace how these frames shape the formation of the identity of 









CHAPTER THREE:  SHIFTING CONFORMITY THEORY AND THE 
EVANGELICAL CYCLE OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION 
  The theological beliefs of the evangelical right drive the daily lives of the 
members in the pews.  They help to give purpose and meaning to the spiritual path of 
these parishioners.  But the question remains:  How do the theological commitments of 
conservative evangelicals influence their political perspectives?  In examining this 
question, several other questions emerge.  How do culture, theology, and political 
viewpoint interrelate?  What view of culture best describes how the theological tenets of 
conservative evangelicals suffuse their lives?  How do conservative evangelicals view the 
people, groups, and institutions they come in contact with?   
In this chapter, I will postulate a model that attempts to explain the moral 
worldview of the evangelical right and how dedicated political commitments emerge 
from this worldview.  I will look at the symbolic boundaries that protect the cultural 
commitments of conservative evangelicals and how these boundaries bend and shift.  In 
doing this, I will interlace sociological perspectives on cultural identity formation 
(Wellman, Swidler, Smith & Emerson, Stark, Emerson & Smith), postulate ideological 
frames that emerge from conservative evangelical theology, propose ideal types (Weber) 
that adhere to these frames, and examine the engagement strategies use to apply these 




MORAL WORLDVIEW AND SUBCULTURAL IDENTITY 
In framing my model, I am using a particular concept of culture proposed by 
James Wellman in Evangelical vs. Liberal (2008).  Wellman’s model looks at subcultures 
from the point of view of their moral worldview.  He defines a moral worldview as “a 
narrative system of symbols that guides and shapes action and produces truth claims” 
(35).  Wellman sees religion itself as a force that is constantly creating and negotiating 
social and symbolic boundaries, and this process forms tensions and ends up including 
and excluding people and groups of people (34).  For this view of culture, subcultures are 
defined as embodying a “distinctive moral worldview with values, actions, and goals” 
(25).  The conservative evangelical subculture is very effective at drawing and redrawing 
these social boundaries in a way that develops and highlights relational tension.  In other 
words, the moral worldview not only shapes ethics and values for the subculture but 
draws the clear symbolic boundary lines between who is in – and who is out. 
Wellman uses the term evangelical to describe conservative Protestant 
parishioners, but I argue that the term tends to be too broad due to the diversity of self-
identifying evangelical church-goers.4  I prefer the term conservative evangelicals as a 
more exacting description – referring to the theological conservatism of the largely white 
unified subculture.  David Bebbington’s (1989) quadrilateral provides a clear delineation 
                                                
4 James Wellman uses the term evangelical as “the overarching term for conservative 
Protestant church-goers, to include Pentecostal and charismatic Christians as well as 
Christians in the American fundamentalist tradition” (2008, p. 8). I use the term 
conservative evangelical or evangelical right similarly to David Gushee’s (2008) 
description of the evangelical right/center in American politics. 
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of attributes that distinguish the key theological tenets of this subculture.  Bebbington’s 
quadrilateral delineates four beliefs emphasized in evangelicalism:  
Biblicism (seeing the Scriptures as the sole authority for belief and action), 
crucicentrism (the belief in Christ’s sacrifice on the cross as atonement for human 
sin), conversion (the need for a personal decision to follow Jesus Christ), and 
missionary activity (the obligation to share with others this need for conversion).  
(Wellman 2008, 11) 
 
I argue that the evangelical right maintains high conformity around interpretations of 
these four beliefs, bringing interpretations of the Bible and the cross into their 
sociopolitical views.5  
I utilize Wellman’s concept of the moral worldview and draw on two other key 
sociological theories in my approach:  Smith and Emerson’s (1998) subcultural identity 
theory and Ann Swidler’s (1986) theory of the cultural tool kit.  In American 
Evangelicalism:  Embattled and Thriving (1998), Christian Smith suggests a theory that 
seeks to explain the strength of evangelical Protestantism in American culture.  He claims 
that evangelicalism flourishes in an embattled atmosphere, thriving “on distinction, 
engagement, tension, conflict, and threat” (Smith & Emerson, 1998, p. 89).  In 
subcultural identity theory, constructed and reinforced cultural boundaries function to 
help portray other groups as threats to the existence of the conservative evangelical 
subculture, which produces deep tension within it (Smith & Emerson 1998, 97).   
                                                
5 While “end times” eschatology is an important feature for some portions of the 
evangelical right, major groups such as the Southern Baptist Convention place very little 
emphasis on eschatology in their primary theological teachings.  Because this theological 
element is not central to a large number of conservative evangelicals, I have not included 
it as a principal identifying aspect. 
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In the cultural tool kit theory, Ann Swidler claims that people have different 
cultural tools from their experiences choose the tools to use that best fit a particular 
situation:6   
The symbolic experiences, mythic lore, and ritual practices of a group or society 
create moods and motivations, ways of organizing experience and evaluating 
reality, modes of regulating conduct, and ways of forming social bonds, which 
provide resources for constructing strategies of action.  (Swidler 1986, 284)7   
 
Since conservative evangelicals develop a mobilizing tension by portraying 
themselves as embattled victims of “them” (various versions of the outside, attacking 
culture), they create a continual sense of threat from those outside of their cultural 
boundaries – a sense of threat that is sustained by the continual anxiety-producing 
rhetoric of elites.   This sense of continually unsettled embattledness is interwoven into a 
rhetoric of victimization from the evangelical right:  a belief that these communities are 
actually victims of a hostile secular American culture (Watson 1997).  I combine 
                                                
6 Wellman claims that his “onion” model of evangelical identity differs from Swidler’s 
toolkit model, but they are not necessarily incompatible.  When you take into account the 
limited number of cultural tools available to each individual, Swidler’s model can 
complement the onion model of culture rather than present a completely different 
perspective of culture. 
 
7 While Swidler’s theory works well for most cultural settings, she also makes a key 
distinction in her article, asserting that the cultural tool kit model works differently in 
different periods of time.  In times of settled lives, “cultural resources are diverse…and 
normally groups and individuals call upon these resources selectively, bringing to bear 
different styles and habits of action in different situations” (Swidler, 1986, p. 280).  
However, when times are “unsettled” and tumultuous, ideological activism can take 
priority, creating a mobilizing tension that enables culture to directly shape systematic 
habits of action, seeking not multiple answers, but “one unified answer to the question of 
how human beings should live.  In conflict with other cultural models, these cultures are 
coherent because they must battle to dominate the world-views, assumptions, and habits 
of their members” (Swidler, 1986, p. 279).  Emerson and Smith further build on 
Swidler’s framework of the cultural “toolkit” in Divided by Faith, delineating particular 
cultural tools that evangelicals employ. 
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Swidler’s insight about the difference between unsettled and settled lives with Smith’s 
theory of subcultural identity in order to support my thesis that ideological frames shape 
the conservative evangelical political worldview:  it is a continually unsettled subculture 
wherein ideology is frequently enlisted as a means of creating tension.  Those who attend 
church on a regular basis tend to be most connected to the ideological frames emerging 
from this subculture due to the level of exposure to the ideology they regularly receive.   
The moral worldview of the evangelical right is deeply rooted in specific concepts 
of biblical interpretation and literalism.  While regional, racial, and gender differences 
certainly make an impact on the subculture, I argue that theology is at the root of most of 
the cultural boundary lines that emerge – and that ideological “frames” that emerge from 
the theology are the key to understanding the alignment of political views within the 
subculture.  Same-sex marriage and abortion emerge as pivotal issues for evangelical 
right because of how theology is interpreted.  I assert that these issues come to the 
forefront of the evangelical right subculture because the issues signify complete 
nonconformity to three ideological frames that shape the subculture’s moral worldview.  I 
propose three ideological frames:  1) moral purity/innocence (Balmer 1989, Diamond 
1998, Liebman, et al 1993, Marsden 1990, B. Moore 2000, Morone 2003, Watson 1997, 
Wills 1990), 2) personal responsibility (Emerson & Smith 2000, Himmelstein 1990, 
Morone 2003, Watson 1997), and 3) obedience to authority (Bartkowski 1995, 
Bartkowski & Ellison 1995, Bartkowski 2000, Hunter 1987, Hunter 1991, Wilcox 1992), 
due to the theological significance and cultural inculcation of these ideas in the 





The emphasis on moral purity in the evangelical right, especially around 
sexuality, connects with roots deep in the Protestant reformation, including reformers like 
John Calvin.  In Moral Purity and Persecution in History (2000), Barrington Moore 
examines the important connection between Christianity (particularly Calvinism), 
sexuality, and persecution.  Moore shows how Protestant reformer John Calvin wraps the 
concept of moral purity in the practice of sexuality: 
In his major text Calvin devoted a great deal of attention to the concept of purity.  
He did so in very much the same way as the Old Testament.  In both, purity had to 
do mainly with sex.  Religiously approved sexual behavior was pure; so was 
virginity or complete continence, according to Calvin… ‘(God) requires of us 
purity and chastity.’  Thus purity and chastity are synonymous.  (B. Moore 2000, 
p. 36) 
 
Moore points to the biblical figure of Adam as an image of evil for Calvinism, a 
man corrupted from moral purity by giving in to temptation in the Garden of Eden.  
Moore compares this to Catholic understandings (in the Hugenots), identifying similar 
discourse around moral purity and how this discourse encourages hatred and persecution 
of those identified as impure.  Conservative evangelicals embrace the focus on sexual 
purity and tend to demonize and exclude those whom they identify as outside that moral 
and social boundary.  The singularity of belief as a form of purity of thought, and the 
singularity of moral action in sexual purity are very important to maintaining the 
boundaries of the subculture. 
Sara Diamond (1998) talks about the close connection between images of pure 
sexuality and the conservative evangelical worldview directly.  One of her most potent 
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examples involves the male evangelical group “Promise Keepers.”  In reviewing some of 
their literature, she addresses the issue:  
Another article by a Christian psychology professor titled ‘Sex under Control’ 
assures readers that ‘most Christian men face a lifelong struggle controlling their 
sexuality.’  He notes that the use of pornography, sexual fantasies, and 
masturbation are particularly difficult to avoid.  (Diamond 1998, 232)   
 
The obsession with eliminating sexual fantasies and sins that begin in the mind permeates 
the evangelical literature for men.  Diamond points out that the messages create an issue 
for the evangelical men involved in Promise Keepers: “Archaic attitudes about sex set the 
Promise Keepers far afield from the secular culture and make it inevitable that PK men 
will have to struggle to repress their responses to ubiquitous sexual imagery” (232). 
Diamond relates the need to control sexuality – and families – to the opposition to 
same-sex relationships.  Thoughts about sexuality need to be controlled, by both men and 
authority figures – which tend to be one and the same.  She puts it this way: “Variability 
in family relations means that the behavior and thoughts of men and women – especially 
women – cannot be tightly controlled by central authority” (1998, 172).  In this example, 
she links sexual purity and authority in the evangelical mind.  This is a frequent theme in 
much of conservative evangelical rhetoric and literature. 
 
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The concept of personal responsibility and accountability to God for individual 
actions is at the heart of much of conservative evangelical theology.  Emerson and Smith 
(2000) talk about this in their concept of accountable freewill individualism: “White 
conservative Protestants are accountable freewill individualists.  Unlike progressives, for 
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them individuals exist independent of structures and institutions, have freewill, and are 
individually accountable for their own actions.” (76-77)   In this brand of evangelical 
theology, the individual is totally responsible for his or her own sins, and conservative 
evangelicals tend to always interpret social ills as distinctly individual problems; issues 
that can only be solved by individual changes and individual strategies for making 
change.  I argue that conservative evangelicals essentially see not only individual people, 
but also organizations, groups, and nations as individuals as well.  Thus, these institutions 
or groups can be evaluated through the same lens of individual personal responsibility. 
The lens can even turn to an unborn human being.  While it may seem odd to refer 
to the fetus as “responsible,” I take the concept of responsibility and project it to the 
evangelical understanding of the “unborn child.”  This connects to George Lakoff’s 
discussion of responsibility related to the “strict father morality” of the conservative 
religious worldview presented in Moral Politics (2002) and Don’t Think of an Elephant 
(2004).  He links conservative morality (using an analysis of James Dobson’s rhetoric) to 
the concept of appropriate “dependence” and “independence” – total dependence for the 
youngest children building to independence in maturity as an adult.  Being independent 
(and rebellious) as a child is considered immoral and irresponsible (and a rebellion 
against God’s ways); in the same way, being dependent as an adult is considered immoral 
and irresponsible (Lakoff relates this to conservative attitudes about social programs).  
Thus, there is a sense of appropriate dependence within the concept of personal 





OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 
One part of obedience to authority is the need to conform to the tenets of a 
specific belief system in order to gain acceptance into a cultural community.  Literally 
understood as “right belief,” orthodoxy has played a major role in the development of 
most of the major world faiths, especially in the monotheistic ones.  Rodney Stark 
examines the importance of conformity and orthodoxy in monotheism, pointing out how 
Christian claims against the heretics and the Jews waxed and waned throughout the 
Church’s history, depending on the level of demands for conformity and orthodoxy at the 
time (2001, 157).  Demands for orthodoxy permeate various expressions of Christian 
theology in the West, especially in conservative evangelicalism (Bebbington 1989, 
Diamond 1998, Hunter 1987, Morone 2003, Smith & Emerson 1998) and also in more 
marginal militant movements such as the Christian Identity movement (Burlein 2002).  
Orthodoxy permeates the history of monotheism in particular, and conservative 
evangelical theology tends to focus heavily on the jealousy of the monotheistic God.  
The image of God as the heavenly “father” brings in the aspect of gender roles 
into the structure of obedience.  The role of the child is focused around dependence 
within the conservative evangelical family structure.  Absolute obedience to parents and 
is sacrosanct in conservative evangelical childhood education.  Patterns of discipline are 
designed to inculcate the child with a need for evangelical values and acceptance, and, 
ultimately, create a need for personal salvation.   
Bartkowski and Ellison point out that one of the central features of evangelical 
parenting is the “belief that human nature – including the nature of children – is 
fundamentally sinful, and the related concern with punishment and salvation” (1995, 22).  
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In the conservative evangelical parent-child relationship, authority is what matters and 
independent thought is a threat to authority.  Moral authority is found in the biblical text, 
and respect for the authority of parents is understood to be connected to the development 
of respect for authority outside the home.  Children must learn respect for authority in 
order to respect “superiors” outside the family, and also for them to be able to operate as 
“superiors” in future leadership roles (Bartkowski 1995).  While Gallagher (2003) and 
Wilcox (1998) have discussed some shifts in gender roles as well as “positive 
encouragement” aspects of conservative evangelical parenting styles, the structured 
patriarchy of the model family remains central to the conservative evangelical worldview.  
The principal responsibility for conservative evangelical children is obedience; obedience 
to God, and obedience to parents as the way to show obedience to God.  Maintaining 
obedience is the way to maintain order; and the maintenance of order is central to the 
evangelical worldview. 
Conservative evangelical gender hierarchy is about the preservation of the 
traditional family structure in a world that is seen through the lens of sin and chaos.  
Personal stories of conversion to the faith are framed around a realization of “the 
disconnection of culture and society from God’s order for the world” (Brasher 1998, 38).  
The subculture becomes a shield against the sin and disobedience of the outside world. 
Evangelical leaders focus on the immorality of the demise of the family structure:  
The traditional family and marriage as defined from the dawn of time are among 
the few institutions that have, in fact, stood the test of time.  If we now choose to 
stand idly by while these institutions are overthrown, the family as it has been 
known for millennia will be gone.  And with its demise will come chaos such as 
the world has never seen before.  (Dobson 2004, 18)  
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The focus on masculine, authoritarian leadership extends to congregations; 
conservative evangelicals take the gender hierarchy seriously enough to not allow women 
ministers or leaders in their pulpits, particularly where strict biblical literalism reigns 
supreme (Balmer 1989, 23).  The desire to challenge God’s ordained order is seen as an 
affront to biblical and divine authority by conservative evangelicals, and this affront is 
the essence of independent disobedience when God is calling for dependent obedience.   
 
SHIFTING CONFORMITY THEORY 
Taking into account the three ideological frames, I make the case that 
nonconformity to these frames is not a binary:  it is one option of three, which results in 
shifting conformity to a subcultural identity.  While western Protestant thought tends 
toward dualistic formulations, the theological evangelism of the evangelical right works 
so diligently toward the conversion of “the other” to the conservative evangelical 
worldview it complicates the way dualism is understood.  While Christian Smith’s theory 
describes subcultural identity theory as having a dualistic, “us vs. them” boundary 
system, my theory sees a more complex interaction pattern with the public sphere.8  I 
argue that ideological frames do guide action, and that nonconformity to these frames is 
but one option of three.  My model suggests that, instead of a strictly dualistic set of 
choices, the element of potentiality relating to the centrality of the evangelistic mission 
necessitates that evangelicals have three different classification categories that govern 
                                                
8 I also agree with Sally Gallagher (2003) that ideology restricts the cultural tools that can 
be chosen by evangelicals, but I describe how ideological frames guide the process in a 
different way than her description.   
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their actions toward other individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions in the public 
sphere.  I designate these categories as:  1) conforming (or honorable), 2) 
nonconforming (or shameful), and 3) potentially conforming (or redeemable).  These 
three categories are distinct from one another, but a reclassification of individuals, 
institutions, organizations, or groups is continually occurring among the categories.  The 
classification categories serve as mental symbolic boundaries for designating the 
difference between the self and the other.  This three-part delineation is similar to Eviatar 
Zerubavel’s (1993) three “sectors” for social segregation/social exclusion in The Fine 
Line.  In Zerubavel’s concept, social boundaries for moral acts or group inclusion are set 
between the appreciated/included, the indifferent/tolerable, and the intolerable/excluded.  
Zerubavel uses examples of particular sexual acts as moral boundaries that vary 
depending on group identity.   
Individuals, institutions, or groups can be seen as not conforming to norms of 
purity, responsibility or obedience, but yet still redeemable in the future.  The future 
potentiality allows the other to be viewed in a favorable light as a target of evangelistic 
endeavor rather than someone or something to be avoided.  Once there is active 
resistance seen to the conversion of worldview, however, the other is likely to shift into 
the nonconforming, or shameful, category.  This wraps the concept of shame (and innate 
badness of self) into being different from the dominant subculture.  Nonconforming 
people or groups tend to be shunned by evangelicals, and defensiveness overshadows the 
proclivity to evangelize these individuals.  Conforming people or groups are accepted 
into the community readily due to the cohesion in worldview to the ideological frames.    
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Figure 1:  Ideological Frames and Shifting Conformity 
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From the ideological frames, how do we determine which issues get magnified in 
the political and moral arena?  While institutions, groups, and individuals are classified, 
how do public issues come to the forefront of the evangelical mind?  The key to this 
designation is understanding the centrality of the heteronormative family archetype to the 
evangelical mind.  Evangelicals see the family as the basic building block of social 
structure, the most sacred institution in the eyes of God, and the most important goal of 
social change.  Preservation of an idealized form of family is the central story of 
conservative evangelical thought.  So the questions to ask regarding the ideological 
frames of conservative evangelicals are reflected best in figure 2 below: 
 
Figure 2:  Conformity and Issue Selection 
 
IDEAL TYPES AND THE CYCLE OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION 
 By asking questions around adherence and deviance from moral norms as well as 
the level of existential threat, we can begin to determine which issues will emerge as the 



















as the seminal issues on the evangelical right?  I propose that there are particular 
discursive symbols within the rhetoric around these topics that function as “ideal types” 
relating to the idealized family norm for conservative evangelicals (Weber 1949).  These 
are:  the unborn child, the homosexual, and the institution of marriage.  I contend that 
each of these symbols or ideas is socially constructed by the evangelical right and aligns 
with my proposed ideological frames – as either an ideal positive or ideal negative 
symbol of family morality.  I suggest that in the conservative evangelical mind, the 
unborn child signifies a complete purity and innocence, responsibility, and obedience to 
(dependence on) God.  The fetus, or unborn child, then, takes on an almost “holy” 
position in the moral worldview of conservative evangelicals.   An abortion of an unborn 
child is then seen to be the destruction of something truly holy, pure, godly, and the most 
valuable life to be preserved – and from this perspective, the most offensive act of the 
destruction of life that is possible.   
On the other hand, the homosexual (and relationships between homosexuals) 
signifies complete impurity, shamefulness, irresponsibility, and disobedience to God to 
the conservative evangelical mind.  It is the binary opposite of the kind of holy lifestyle 
conservative evangelicals believe that they are called to live.  This relates to the third and 
final symbol, the institution of marriage, which signifies a structure that transforms what 
would be impure, shameful, irresponsible, and disobedient acts (outside of heterosexual 
marriage) into a sexuality that is completely pure, innocent, responsible, and obedient to 
God.  Through this symbol system, marriage essentially becomes a force for the 
sanctification of heterosexual sexuality – a “baptism” of sex that makes it instantly pure 
after the ceremonial exchanging of vows before God.  From this perspective, the union of 
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a same-sex couple is seen as a violation of the very function of marriage regarding 
sexuality.  It is seen as a perversion of the holiness and purpose of the marriage bed.   
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the ideal types in relation to the frames as applied to the 




























Figure 4:  Ideal Types and Active Threats 
I contend that these three ideal types of the ideological frames are the reason that same-
sex marriage and abortion have become the central political issues for the evangelical 
right. The symbols of the unborn child and the institution of marriage represent the 
closest pictures of the ideal family as framed by innocence, purity, obedience, and 
responsibility.  The symbol of the homosexual (in juxtapostion to marriage) or the 
physical threat of fetal annihilation provide the highest levels of threat.  Combining these 
elements mobilizes the evangelical right, then, around same-sex marriage and abortion as 
the preeminent political issues. Emerging from the theology to ideological frames, the 





















 Ultimately, these elements all come together to form a cycle of political 
mobilization around public issues that resonate with the ideal family archetype. The 
evangelical mind assesses issues through the lens of the ideal form of family, embodied 
in the three ideological frames of moral purity/innocence, personal responsibility, and 
obedience to authority.  This image of family, combined with salient public issues, 
becomes a litmus test for the definition of the self and the other, as expressed by the 
trinary categories of us, them, and potentially us.  As perceived shifts in conformity by an 
individual, group, or institution occur, then that classification is re-evaluated.  Ultimately, 
those issues that continue to be assessed and re-assessed as most closely adhering to the 
ideological frames and the family archetype continue the cycle of mobilization.  Figure 5 
below illustrates this process.   
 


















CLASSIFICATION AND DIFFERING ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES   
After classification of the self and the other, what patterns of engagement do 
evangelicals use to determine their actions?  The patterns of action members of the 
subculture make toward others vary.  The evangelical penchant for a posture of individual 
conversion means that there is not indifference to the potentially conforming, but instead, 
there is an active engagement in conversion strategies.  This emphasis on prospective 
conversion to conformity affects the cultural tools that evangelicals choose in relation to 
individuals, groups, or institutions that are designated as potentially conforming.  In other 
words, the categories serve two functions:  1) they enforce orthodoxy to the ideological 
frames, and 2) they differentiate potential candidacy for orthodoxy to these frames.   
Utilizing engagement strategies of inclusion, exclusion, or conversion, members 
of the evangelical right unconsciously classify and react toward individuals, groups, and 
institutions within the broader culture.  In relation to external (meaning non-evangelical 
or non-Christian) individuals, groups, or institutions, one’s view of oneself is always 
considered as conforming to ideological frames.   
Inside the pews of the evangelical church, classification of both the individual self 
and the other can still shift between the categories.  Evangelicals relate experiences of 
incredible love and compassion within a church community.  When they are inside their 
community, evangelical believers focus on the idea that “all have sinned” and that no one 
has “arrived” yet; humility is preached toward other Christians.  Therefore, within the 
community, both the self and the other are seen as potentially conforming, allowing for 
tremendous grace to be offered for slips of sinfulness.  This dynamic also explains the 
differences in reaction when ministers are caught in acts of “sin,” versus those outside the 
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church caught in similar acts who become targets of vitriol by the evangelical 
community.   
What is seen as hypocrisy by some outside the church is in fact a shift of 
classification – for both the self and the other.  In this way, a compassionate response to 
the internal sinner, but not the external one, is entirely consistent to the evangelical mind.  
In cases where the other is considered conforming or redeemable, inclusion is warranted. 
In cases where the other is considered potentially conforming, conservative evangelicals 
utilize a strategy of conversion toward the other.   
For example, when conservative evangelicals are attempting to evangelize other 
individuals, they consider themselves to be conforming, while the other individuals are 
only potentially conforming.  Groups such as Jews and Catholics are typically seen as 
potentially conforming, necessitating a conversion strategy that allows for some common 
purpose.  This also illustrates how groups can shift within the evangelical worldview; in 
the past, conservative evangelicals frequently considered Catholics to be nonconforming, 
reflecting a historical shift from conservative evangelical hostility toward Catholics to an 
agenda of common political attitudes and goals with Catholic groups on some issues 
(Wuthnow 1988).   
In cases where the other is considered nonconforming, conservative evangelicals 
utilize one of two strategies:  active exclusion (strategies including strong disparagement, 
political attack, etc.) or passive exclusion (strategies including withdrawal, non-
engagement, or potential group separatism).  For instance, when conservative 
evangelicals encounter an individual who is strongly committed to a cause they 
vehemently oppose, they will frequently reclassify the other individual from potentially 
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conforming to nonconforming and seek to either disassociate with the person (passive 
exclusion) or express strong opposition to them (active exclusion).   
Alternate engagement strategies also offer new insight into differences in 
conservative evangelical views toward the government.  Separatist conservative 
evangelical groups tend to view governmental institutions as totally nonconforming 
(passive exclusion); while groups in the New Christian Right engage forcefully in 
political advocacy (conversion) in order to redeem a potentially conforming 
institution.  This explains how different conservative evangelical groups with similar 
theologies can reach very different conclusions about political engagement.  Figure 6 
illustrates the different engagement strategies in relation to categorization. 
 





































Christian Smith (1998) argues that one of the distinctions between 
fundamentalists and evangelicals is that fundamentalists withdraw from social and 
political activism while evangelicals consistently engage.  I disagree with his assessment.  
As I have detailed here, evangelicals both engage and withdraw, but this engagement is 
based on decision-making that is largely dependent upon their current classification for 
the individual, group, or institution they are considering.  This is an important distinction 
in my perspective of the evangelical moral worldview. 
 
TENSION AND CONFLICT 
 The fact that the evangelical right is so driven by a sense of victimhood from the 
outside culture means that no matter what political losses come in the arena of same-sex 
marriage or abortion, it simply motivates conservative evangelicals to fight for the cause 
even more passionately.  Each loss of social hegemony further underscored the narrative 
of being under moral assault.  While the cultural tools for fighting back may vary, 
especially by region of the United States, the sense of embattledness continues to spur on 
the resistance to the advance of same-sex or abortion rights.  The victimhood and 
grievances of the evangelical right have been a rallying cry to nurture the sense of threat 
around same-sex marriage and abortion as issues for action.   
 In the next chapter, I take a deeper look at the ideological frames, what they 
mean, and how they relate to political mobilization for evangelicals.  I particularly relate 
these to the sense of social crisis that pervades the evangelical subculture and how the 









CHAPTER FOUR:  WHEN THEOLOGY BECOMES IDEOLOGY 
 
The moral decline of a nation that was once great and blessed by God – this is a 
core message seen in the rhetoric of the leading figures in the evangelical right over the 
last several decades.  It is a call to arms to defend morality, virtue, and right living in the 
face of an advancing and insipid immorality that threatens Christianity and the nation as a 
whole.  This selective call back to the Bible and to biblical authority continues to lead 
conservative evangelicals to church on a regular, often weekly basis.  These strong and 
committed believers have flocked to churches and mega-churches where I believe a 
transformation has taken place; theology has directly transformed into political ideology.  
In this chapter, I will explore in more depth my hypothesis about the ideological frames 
that I believe are at work in the mind of the 21st century conservative evangelical. 
 What is an ideological frame?  As mentioned in Chapter 1, Soper captures the 
concept of ideology well when he defines ideology as the set of “values, ideas and beliefs 
which gives meaning to the social experiences of adherents, defines group objectives and 
legitimates group formation” (1994, 1-2).  Ideological frames, then, are a set of thought 
frames that guide and limit the choices available to the mind and are structured out of 
these values, ideas, and beliefs.  They direct and restrict the number of rational choices 
for the committed evangelical, in this case, to choices that follow directly from the 
translated theological values.  I argue that these frames take theological belief and guide 
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it directly over into political belief and political action related to same-sex marriage and 
abortion.   
I believe that the focus of political action by members of the evangelical right is 
governed by three ideological frames which dominate their way of viewing the world.  
These frames are:  1) moral purity/innocence, 2) personal responsibility, and 3) obedience 
to authority.  I contend that both important issue selection and level of political passion 
are directly tied to these frames, which are derived from theological themes embedded in 
the conservative evangelical core religious worldview. 
While I touched briefly on the three proposed frames in Chapter 3, I will explore 
them much more fully in this chapter, before moving on to test and examine whether 
these hypothesized frames may be present in evangelical rhetoric in Chapter 5, especially 
related to the subjects of same-sex marriage and abortion. 
 
A NATION UNDER THREAT  
To look at America today is to witness a nation struggling against forces as 
dangerous as any military foe it has ever faced.  The threats, however, come not 
from without but from within.  Families are disintegrating, fathers are abandoning 
their children, abortion is the most common medical procedure in the nation, and 
young people attend schools that are not safe and in which they do not learn.  In 
the inner city illegitimacy is rampant, drug deals are openly conducted on 
streetcorners, hopelessness is the norm, and children are shot by marauding 
carloads of juvenile gang members. (Reed 1996, 9) 
 
In this quote from Active Faith, early Christian Coalition leader Ralph Reed perfectly 
captures the embattled tenor of rhetoric from the evangelical right over the last 35 years.  
The narrative of national decline and departure from the ways of God permeates pulpits 
and political speeches on the right.  In the passage above, we see multiple pieces of this 
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narrative of internal threat:  the disintegration of the traditional family and a rebellion 
against conformity to God’s ways and order in the family; the loss of safety for our 
children; a reference to “illegitimacy” as a catch-all for personal irresponsibility in both 
sexual activity and parenting; a focus on the failure of fathers in the patriarchal order (as 
ordained by God), as they abandon children.  Reed paints a bleak picture of American 
culture that serves as a foundational and fearful narrative that fuels the Christian 
Coalition’s agenda for reforming America through the political system.   
In this brief excerpt, we see all three of the themes I propose are ideological 
frames for the evangelical right.  The loss of moral purity and innocence in the culture is 
the major theme of this passage.  References to abandonment of children and illegitimacy 
highlight the theme of personal responsibility and how the evangelical right paints all 
social issues as issues of personal shortcoming.  And the focus on the breakdown of 
society, the disintegration of the family, and the importance of masculinity and 
fatherhood points to an overarching patriarchal narrative:  peace comes when there is 
obedience to God’s ordained structures and authority (family, church) and chaos results 
when there is rebellion against God’s ways and God’s ordained authorities.  I move on to 
look closer at these three hypothesized frames now:  moral purity/innocence, personal 
responsibility, and obedience to authority.  
 
THE LOSS OF INNOCENCE 
 America’s loss of innocence, holiness, righteousness, and moral purity is perhaps 
the greatest message of the day from both theological and political leaders on the 
evangelical right.  Within this conservative evangelical imperative, perhaps the most 
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prevalent tendency is the need to execute sexual control – control over the sexual choices 
– and orientations – of religious adherents in the churches.  This God-given demand for 
moral purity saturates the messages from evangelical pulpits on a weekly basis.  
American evangelical Christianity has a strong tradition which emphasizes the need to 
continually control and repress the natural human impulse for sexual activity.  A 
biblically-framed battle between the “spirit” and the “flesh” is a frequent theme of 
evangelical sermons and translates into sex education messages at home for evangelical 
children as well as sex education school curriculum battles across the nation, and 
particularly in the Bible Belt.   The themes of sin and repentance continually get viewed 
through the lens of sexuality- while there may be other sins and transgressions that 
humans do against a holy God, in the theology of the evangelical right, that divine 
holiness tends to be viewed as an ideal type of sexual purity.   
In politics, the tradition of the American Jeremiad shows up across centuries of 
political rhetoric (Bercovitch 1978).  The idea that America is a divinely chosen nation 
that has fallen away from the straight and narrow path, especially in its sexual morality, 
suffuses a particular religio-political worldview.  From this perspective, America is being 
called back to a former pure and sanctified morality, and the blessings of God will be 
withheld until the country obeys God and returns to its former pure and holy ways (or 
idealized and imagined pure and holy former self).  The narrative of America as God’s 
chosen nation that hinges on faithfulness to God’s character and will has resurged in the 
rhetoric of the evangelical right over the past several decades.  The idea of a broken 
covenant with God is powerful; it provides the backdrop for narratives of American 
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exceptionalism as well as a divine character to calls for personal moral change and 
sanctified living. 
 In addition to the theme of repentance, the call to moral purity is interlaced with a 
sense of grievance, threat, and besiegement.  I highlighted some of these themes in 
chapter 1: the evangelical right finds meaning and passion in the idea that they are under 
siege by a constant deterioration of cultural values and forces that are opposing the will 
of God (Himmelstein 1990, Diamond 1998, Fetner 2008, Watson 1997).  We also see that 
in Ralph Reed’s rhetoric above.  The sense of being under attack creates fear and drives a 
need for a consistent, uniform, and tenacious response to the perceived threat.  This helps 
to solidify the ideological frame in the minds of believers and makes it difficult to 
challenge.  The symbolic morality of refraining from sexual sin becomes an imperative as 
a way to oppose the continually advancing immorality in the outside culture.  The 
narrative is one of advancing moral decline; the only way to oppose this decline is to 
recommit to wholesome “family values” and a return to a time of innocence in America 
when God blessed the country and there were fewer problems.  This imagined time of 
previous innocence is really a counter-memory (Burlein 2002) that serves to inspire a 
resistance to cultural change and a rallying cry for a politics of blame and scapegoating.  
By framing a narrative of cultural decline, leaders can vilify the agents and factors to 
blame for this decline.  Christian Smith (1998) also discusses how this happens: “Viewed 
from the perspective of committed faith, the relative success of a religious group might 
be understood as the result of spiritual consequences or the blessing of God” (67).  He 
goes on to describe how the sense of perceived threat generated by religious leaders can 
create cohesion and strength within a subgroup’s identity:  
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Certainly, many religious elites – no less than secular ones – tend to fabricate 
enemies and exaggerate the strengths and threat of their perceived opponents, 
precisely in order to bolster members’ commitment, solidarity, and financial 
contributions.  But whether fabricated and exaggerated, or actual and factual, 
recognizing that outgroup conflict typically builds ingroup strength helps us to 
understand better the bases of the persistence of religion in the pluralistic, modern 
world.  (Smith 1998, 116) 
 
The evangelical right’s call to moral purity and a return to innocence is almost always 
wrapped in this sense of threat from the impure and corrupting surrounding culture.  It is 
a call to arms against the steadily advancing immorality that threatens the very core of 
being an evangelical Christian – and a true American as well. 
In What If America Were Christian Again, evangelical pastor D. James Kennedy 
captures this idea very succinctly:  
In less than forty years, our culture has gone from the strong family values of a 
society with a Christian consensus to a society that glorifies violence, illicit sex, 
and rebellion.  We have severed ourselves from the roots of what made us great in 
the first place.  We have gone from Leave it to Beaver to Beavis and Butthead in 
some thirty to forty years.  (2003, 3-4)   
 
This quote from Kennedy echoes the narrative we have seen: disorder, sex, and a 
rebellion against authority threaten values that are framed not only as family values, but 
also as the essence of what it meant to be American- a need to return to a “Christian 
consensus” that supposedly previously existed in American society.  In this case, the 
idealization of largely the post-World War II monolithic American culture (here framed 
as the time of Leave it to Beaver) wraps morality, purity, and innocence in the vintage 
garb of 1950’s patriarchal, white American society.  This provides an even more concrete 
idealized memory from the past to point to as a time of peace and prosperity.  It 
whitewashes and ignores the social injustices of the time period and pretends that it was a 
utopian time of God’s blessing for believers and for America. 
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 In Hellfire Nation, Morone (2003) explores some of these tendencies in American 
political culture as well.  As he describes well, “Visions of vice and virtue define the 
American community” (2003, 4).  The politics of sin has been a strong theme throughout 
American history, whether focused on sexuality or on things like the temperance 
movement.  Ultimately, these two themes share the common vision of bodily holiness 
and purity.  The idea that the human body is “God’s temple” suffuses evangelical 
theology and merges into narratives about appropriate substances to drink, eat, or smoke 
much less what sexual partners one should have.  This idea of appropriateness – right 
things and wrong things to expose the body to – is very important to this mentality.  Sex 
and marriage must fit into this space of appropriateness and must be controlled at all 
costs.  As Morone says about these: “Sex and marriage mark the intimate frontier 
between us and them” (17).  By making sexuality the designator of us and them, leaders 
on the evangelical right are able to exercise control over the behavior of members of their 
worldview.  If one deviates from the sexual norm, one risks becoming them to family, 
church, and community.  This potential rejection is a powerful motivator for orthodoxy 
and orthopraxy and provides a substantial amount of control over the behavior of 
evangelical adherents. 
Prominent evangelical ministry leader Jerry Bridges talks about these concepts of 
self-control, moral purity, holiness, and the human body.  Consider this passage from The 
Pursuit of Holiness:   
Our physical bodies and natural appetites were created by God and are not sinful 
in themselves. Nevertheless, if left uncontrolled, we will find our bodies 
becoming “instruments of wickedness” rather than “instruments of righteousness” 
(Romans 6:13). We will be pursuing the “cravings of sinful man” (1 John 2:16) 
instead of holiness. If we watch ourselves closely, we can see how often we eat 
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and drink just to gratify physical desire; how often we lie in bed in the morning 
simply because we don’t “feel” like getting up when we should; how often we 
give in to immoral looks and thoughts simply to satisfy the sin-tainted sex drive 
within us. (2006, 107-108) 
 
The “sin-tainted sex drive” must be controlled- both through the discipline of the self and 
the accountability of the church community.  Within conservative evangelical rhetoric, 
there is a constant theme of control and accountability for one’s thoughts - as well as 
one’s actions - within God’s divine will.  Bridges also echoes a theme here that Morone 
pointed out:  the body as a temple of God.  He frames this as bodily contrast of 
instruments – instruments of wickedness or instruments of righteousness.  This stark 
dualistic worldview of the human condition and sin itself is typical of the evangelical 
mindset.   
 Other outspoken conservative evangelicals such as Southern Baptist leader Al 
Mohler also decry the growing openness about sexuality in the culture.  In Desire and 
Deceit, Mohler states: “Sex has lost its public shamefulness; moral boundaries have been 
pulled down in the name of moral “progress”; and overt sexuality now drives much of 
our entertainment, advertising, and cultural conversation” (2008, 14).  In talking about 
the sin of lust, he continues:  
Tracing the idea of lust through Western thought, (Simon) Blackburn rejects the 
common association of lust with excess. Lust is not really about excessive desire, 
argues Blackburn, but rather a desire for sexual pleasure as an end in 
itself…Sexual desire for its own sake is sexual desire stripped of the Creators 
glory and stolen from its moral context. What Blackburn celebrates, Christianity 
rightly condemns….  (Mohler 2008, 15)   
 
In this passage, Mohler attacks the idea that sexual craving and desire should be the end 
goal of sexual encounters.  He sees this idea as counter to the moral context of God’s 
order and the institution of marriage itself.  To seek pleasure above God’s call to holy 
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living is seen as one of the deadly sins.  Mohler’s narrative attacks an open expression of 
sexual freedom as a threat to America and to the spread of the Christian message and 
culture. 
 Moral purity and innocence are powerful ideas within the movement, and with the 
call to live an individual life of purity comes the call to live a life of personal 
responsibility.   
 
RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
What does it mean to be personally responsible within the conservative 
evangelical worldview?  What about systemic social and cultural explanations for 
societal problems?  Due to its emphasis on individual repentance and conversion and the 
call to individual relationship with God, conservative evangelical theology tends to reject 
systemic explanations for social problems.  The evangelical reading of the Bible places a 
heavy emphasis on the responsibility of the individual for his or her own actions and the 
idea that each individual will be accountable to God at some future date.  As mentioned 
in chapter 3, Emerson and Smith (2000) have a concept they call accountable freewill 
individualism when they talk about white conservative Protestants in American culture.  
This is that same mindset that discounts systemic explanations for problems because they 
see individuals as existing outside of institutions, structures, and systems (76).   They 
trace this tradition within evangelical thought back to the Free Church tradition after the 
sixteenth-century Reformation and the Great Awakenings and fundamentalist movements 
that railed against Social Gospel teachings (77).  The most important aspect of this 
freewill-individualist worldview, however, is the accountability aspect of this personal 
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responsibility: “Individuals do not simply have the freewill to make the choices they 
deem best.  They are individually accountable to family, other people, and, most 
important to God for their freely made choices” (77).  It is a black and white choice 
between right and wrong through this mentality.  Divine will for individual action trumps 
all.  From this worldview, sin simply exists entirely separately from social structures and 
inequities.  Social ills are framed as acts of irresponsibility by individual actors on a 
neutral stage with two choices:  be obedient to God’s ways or be disobedient to God’s 
ways.  Sin is seen as an individual problem between an individual sinner and a holy and 
judging God.  There is a contempt toward more liberal theologies that consider power 
relations or the social ethics of poverty or other areas.  Whether they emphasize issues of 
race, gender, or class, theologies that delve into inequities and the dynamics of social 
power or group explanations of phenomena are simply seen by conservative evangelicals 
as excuses for a lack of personal responsibility by an individual.  From this perspective, 
anyone who disagrees with this idea can not only be marginalized, they can also be 
painted as irresponsible themselves. 
Leaders on the evangelical and political right come together to attack the 
relativism of the liberal culture as a symbol of irresponsibility and rebellion against God.  
Chuck Colson, well-known former special counsel to President Richard Nixon and 
evangelical activist, frames the loss of personal responsibility as a loss of God and a loss 
of objective truth in American culture, referring to existentialist readings on college 
campuses: 
These existentialists (Camus and Sartre) argued that since there is no God, life has 
no intrinsic meaning.  Meaning and purpose must be boldly created though an 
individual’s actions, whatever they may be.  This relativistic view of truth 
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perpetuated a subculture whose password was “do your own thing” – which for 
many meant a comfortable spiral of easy sex and hard drugs.  Personal autonomy 
was elevated at the expense of community responsibility.  Even as many pursued 
these new freedoms in search of fresh utopias, some acknowledged the void left 
by the vacuum of values. (Colson 2007, 48-49) 
 
 It is interesting how the right-wing media also lends itself to individual 
explanations for moral issues, particularly in the economic realm.  In this way, 
conservative evangelicalism and conservative media dovetail together.  Leading 
conservative commentators claim that poverty is a result of personal irresponsibility and 
that the economic arena is a neutral playing field that favors and privileges no group, 
regardless of what evidence may be presented to the contrary.  Those who fail financially 
in American society are painted as lazy and irresponsible, regardless of social structures, 
cultural barriers, or factors beyond the control of an individual.  For example, take this 
statement from Fox News host Bill O’Reilly’s radio show The Radio Factor in 2005:   
It's hard to do it because you gotta look people in the eye and tell 'em they're 
irresponsible and lazy. And who's gonna wanna do that? Because that's what 
poverty is, ladies and gentlemen. In this country, you can succeed if you get 
educated and work hard. Period. Period.  (O’Reilly 2005) 
 
In rhetoric like this, privilege of race, gender, or class is ignored and the narrative of 
guaranteed personal success through a solid work ethic is celebrated. 
 Much of the focus on personal responsibility tends to focus around parenting and 
the process of teaching children.  A narrative of the increasing irresponsibility of youth in 
America is growing and this narrative magnifies the overall emphasis on personal 
responsibility for adult believers and citizens.  For example, in Culture Shift, Al Mohler 
states: “Our kids are growing up to be pampered wimps who are incapable of assuming 
adult responsibility and have no idea how to handle the routine challenges of life” (2011, 
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82).  There is a glorification of physical corporal punishment in parenting in some of this 
rhetoric as well.  Many parenting leaders such as James Dobson point to a demonization 
of physical discipline for children as child abuse and blame this change in American 
culture for an inability for youth and young adults to exercise personal responsibility.  
Evangelical parenting leaders such as Dobson paraphrase Proverbs 13:24 (the “Spare the 
rod and spoil the child” verse) and present a narrative of a crisis of discipline in American 
parenting.  If only there were better parents and not a culture of permissiveness, our 
children would not be “soft” and rebellious.  This passage from Dobson on discipline 
from The New Strong-Willed Child is typical of this narrative: 
Brace yourself now, because I’m about to recommend something to you that will 
be controversial in some circles. You may not even agree with it, but hear me out. 
On those occasions when you find yourself and your strong-willed child in one of 
those classic battles of the will, it is not the time to discuss the virtues of 
obedience. You shouldn’t send Jack or Jane to his or her room to pout.  Time-out 
doesn’t work very well and time-in is a total failure. Bribery is out of the 
question. Crying and begging for mercy are disastrous. Waiting until tired ol’ Dad 
comes home to handle matters at the end of the day will be equally unproductive.  
None of these touchy-feely responses and delaying maneuvers are going to 
succeed. It all comes down to this: When you have been challenged, it is time for 
you to take charge— to defend your right to lead. When mothers and fathers fail 
to be the boss in a moment like that, they create for themselves and their families 
a potential lifetime of heartache. Or as Susanna Wesley said, “No indulgence of 
[willful defiance] can be trivial, no denial unprofitable.” Therefore, I believe a 
mild and appropriate spanking is the discipline of choice for a hot-tempered child 
between twenty months and ten years of age. (Dobson 2004b, 58) 
 
There are multiple points to consider in this seminal passage from Dobson on 
conservative evangelical discipline.  From his perspective, parenting is frequently about a 
battle of wills and submission to authority.  He refers to “tired ol’ Dad” coming home 
from work- clearly reflecting the evangelical penchant to assume the man works outside 
the home and the woman is home with the children.  Not choosing to use physical 
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discipline is choosing to “fail to be the boss” in the key moment.  This view of parenting 
focuses less on the process of teaching or equipping, and more on the importance of 
maintaining behavioral conformity through a position of authority.  Bartkowski and 
Ellison (1995) point this out in their study of evangelical parenting as well; learning to 
respect parents and build responsibility in the home is important and reflects the 
development of responsibility – and responsiveness – to God-given authorities outside 
the home.   This is the essence of the rhetoric of personal responsibility in the church and 
in the conservative evangelical household.  It is about the idea of developing an ethic of 
individual responsibility (as delineated by the church) and the individual accountability to 
measure and maintain that responsibility.   
When it comes to pivotal social issues like abortion, a similar logic is applied.  
Social explanations for unwanted pregnancies (including a lack of sex education and 
access to birth control, etc.) are rejected by the evangelical right.  For them, the issue 
boils down to the personal sexual irresponsibility of individual women – and the 
irresponsibility of individual doctors who provide immoral services to these women.  I 
will explore this idea more and look at some of the supporting texts for this in chapter 5. 
 
ORTHODOXY AND OBEDIENCE  
 The imperatives of personal responsibility and moral purity are intricately linked 
to a particular reading of the Bible.  This reading of the Bible highlights the sovereignty 
and supremacy of God’s will and the concept of absolute obedience to God within divine 
order- as interpreted through the Bible and personal experiences.  This concept of divine 
authority also extends into the patriarchal family structure and the authority of church 
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leaders in the evangelical mind.  As mentioned in Chapter 3, much of the emphasis on 
divine authority is rooted in the idea of orthodoxy, or right belief.  For the conservative 
evangelical mind, obedience has as much or more to do with belief as it is does with 
action.  Beliefs matter, and taking captive the thoughts in one’s mind is essential to being 
obedient to God.  From their perspective, God can see all- and disbelief is a sin in and of 
itself. 
 This kind of belief-guarding leads to a hyper-vigilant pursuit of orthodoxy and 
orthopraxy as well.  Social structures and institutions like marriage in contemporary 
society are interpreted through a divine lens, such as James Dobson’s introductory words 
in Marriage Under Fire:   
Behold, the institution of marriage! It is one of the Creator’s most marvelous and 
enduring gifts to humankind. This divine plan was revealed to Adam and Eve in 
the Garden of Eden and then described succinctly in Genesis 2:24, where we read, 
“Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his 
wife: and they shall be one flesh” (KJV). With those twenty-two words, God 
announced the ordination of the family, long before He established the two other 
great human institutions, the church and the government. (Dobson 2004a, 7) 
 
The institutions of marriage, the church, and the government- these are the institutions 
held up by Dobson as God-ordained institutions to be revered, protected, and defended 
from corruption by the non-Christian culture.  He presents this as the imperative of 
obedience to God’s will- and personal accountability does not just entail personal action 
here- it also involves the institutions of society. 
 For conservative evangelicals, the family structure and gender itself are part of 
submission to authority within God’s plan.  James Dobson is one of the most outspoken 
leaders promoting an essentialist gender difference perspective and discussing gender as 
something designed by God for divergent household roles dictated by biology.  Dobson’s 
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view fits into the gender “complementarian” perspective prevalent within conservative 
evangelicalism.  This perspective focuses on differences in function and role between the 
genders, granting men the role of teaching and leading in both the family and in the 
church, and grounding this view of complementary genders in biblical texts.  The 
complementarian view differs from a strict “patriarchal” view in that it sees more 
equality of roles/function for women in the workplace.  A good example is this passage 
from Bringing Up Boys: 
Consider again the basic tendencies of maleness and femaleness. Because it is the 
privilege and blessing of women to bear children, they are inclined toward 
predictability, stability, security, caution, and steadiness.  Most of them value 
friendships and family above accomplishments or opportunities.  That is why they 
often dislike change and resist moving from one city to another. The female 
temperament lends itself to nurturance, caring, sensitivity, tenderness, and 
compassion. Those are the precise characteristics needed by their children during 
their developmental years. Without the softness of femininity, the world would be 
a more cold, legalistic, and militaristic place. 
 
Men, on the other hand, have been designed for a different role. They value 
change, opportunity, risk, speculation, and adventure. They are designed to 
provide for their families physically and to protect them from harm and danger. 
The apostle Paul said, “If anyone does not provide for his relatives, and especially 
for his immediate family, he has denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever” 
(1 Timothy 5:8). This is a divine assignment.  Men are also ordained in Scripture 
for leadership in their homes, to be expressed within the framework of 
servanthood. Men are often (but not always) less emotional in a crisis and more 
confident when challenged. A world without men would be more static and 
uninteresting. When my father died, Mom said with a tear in her eye, “He brought 
so much excitement into my life.” That characteristic is often attractive to women. 
 
When these sex-linked temperaments operate as intended in a family, they 
balance and strengthen one another’s shortcomings. (Dobson 2001, 27) 
 
In this passage, Dobson emphasizes several key elements I argue are part of the 
ideological frame of obedience to authority.  He wraps the concepts of masculinity and 
leadership together -and he proclaims this masculine imperative for leadership as 
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“ordained by Scripture” and a “divine assignment”.  In other words, God is masculine, 
the Bible is His divine authority, and the Bible dictates that men should lead in the 
household as a mirror of God’s divine leadership in the lives of evangelical followers.  
There is frequently this penchant for looking for toughness and masculinity in political 
and religious leadership on the evangelical right.   
From the overtly political side, the activism against the Equal Rights Amendment 
(ERA) in the 1970s and early 1980s provides a good example of how a traditional 
patriarchal family structure, built on a foundation of conservative religious belief, can 
inform political action.  Himmelstein discusses these anti-ERA activists:   
They believed that the only safeguards for women in a male world are the 
privileges and protections that they can claim from men within the family.  From 
this perspective the family, when it works, requires men to support women and 
thus protects women from having to compete in a working world dominated by 
men and male values.  (1990, 106)  
 
While the extremity of some of these views may have faded over the decades due to 
economic stresses changing the need for women to work outside the home (Dobson 
2001), the view of God’s ordained order within the family has not shifted that much 
among the members of the evangelical right.  There is still a strong emphasis on male 
headship and responsibility within the family and an extension of this masculinity-
focused perspective to the political arena, even in areas like the rhetoric around gun 
control and family/home protection. 
In the frame of obedience to authority, we see the conservative evangelical core 
value of biblical inerrancy.  As Wellman points out, “To question the authority of 
scripture for evangelicals is by definition to fall into error and, worse, to risk apostasy” 
(Wellman 2008, 102).  Evangelicals do not typically admit that all scriptural readings are 
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an interpretation; part of the worldview of external authority that they cherish does not 
allow for acknowledgement of the subjectivity of interpretive lenses.  Scripture is 
predominantly seen as something to be taken at face value without deeper considerations.  
In this way, it fits into a paradigm of command and obedience.  In a poetry reading, the 
text is never seen as a command, but rather as a work of art open to different 
interpretations.  In the evangelical paradigm, however, the Bible is seen as an 
unquestionable framework for external imperatives, and obedience to a literal 
interpretation of these imperatives is what it means to be a committed and orthodox 
member of the subculture.  Honorable leaders who are seen as followers of God and the 
Bible- in the home, in the church, and in the political sphere- demand a special reverence 
in the evangelical mind.   As Sara Diamond notes, the Christian right brings an 
“ideological fervency and authoritarian group dynamics” that is different than many other 
movements (Diamond 1989, vi).  This tendency toward authoritarian leadership lends 
itself to simple answers to complicated questions and creates a fertile intellectual ground 
for ideological frames and limited moral choices. 
 
IDEOLOGY AND RHETORIC 
 In conclusion, I argue that these three ideological frames – moral 
purity/innocence, personal responsibility, and obedience to authority – guide and restrict 
moral choices, commitments, and priorities in both the religious and political spheres.  
Taken together, they shape and mold the symbol of the family archetype – an idealized 
norm of heterosexual, monogamous family that serves as a litmus test for the evaluation 
of issues in the public moral arena.  These ideological frames emerge directly from the 
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theological world of evangelicals and serve to guide political views and commitments.  
As we move to chapter 5, I will explore specific influential texts from particular 
evangelical leaders regarding two primary issues of the evangelical right:  same-sex 
marriage and abortion.  I will see if the rhetorical analysis supports my assertions and 
examine whether other themes may also be present in the ongoing narrative regarding 









CHAPTER FIVE:  SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND ABORTION AS  
EVANGELICAL ORTHODOXY 
 Same-sex marriage and abortion have become synonymous with the political 
commitments of evangelicals in America.  These two issues are really flip sides of the 
same coin:  a theological commitment to purity, holiness, personal responsibility, 
obedience to legitimate authority, and biblical precedence in the lives of true believers.  
In this chapter, I will lay out my findings after examining numerous texts from leaders on 
the evangelical right and considering how the moral worldview of evangelicals is shaped, 
reflected, and reinforced by these texts.  I used the HyperRESEARCH program to code 
the texts and explore the themes that emerged, particularly focusing on seminal works on 
the topics by James Dobson, Albert Mohler, Tony Perkins, and Randy Alcorn.  After 
looking closely at some of the leading voices on the evangelical right, the most dominant 
rhetorical theme I found encompassing both topics was the message of potential calamity 
and existential crisis.  Evangelical leaders frame both issues as matters of cultural 
emergency, where any compromise will result in a slippery slope that descends to 
absolute moral chaos.  I will discuss how this narrative of potential cultural collapse 
infuses energy into the movement and is the key to understanding the strength of 
conservative evangelical activism.  While these political issues are frequently interlaced 




PERVERSITY AND THE PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE 
In the opening pages of Marriage Under Fire, James Dobson outlines a 
worldview of marriage and cultural change prevalent in the Evangelical Right.  His words 
help to shape a catastrophizing narrative on the state of American culture and who the 
Right blames for this moral condition: 
To put it succinctly, the institution of marriage represents the very foundation of 
the human social order.  Everything of value sits on that base.  Institutions, 
governments, religious fervor, and the welfare of children are all dependent on its 
stability.  When it is weakened or undermined, the entire superstructure begins to 
wobble.  That is exactly what has happened during the last thirty-five years, as 
radical feminists, liberal lawmakers, and profiteers in the entertainment industry 
have taken their toll on the stability of marriage.  Many of our pressing social 
problems can be traced to this origin. (Dobson 2004a, 9-10). 
 
In this excerpt, we can see several key themes that emerged in my analysis of texts from 
evangelical leaders on the right.  The concept of marriage is wrapped in purity and 
innocence, as well as social order and authoritative structure.  It is portrayed as a 
foundation that is incomparably fragile – without this foundation, the entire human social 
order crumbles.  This lack of stability not only threatens the norm of heterosexuality in 
the culture, but the safety of children, private and public institutions, and even 
governments.  Any process of loosening moral standards and cultural change that 
challenges the heterosexual, monogamous norm of the lifelong marriage commitment 
threatens the will of God in both individual and corporate identity.  The defense of the 
fragile foundation of the social order then becomes a culture war bugle call for soldiers 
on the Evangelical Right.  From this perspective, the battle is not just about the defense of 
church, nation, or family; it is the defense of a basic human social order first delivered by 
God in the book of Genesis.  Any cracks in the social foundation are seen as catastrophic 
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events.  These cracks are always the beginning of a slippery slope toward increasing 
moral decay and disobedience to God that will consume American culture and lead to 
every form of evil.  In my findings, I saw this theme of the fear of catastrophic cultural 
change in attitudes toward both same-sex marriage and abortion.  The slippery slopes of 
both arguments are integrally connected on the journey down the hill.   
 Let’s look at a few of these arguments, beginning with some more of James 
Dobson’s words on marriage:   
A life in keeping with God’s design and instruction brings the greatest possible 
fulfillment, while any deviation from His design invites disaster.  This is why the 
Bible warns against all harmful forms of sexual behavior, including premarital 
sex, adultery, prostitution, incest, bestiality, and pedophilia.  Homosexuality is 
only one of the several ways we can wound ourselves and devastate those around 
us.  Ironically, homosexual activists strive with all their energies to achieve 
“freedom” from the shackles of moral law and traditional institutions.  But the 
Scripture teaches that true freedom and genuine fulfillment can be found only 
when we live in harmony with our design. (Dobson 2004a, 18) 
 
The catastrophic language in this passage is obvious: “deviation…invites disaster,” 
“wound ourselves and devastate those around us,” freedom from the “shackles of moral 
law.”  Dobson manages to wrap homosexual sexual orientation into a conglomeration of 
sexual practices ranging from sex before marriage to sex with children or animals.  This 
conflation of sexual identity with certain hot-button extremes of sexual activity is a 
common theme on the Evangelical Right.  Any deviation from evangelical norms in the 
moral realm is seen as an invitation for the descent into absolute moral chaos.  In this 
way, it does not just tap into anxieties about sexuality that run deep in evangelical 
interpretations of the Bible; it also taps into the existential angst of a terrifying collapse of 
social order.  Order, structure, and authority are so important to the moral worldview that 
this harnesses other people’s sexual identity and activity to the most basic need of 
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personal safety and order in the world.  Deviation from God’s plan invites existential 
destruction; the advance of activists on the left demands the defense of order, 
responsibility, authority, holiness, and all that is right about the world.  Any sexual 
freedom, sexual orientation, identity, or expression that refuses to conform is seen as 
disobedience to God and to God’s authority rather than an expression of individual 
authenticity.  Throwing off the “shackles of moral law” imputes motives of divine 
disobedience and moral irresponsibility to these alternative, non-conforming expressions 
and identities.   
 Southern Baptist leader Albert Mohler echoes this theme of catastrophic social 
damage due to moral decay.  While many leaders on the Evangelical Right rely primarily 
on biblical authority-based arguments to make their claims, in Desire and Deceit, Mohler 
also brings in other literature in order to try to add more legitimacy to this claim: 
Looking at the history of Western civilization, William and Ariel Durant argued 
that one of the first achievements necessary for the establishment of civilization is 
the restraint of sexuality.  As they put it, sexuality is like a hot river that must be 
banked on both sides.  Sadly, what we see in the latter half of the twentieth 
century is the unbanking of that river…Pitirim A. Sorokin, founder of the 
department of sociology at Harvard University, argued that heterosexual marriage 
is the foundation of civilization itself.  You simply cannot build or maintain 
civilization without heterosexual marriage, and without heterosexual marriage 
being understood as the norm.  Unless heterosexual marriage is protected by law, 
custom, and habit to the exclusion of every other arrangement, civilization is 
impossible.  Sorokin made this point more than fifty years ago.  Even from such a 
distance, he saw this age of perversity arising, and he argued that this age of 
rebellion would destroy civilization. (156) 
 
Several key ideas emerge in this passage.  First of all, Mohler’s key word in talking about 
deviation from heterosexual marriage is perversity.  Mohler references the “restraint of 
sexuality.”  This concept that sexuality needs to be channeled, restrained, restricted – it 
animates the Evangelical Right.  The symbol of the unbounded river is an image of 
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catastrophic destruction and flooding.  The rhetoric of civilization foundation is found 
here as well.  And heterosexual marriage is once again presented as antithetical to same-
sex marriage.  They cannot coexist in this worldview: it is “to the exclusion of every 
other arrangement.”  There is no pluralism of ethical standards here.  There is conformity 
to sexual norms as defined by conservative evangelicals around authorities of the Bible, 
law, and tradition, and there is non-conformity to these norms – or “perversity” as Mohler 
references it.  Mohler presents the ethical landscape as one shaped by stark moral 
choices, diametrically opposed to one another, with existential consequences for those 
who make the wrong decisions. He continues: 
That is the great question of our day – whether or not this civilization will indeed 
wake up once marriage is clearly understood to the critical battleground and the 
primary target of attack.  Today, we face a cultural crisis that actually threatens to 
reverse civilization and to embrace barbarism.  Can civilization survive under 
these circumstances?  I would have to argue that it cannot.  There is no example 
in the history of humankind of a civilization enduring for long when an age of 
polymorphous perversity is set loose. (157) 
 
Mixing in militaristic metaphors of battleground and attack targeting, Mohler frames the 
sense of crisis that animates conservative evangelical political action here. Reversing and 
removing civilization (“embrace barbarism”) is what is at stake in this apocalyptic vision.  
Once again, the structure and order of society are under siege, and it is sexual non-
conformity and perversity that are to blame.   
 In the rhetoric of both Dobson and Mohler, we see the theme of moral crisis and 
the defense of the social order itself.  For the leaders of the evangelical right, the fight 
against same-sex marriage is not just a political preference or an expedient issue for 
mobilizing constituents; it is an existential battle for the heart and soul of moral 
civilization and a cataclysmic crisis that demands passion, commitment, and action from 
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true believers.  This narrative of catastrophic moral change emerges from the theology 
around marriage and sexual purity and also reinforces this theology as leaders package 
their words in the language of moral survival and terminal change.  The catastrophic 
moral change particularly connects to children and the institution of the family as a 
whole.  Take these words from Tony Perkins, president of the Family Research Council 
in his State of the Family address in January 2016: 
The promise of strong efforts these past seven years to restore fatherhood and 
reestablish family life in our poorest communities has faded completely.  Instead, 
national policies have sown confusion about the very definition of family. 
President Obama has extolled the virtues of fatherhood even as he has fought for 
same-sex marriage, in essence saying two same-gendered person can parent as 
well as a mom and a dad. This contradictory message is more than disappointing. 
For our children throughout the country, it is devastating. It reduces mothers and 
fathers to genderless caregivers. Our children deserve better: They deserve a mom 
and a dad.  And we pay a price for this incoherent, ideological campaign by havoc 
in our homes and blood in our streets.  That’s why we have to re-empower 
American parents. The decision of our courts on contraception for minors, 
abortion on demand and redefining marriage have gravely weakened the family. 
(Blue 2016, par. 3-4) 
 
Perkins’ stark language references “blood on the streets” and “havoc in our homes,” all 
because of an epidemic that reduces caregivers to genderless status.  This argument, 
centered in the primacy of gender roles in the nuclear family, brings the health and well-
being of children into the motivation for moral action.  
 Whether it is references to blood on the streets, the destruction of civilization, or 
epic battles for the soul of the culture, the level of rhetorical fervor from leaders on the 
evangelical right is extraordinary.  Take this statement from Dobson regarding the 
Lawrence vs. Texas Supreme Court decision:   
It was this regrettable decision that has created the present turmoil throughout the 
nation. It has emboldened rogue commissioners, mayors, and legislators to begin 
overriding laws prohibiting homosexual marriage. They have been passing out 
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marriage licenses like candy. These minor bureaucrats now have things going 
their way, and they are going to strike while the iron is hot. This is why we are in 
the state of peril that faces our nation today. Like Adolf Hitler, who overran his 
European neighbors, those who favor homosexual marriage are determined to 
make it legal, regardless of the democratic processes that stand in their way. 
(2004a, 41) 
 
The hyperbolic comparison of activists and government officials to Nazis underscores the 
sense of grievance and threat that exists in the rhetoric of conservative evangelical 
leaders.   This sense of threat is what helps to reinforce the subcultural boundaries of the 
evangelical subculture.  It gives energy to the delineation of insiders and outsiders – and 
potential insiders.   
 In my examination of evangelical texts, common themes emerged over and over.  
These included marriage as a divine institution, the slippery slope into cultural chaos and 
loss of order, the theme of consequences: legal, moral, and divine, government 
interference in traditional values through court activism, the fragility of God-ordained 
marriage, the undermining of biblical authority, and homosexuality as sin and sexual 
impurity in the world, the safety of vulnerable children in the face of the homosexual 
agenda, and the blaming of liberals and Hollywood celebrities for the current crisis.  This 
passage from James Dobson in Marriage Under Fire captures several of these themes: 
Why will gay marriage set the table for polygamy? Because there is no place to 
stop once that Rubicon has been crossed. Historically, the definition of marriage 
has rested on a foundation of tradition, legal precedent, theology, and the over 
whelming support of the people. After the introduction of marriage between 
homosexuals, however, it will be supported by nothing more substantial than the 
opinion of a single judge or by a black-robed panel of justices. After they have 
reached their dubious decisions, the family will consist of little more than 
someone’s interpretation of “rights.” Given that unstable legal climate, it is cer-
tain that some self-possessed judge, somewhere, will soon rule that three men or 
three women can marry. Or five men and two women. Or four and four. Who will 
be able to deny them that right? The guarantee is implied, we will be told, by the 
Constitution. Those who disagree will continue to be seen as hatemongers and 
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bigots. (Indeed, those charges are already being leveled against Christians who 
espouse biblical values!) How about group marriage? Or marriage between 
daddies and little girls? How about marriage between a man and his donkey? 
Anything allegedly linked to “civil rights” will be doable. The legal 
underpinnings for marriage will have been destroyed.  (49-50) 
 
Here we see a number of themes that emerge in the narrative of the evangelical right 
when it comes to homosexuality and marriage.  Dobson’s words here are the classic 
slippery slope argument: once you have crossed a certain boundary there is “no place to 
stop.”  He defends heterosexual marriage as resting on not only divine will, but also 
tradition, law, and popular opinion.  This latter appeal to general popular opinion works 
as a foil to his attack on how this assumed perspective can be over-ruled by the few in a 
court of law.  In this way, he is presenting individual representatives (“some self-
possessed judge”) of one branch of the system of American democracy as somehow 
undemocratic.  They reinforce an “unstable legal climate” where everything is at stake.  
We can see the themes of cultural chaos, the fragility of marriage (“the legal 
underpinnings will have been destroyed”), the proposed threat to children (“daddies and 
little girls”), and the appeal to the Bible, citing “biblical authority” behind heterosexual 
understandings of marriage. He clearly questions the authority of man-made institutions, 
contrasting these human decisions to what God has ordained. The language about the 
“dubious decisions” of judges helps to highlight this perspective on eternal and 
unchanging divine moral authority in contrast to questionable and changing human 
authorities. 
 Dobson’s rhetoric seems extreme:  comparing bestiality and pedophilia as 
analogous to same-sex marriage blurs moral lines and creates a sense of catastrophic 
legal consequences for any change in sexual ethics.  By appealing to all things “perverse” 
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in the evangelical sexual mindset, he activates an intense fear response based on this 
moral worldview.  A deviation in sexual orientation becomes a direct descent into 
complete and total sexual depravity.  This also taps into the conservative evangelical 
theological concept around sin: all humans are sinful and any sin at all separates the 
individual from God and requires repentance, humility, and a cleansing by God.  This “all 
or nothing” view of the nature of sin makes the evangelical mind more open to slippery 
slope arguments; if God rejects human beings completely for one sin, then each and 
every sin must be connected to deeper issues.   
 Who is to blame for the advance of legitimacy for same-sex marriage in the 
perceived culture wars on the evangelical right?  The blame can spread to a variety of 
subjects, but this passage from Dobson captures many of them: 
We’re in a very difficult situation now.  It’s tough.  It’s hard swimming against 
the tide of political correctness, the liberal media, the entertainment industry, 
Congress, the libraries, and the cultural forces making fun of us.  It is not pleasant 
to be called “the religious right,” “the far right,” “religious extremists,” and 
“fundamentalist right-wing crazies.”  None of us likes that.  But being ridiculed 
and marginalized is the price we must pay to defend what we believe.  Jesus told 
us that it would be that way.  (2004a, 87) 
 
The blame finds multiple cultural targets here, including academia (political correctness), 
the “liberal” media, Hollywood, politicians, and intellectual public institutions.  Dobson 
highlights name-calling as offensive, yet implies that this marginalization is part of the 
evangelical cross to bear for being faithful to fighting for God’s ways in the world.  This 
theme that liberals of all stripes, especially those of an intellectual, entertainment, or 
media ilk, runs through much of the narrative of blame on the right.  These industries 
make for an easy “Them” to fit into the culture wars narrative.  The fight for maintaining 
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a worldview of purity, holiness, and righteousness must have opponents that represent the 
forefront of cultural change and moral questioning. 
 
THE UNBORN CHILD AND THE DESTRUCTION OF INNOCENCE 
 Same-sex marriage is one front on the lines of the evangelical-declared culture 
wars, but another dramatic front is abortion.  I examined sources from leading figures on 
the evangelical right framing this topic as well.  While there are a number of leaders on 
the right who write on this sensitive and passionate topic, one particular source has 
served as a primer on the topic.  This book has been used as a training manual for 
numerous prolife advocacy organizations for framing both the prolife arguments and 
combatting prochoice arguments.  I want to begin by looking at the themes that emerged 
from this source and expanding these to compare to other sources as well. 
 This leading source for prolife arguments for several decades is Randy Alcorn’s 
ProLife Answers to ProChoice Arguments.  Early in the book, Alcorn outlines the 
argument between prochoice and prolife positions: 
If the prochoice position is correct, the freedom to choose abortion is an 
expression of equal rights, fairness, and justice.  Abortion is a necessity, making 
society a better place for all.  If we ever went back to a society in which abortion 
was not freely available, it would be a gigantic step backward in the history of 
human rights.  If the prolife position is correct, the 3,753 abortions occurring 
every day represent 3,753 human casualties.  And though none of these deaths is 
reported on the evening news (though the same unborn child killed by a bullet 
would be), each aborted child is just as real and just as valuable as other children.  
If these unborn are really babies, then America has one of the highest infant 
mortality rates in the world.  If abortion does not kill children, the prolife 
mentality is at best a nuisance and at worst a serious threat to women’s rights and 
personal liberty.  If abortion does kill children, the prochoice mentality is 
responsible for the deaths of 1.3 million innocent people each year, more than the 
combined total of Americans who have died in all wars in our history.  This is not 
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a case where “it doesn’t make a difference who’s right and who’s wrong.”  No 
matter who is right or wrong, the stakes are enormously high. (2000, 38) 
 
This passage frames the debate between prochoice and prolife positions, at least from 
Alcorn’s point of view.  Particular words here stand out, and the rhetoric leads a 
particular direction.  “Human casualties” evokes images of the victims of armed conflict 
or attack, especially when compared to a pregnant woman who might lose a fetus due to a 
gunshot wound.  The key idea in this passage is the statement that “1.3 million innocent 
people” are being killed each year.  In talking about the unborn child as the epitome of an 
innocent person, Alcorn refers to Americans killed in wars throughout history, an 
interesting comparison considering he only mentions the American casualties of these 
wars.  This is the point I want to make:  the unconscious cultural assumption in our 
culture is that the American lives lost in the war are innocent lives; Alcorn emphasizes 
that the unborn children are the same thing:  innocent casualties of murder or of an 
organized assault against them.   
 This theme of the innocence of the unborn child runs throughout Alcorn’s rhetoric 
as well as the other evangelical leaders who speak on abortion.  He quotes Dr. Landrum 
Shettles, a retired OB-GYN physician from New York:  “I believe it is wrong to take 
innocent human life under any circumstances” (54).  He states that “any civilized society 
restricts the individual’s freedom to choose whenever that choice would harm an innocent 
person” (110).  Or even his argument countering a Planned Parenthood argument for 
inequality to access for abortion is wrapped in this language:  “It is not unfair for some 
people to have less opportunity than others to kill the innocent” (146).  He continues in 
this vein in attacking Planned Parenthood, painting them as advocates of eugenics and the 
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destruction of the weak, the poor, and the handicapped through abortion itself.  This 
emphasis wraps in the language of what we understand innocence to be- we protect those 
innocent victims that cannot protect themselves.  Even in looking at the law (and the 
implications of the Roe vs. Wade decision), Alcorn leans on the concept of protecting 
innocent life as a higher moral calling: 
That harmful acts against the innocent will take place regardless of the law is a 
poor argument for having no law.  There are laws against burglary, rape, and 
armed robbery, yet every one of these crimes continues to happen in our society.  
That these things still happen should not convince us to make them legal.  Laws 
should discourage bad things from happening, not conform to them simply 
because they happen. (157) 
 
Do we see this same them outside of Alcorn’s work?  Definitely.  Take this example from 
evangelical leader Pat Robertson: 
Thou shalt not murder--not have judicial executions--but you shall not murder. 
Killing is taking away somebody's life. People should be secure in their life. That 
is one of the principles of the Declaration of Independence.  We hold these truths 
to be self-evident that God has endowed us all with life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness, that we have life, the right to life. Life has become more and more 
cheap in the society we live in. But God says you shall not murder.  In my 
opinion, abortion is murder. Once you begin to understand that the taking of an 
innocent life is murder, then that raises the bar from a 'constitutional right' to 
something that needs to be stopped. (Robertson n.d., par 3-4) 
 
Robertson emphasizes innocence in his definition of murder here.  Abortion is the taking 
of an innocent life, therefore it is murder; murder is evil in the eyes of God, therefore 
abortion is evil.   
 In Personal Faith, Public Policy, Harry Jackson Jr. and Tony Perkins (president 
of the Family Research Council) talk about several issues related to what they frame as 
the value and sanctity of life.  In this, they lay out a biblically defended view of abortion:   
Abortion is wrong based upon God’s injunction not to murder human beings.  An 
unborn child is a person with a calling and destiny ordained by God.  In the eyes 
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of God, killing an unborn child is just like killing an adult, because life begins at 
conception – a fact that even science confirms.  Scripture makes clear that God 
acknowledges and has His hand upon the unborn (Job 31:15; Ps. 139:13-14; Isa. 
44:2, Jer. 1:5).  (2008, 65) 
 
What separates the murder of human beings from things like war in the eyes of 
Perkins and Jackson?  They state: “War, at its root, is based in the sin nature of man and 
should be strenuously avoided.  Unfortunately, there are times when war cannot be 
avoided.  In a fallen world, war is sometimes the only option we have to defend innocent 
life” (2008, 51-52).  This distinction between killing human beings in war and the 
defending of innocent life against being killed is the key concept behind the conservative 
evangelical of “sanctity of life” issues.  It helps to explain why these same leaders 
frequently support the death penalty as a punishment for certain crimes or support war as 
a way to try to resolve world conflicts.  Physical violence against human beings is not the 
objection; it is the loss of innocent lives that is the moral outrage.  In this fashion, 
evangelical prolife advocates see their primary mission as the protection of the innocent.  
This fits snugly with the perceived divinely dictated purpose to defend holiness, purity, 
and innocence as a calling.  Their theology posits a God who is quick to destroy the 
guilty and steadfastly defends the innocent:  those who have chosen to follow in faith – or 
those who are too young to make that decision yet.   
This is a critical distinction in understanding the evangelical mind in relation to 
both abortion and same-sex marriage.  Alcorn explicitly talks about the difference that 
this innocence makes in moral decisions: 
  There is a vast difference between punishing a convicted murderer and 
killing an innocent child.  It is twisted logic to say that if one believes that 
innocent children should not be put to death, he is a hypocrite to believe that a 
convicted murderer should be put to death.  Unlike the murderer, the child has 
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committed no crime, no jury has found him guilty, and he is not being executed 
by the state.  He is innocent and is being put to death by a private and subjective 
decision. (2000, 254) 
 
Perhaps a better description of the conservative evangelical prolife movement would be 
the “pro-innocent life” movement.  The defense of innocence dovetails perfectly with the 
theological defense of humans made in the image of a God that is holy, blameless, and 
innocent. 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM PERSONHOOD 
So, what arguments do prolife evangelical leaders make beyond the call to defend 
innocence?  From my research, I found that leaders tend to follow four lines of reasoning:  
1) arguments regarding science and personhood; 2) arguments regarding the law and the 
limits of personal rights; 3) arguments regarding health and safety of those involved, and 
4) arguments regarding moral issues, social implications, and biblical foundations for 
morality.  Many leaders share these arguments, but they are perhaps summarized best in 
Alcorn’s book, which is why it has been used as a messaging training document for so 
many prolife groups. 
The arguments regarding the personhood of the fetus are some of the most 
important because they lay the groundwork for the moral argument that protecting the 
fetus is about protecting independent and innocent life, as compelling as protecting a 
child that has already been born.  The personhood argument is framed in the language 
that is almost always used about the fetus- the phrasing of the “unborn child.”  Prolife 
leaders like to point to physicians that have re-affirmed the idea that independent life 
begins at conception.  They want to eliminate the scientific uncertainty around this point 
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so that the moral arguments they later use will apply fully to the unborn child just like 
they would to other independent human beings.  But even in trying to demonstrate this 
point, Alcorn (2000) tries to hedge his bets and make a moral case that the prolife 
position should win out regardless: 
If there is uncertainty about when human life begins, the benefit of the doubt 
should go to preserving life.  Suppose there is uncertainty about when human life 
begins.  If a hunter is uncertain whether a movement in the brush is caused by a 
person, does his uncertainty lead him to fire or not to fire?  If you’re driving at 
night and you think the dark figure ahead on the road may be a child, but it may 
just be the shadow of a tree, do you drive into it, or do you put on the brakes?  If 
we find someone who may be dead or alive, but we’re not sure, what is the best 
policy?  To assume he is alive and try to save him, or to assume he is dead and 
walk away?  Shouldn’t we give the benefit of the doubt to life?  Otherwise we are 
saying, “This may or may not be a child, therefore it’s all right to destroy it.”  (51) 
 
For this argument to be compelling, the real question is whether this level of uncertainty 
about the question of personhood actually exists in the scientific medical community.   
Alcorn picks and chooses a few physicians and other scientists to make the case for this 
perspective.  He not only seeks out a select few physicians who take this position, he also 
connects his scientific argument to biologists such as Michael Behe, one of the leading 
proponents of Intelligent Design and opponents of evolution.  By connecting the idea of 
intelligent design to scientific arguments about personhood, Alcorn alludes to a sinister 
purpose that he sees for abortion itself:  
The unspoken but underlying premise of abortion is survival of the fittest.  That 
dogma is being challenged as people reconsider whether there is in fact an 
intelligent Designer behind our intelligent design.  By acknowledging a Creator 
some are beginning to return to the concept of a moral Judge who will hold us 
accountable for our actions toward the youngest and weakest of our kind.  (29)  
   
Intelligent design (as an alternative to evolution by natural selection) is not a widely 
accepted position among biologists.  By connecting scientific arguments about the 
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beginnings of life and personhood to biologists such as Behe, who most biologists see as 
drawing on theological concepts rather than scientific ones, Alcorn seemingly connects 
medical arguments to questionable biological premises. 
 Alcorn presents a number of medical professionals that make the case for a clear 
line of independent life beginning – with certainty – at the time of conception.  This 
contrasts prochoice biological arguments that life is a continuum (including the life of the 
sperm and eggs), where the beginning point of life is not a clear-cut issue.  There is not a 
scientific consensus on the issue, but Alcorn backs up his case by pointing to expert 
witnesses, genetic codes, the independent development of the fetus, and stages of human 
development.  He combats the acorn and oak tree analogies that some use, spending 
considerable time on the development of particular body parts, especially the beating 
heart.  His central point here is summed up in one particular statement: “Personhood is 
properly defined by membership in the human species, not by stage of development 
within that species” (74).  Alcorn’s terminology and arguments have been very prevalent 
throughout the nation as prolife groups have shared resources.   
 One of the more interesting tacks that Alcorn uses is appealing through science to 
the moral concept of the personhood of a meaningful life.  He weaves together arguments 
about biology with a moral argument about dehumanization, meaningfulness, and 
discrimination in a very interesting passage: 
But does the worth of a human being depend upon whether others think his life is 
meaningful?  Does the unborn transform from person to nonperson with each of 
his mother’s changes of mind?  And doesn’t every human being regard the life he 
had in the womb as meaningful, since had it been terminated he would not now be 
alive?  Black people, women, Indians, Jews, and many others have been declared 
nonpersons or persons whose lives are not meaningful.  But for whose benefit?  
That of the people in power, who have declared for their own economic, political, 
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or personal advantage who is meaningful and who isn’t.  Whites decided that 
blacks were less human.  Males decided that women had fewer rights.  Not big 
people have decided that little people don’t have rights.  Personhood is not 
something to be bestowed on living human beings, large or small, by an 
intellectual elite with vested interests in ridding society of undesirables.  
Personhood has an inherent value – a value that comes from being a member of 
the human race.  For those who believe the Bible, this is linked to being created in 
the image of God.  But even those who do not can hold to the position – though it 
is increasingly difficult to do so – that human life is valuable event when it is 
young or small or “less useful” to others. (82) 
 
This passage presents some very interesting ideas that tack back and forth from the idea 
of personhood to moral arguments regarding the ethical use of power.  Starting with the 
concept that every single person’s life is meaningful, Alcorn compares the oppression of 
African-Americans, women, Jews, and Indians to the termination of a pregnancy, in the 
process implying that the underlying motivation for abortion is the elimination of less 
meaningful life.  Abortion thus is an unethical use of power to eliminate the powerless – 
because they are less human.  This appeal to common humanity not only frames the fetus 
as the unborn child, but as the “little person” under assault by the big people.  Another 
interesting aspect of this passage is that Alcorn then attributes the attitude of “ridding 
society of undesirables” to a nebulous “intellectual elite.”  This intellectual elite is 
presented in contrast to those who follow the teachings of God and the Bible.  Those who 
see humanity as created in the image of God are thus pitted against an intellectual elite 
determined to dehumanize certain elements of society so that they can be destroyed more 
easily.  The reference to the intellectual elite parallels with others we saw in the rhetoric 
about same-sex marriage, like Dobson.  This is the image of the liberal elite as the other, 




 Interestingly, it is the notion of personhood in relation to abortion that also brings 
in the slippery slope arguments we see with same-sex marriage.  Rebecca Hagelin, 
former vice-president of the Heritage Foundation, penned a column for the online 
conservative site Town Hall in 2012 decrying the perceived rise of partial-birth abortions: 
Decades ago, when Roe v. Wade was decided, conservatives and many religious 
folks predicted that the country had begun an inevitable slide towards a 
murderous future: a time when certain people-in addition to unprotected pre-born 
children-- would be declared less valuable than others, their killing justified.  
Back then, liberal voices jeered at warnings of the slippery slope ahead. But those 
fears have become real. (Hagelin 2012, par. 1) 
 
 
PERSONAL RIGHTS AND THE PROTECTION OF THE POWERLESS 
 Ultimately, Alcorn shapes the abortion narrative of the evangelical right as a 
message about being truly human – about the destruction of innocent personhood.  This 
narrative is built on defending the science behind life beginning at conception.  But it 
moves on to arguments about law, social implications, biblical foundations, and health 
and safety.  In looking at the law, he focuses principally on the concept of rights, 
continuing to tie it into the concept of oppression.  But legally, he frames it as one group 
of people affirming its rights over another, comparing abortion to the control of women 
by abusive men:  
Whenever one group of human beings affirms its rights to determine the fate of 
other human beings, it is the beginning of oppression…Ironically, the same 
oppression that women have sometimes endured from men is inflicted upon 
unborn children in abortion.  Some men have used their greater size and strength 
to justify their mistreatment of women, as if his size gives him the right to control 
another.  Today some women use their greater size and strength to justify taking 




This has become a leading argument for movement leaders across the country, who seek 
to pass “personhood” legislation at the state level.  If they can extend legal rights to the 
fetus through the legal and legislative process, then this protection legitimizes a scientific 
view of the nature of the fetus as an unborn child.  The clear message is that abortion is 
an abuse of power that needs to be constricted by the law.  This framing does not take 
into account concerns about the woman’s body or rights herself – it communicates that 
any defense of the woman’s rights produces oppression of the unborn child’s rights, 
therefore, any right the woman has must be set aside in the name of the protection of the 
less powerful human.   
 What about the Roe vs. Wade decision and the current state of abortion law?  Here 
Alcorn presents an idea that is virtually universal among evangelical leaders’ rhetoric:  
just because something is law doesn’t make it moral.  Comparing current abortion law to 
the laws justifying slavery for hundreds of years, he states:  
Civil law does not determine morality.  Rather, the law should reflect a morality 
that exists independently of the law…If abortion killed children before the law 
changed, it continues to kill children since the law changed.  Law or no law, 
either abortion has always been right and always will be, or it has always been 
wrong and always will be.  (135)   
 
From the evangelical view, the law is something that should be directed by outside moral 
forces, especially the Bible.  From the argument of rights infringement, evangelical 
leaders also attack the prochoice concept of a woman’s right to privacy.  Privacy is not a 
choice if the issue is always the destruction of the rights of the unborn child.  The right to 
privacy is overridden by the need to protect human life.  And the rights of a physician to 
provide medical advice get overridden as well.   
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 Another key argument of Alcorn and the evangelical right is the examination of 
potential health and safety risks in the process of having an abortion.  These extend 
beyond physical risks to psychological ones as well.  Running through a litany of loosely 
supported claims, Alcorn connects other medical conditions such breast cancer to 
abortions.  He emphasizes the pain of certain procedures for the mother.  Then he also 
references the impact on the psychological health of the mother, family members, 
extended family members, clinic workers, physicians, and society at large.  The case for 
the health and safety of everyone involved provides a broader moral argument that he ties 
into the discussion of rights and the humanity of all involved.   
 
MORALITY AND OBEDIENCE TO GOD 
 So how do the arguments of rights infringement, scientific defense of personhood, 
and the health and safety of those involved come together into a cogent defense of the 
prolife position?  The crux of this argument tends to always comes back to morality and a 
particular view of theology and religious authority.  After building on logical premises of 
the personhood of the fetus and the limited nature of legal rights when they infringe on 
the rights of others, Alcorn reaches the base level of ethical motivation for the 
evangelical right:  a moral compass directed by a literal interpretation of the Bible.  This 
passage reflects exactly this view: 
America was founded on a moral base dependent upon principles of the Bible and 
the Christian religion.  If our goal is to keep religion from dictating the moral 
principles and laws of our country, we are hundreds of years too late.  Virtually 
every significant document that defines the values of the United States of America 
– including the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of 
Rights – leans heavily on a belief in God and the moral authority of the Bible…It 
is impossible to reject the moral framework of the Scriptures, including the 
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sanctity of human life, and to simultaneously affirm the values of freedom and 
human rights that distinguish the United States of America…religion’s waning 
influence on our society directly accounts for the moral deterioration threatening 
our future.  (168-69) 
 
The loss of the biblical moral base in American society…this is a central message we see 
tying together arguments about both same-sex marriage and abortion.  This runs to the 
idea of legitimate authority.  The only real authority for moral choices for individuals, 
groups, or nations is the Bible – and a particular interpretation of the Scriptures.  Focus 
on the Family’s key online resource for dealing with decisions about love and sex has an 
entire page dedicated to Bible verses that they believe speak to life beginning at 
conception.  Their resource proclaims: “The Bible is far from silent on the topic of the 
sanctity of human life, especially preborn life in the womb. This resource provides just a 
few of the Scripture verses that speak to the value of preborn life created in God's image 
from the moment of fertilization” (Earll, par. 1).  Here we can see the language around 
sanctity of life, as well as the unborn (or preborn) child.  In this case, FOTF is actually 
trying to demonstrate the genesis of life through Scripture references instead of scientific 
evidence.  This helps to show that at its core, this is a theological issue for conservative 
evangelicals. 
In the end, the Bible is what the evangelical right appeals to for the case against 
abortion, because the Scriptures represent the preeminent authority for life, choices, and 
even facts about the world.  While issues of personhood and rights are important, 
ultimately the defense of innocent human life comes back to a commitment to obedience 
to God and what they understand to be God’s Word to humanity.  Obedience to God and 
to God’s values, ideals, traditions, and holiness is wrapped into reading the Scriptures 
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through a literal lens.  And tied closely to this divine obedience is the concept of personal 
responsibility, especially in the sexual realm.  Alcorn ties this in through the language of 
choices: 
The poor choice of premarital sex is never compensated for by the far worse 
choice of killing an innocent human being.  Abortion may cover up a problem, but 
it never solves it.  The poor choice of premarital sex can be learned from, 
reconsidered, and not repeated.  The poor choice of killing an innocent human 
being by abortion is more serious, more permanent, and more unfair.  It causes 
one person to pay for another’s mistake.  Furthermore, it forces the young woman 
to live with the guilt of her decision and gives her an even worse mistake to cover 
up.  Not only the young woman, but all society suffers from the attitudes fostered 
by the abortion alternative.  We send the message to her and to everyone, “The 
individual’s comfort and happiness come first – even if you have to disregard the 
rights of an innocent person to get it.”  This attitude emerges in a thousand arenas, 
big and small, which cumulatively tear apart the moral fabric of society.  (121) 
 
In this text, Alcorn moves away from arguments about power and oppression or the 
scientific determination of the point life begins to the root of much of the evangelical 
right’s primary message in the culture:  individual sexual morality.  The language of 
choices here is the language of personal responsibility – a shift in focus away from law, 
health, or the destruction of the less meaningful back to a central focus of evangelical 
theology.  Here we see the integral connection in the evangelical mind between the 
choice to terminate a pregnancy and the context of that pregnancy in the first place.  It is 
not immediately clear why pregnancy outside of marriage would automatically be 
relevant to the abortion question.  There is a presupposition of the reasons a woman 
would be seeking to terminate a pregnancy; and in this passage, clearly the assumption is 
that these reasons are grounded in cultural shame and an ideal of heterosexual Christian 
marriage.  And the idea here is clearly that the young woman will regret her decision 
(“live with the guilt”); the insinuation is that she isn’t good enough to make this decision, 
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so it must be made for her.   Alcorn implies the logical consequences of disobedience to 
God between the lines of this missive that exhorts the single mother to “learn from, 
reconsider, and not repeat” their presumed mistake.  The act of terminating a pregnancy 
then is intricately linked to sexual purity as understood through the prism of conservative 
evangelical teachings on marriage.   Abortion – the termination of an innocent life – 
becomes a societal ill brought about a lack of personal responsibility and an active 
disobedience to God’s teachings on marriage and sexual purity. 
 
EXISTENTIAL THREAT AND EVANGELICAL ENERGY 
 In addition to the arguments against abortion, another aspect of the conservative 
evangelical texts parallels the rhetoric around same-sex marriage:  the catastrophic 
language of potential calamity and cultural threat.  Just as with other leaders, Alcorn’s 
preferred analogy was Nazi Germany and the Holocaust: 
When my wife and I visited the Yad Vashim Holocaust Memorial in Jerusalem, 
we were most deeply touched by the children’s memorial.  It has 1500 candles, 
with mirrors designed to reflect each candle a thousand times, representing the 1.5 
million children killed in the Holocaust.  We stood in the darkness hearing the 
names of individual children read one by one.  I was struck by the number, 
because at the time it was the same number killed by abortion in America each of 
the previous few years.  (301) 
 
This sense of crisis – one on par with the Holocaust itself – animates the mind of the 
evangelical right regarding both abortion and same-sex marriage.  From this point of 
view, we live in a culture besieged by immorality, irresponsibility, disobedience to God, 
impurity, and an attack on innocence itself.  A continually reinforced sense of cultural 
embattlement is what generates the energy needed to buttress the subcultural boundaries 
and define in-groups and out-groups effectively for sustained social action.   
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EVANGELICAL ORTHODOXY IN ACTION 
Conservative evangelical theology is based in a deep commitment to theological 
orthodoxy; an orthodoxy that always emerges from a highly literalist reading of the 
Christian scriptures.  I make the case that the politically mobilizing (and polarizing) 
issues of same-sex marriage and abortion fit perfectly into a version of this theological 
orthodoxy.  In chapter 3, I hypothesized three ideological frames that explain why these 
two issues rise to preeminence in the evangelical mind.  These were:  Moral 
Purity/Innocence, Personal Responsibility, and Obedience to Authority.  As I looked at 
both of these moral issues, I did find these common themes running in the rhetoric for 
both.  I also found several other common ideas: the symbol of the liberal elite 
(intellectuals, media, Hollywood) as the enemy, the distrust of the humanly created legal 
system as an arbiter of morality, the limited use of science to defend genetic moral 
arguments, and the crisis nature of engaging in culture war.  How do these themes fit into 
my frames?  As I pondered this, I saw that the attitudes toward the legal system and 
toward science are grounded in the concept of obedience to external authority.9  The 
evangelical right respects the findings of scientists or judges only to the extent that these 
findings conform to the ultimate biblical authority.  For the evangelical mind, God’s 
ways take preeminence, period; in private, in public, in law, in science, in life.  So, in this 
                                                
9 The evangelical relationship with science and the Enlightenment is a complicated one.  
Marsden (1991) talks about four types of the Enlightenment and how one in particular 
was based in Scottish Common Sense thought, which was less based in more radical 
skepticism and revolution (128).  This view of Enlightenment thinking has influenced the 
evangelical penchant to see science and Biblicism as inherently compatible, but even in 
the midst of this perceived compatibility, conclusions that contradict their interpretations 
of Scripture are discarded.  
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sense, the attitudes toward courts and scientific findings are a subset of the need for 
Obedience to Authority.   
How do the crisis nature of the cultural conflict and the symbol of the liberal elite 
as enemy fit into the frames?  Are they additional frames within this moral worldview?  I 
looked carefully at these two elements and how they work within the conservative 
evangelical subculture itself.  I realized they don’t really function as ideological frames; 
they both function in a different way.  They are the energy around the strong boundaries 
of the subculture.  The constant element of crisis and existential threat is the engine that 
fuels the maintenance of the boundaries, much like Christian Smith (1998) describes.  
And the liberal elite – whether it be “secular humanists” (Diamond 1989), the media, 
intellectuals, judges, or politicians – are the foil for the subcultural boundaries.  They are 
the ever-present enemy that demands the sense of crisis and always presents catastrophic 
threat.  To sum up, my ideological frames help to explain the what of the subject matter 
for the key political and moral issues on the evangelical right; but the crisis culture and 
the liberal elite help to explain how the ideology is fully mobilized and why it has 
maintained such energy and momentum over the decades.  I turn now to examine this 
how and this why more fully.  How does the model I have proposed get mobilized around 
the salient issues of same-sex marriage and abortion?  What gives these issues such a 
sense of threat in the evangelical mind?  And why have other issues not emerged as just 
as important for the evangelical right?  In chapter 6, I will look at these questions as well 








CHAPTER SIX:  MOBILIZING A MORAL WORLDVIEW 
 
 I have traced ideological frames that emerge from the rhetoric of leaders of the 
evangelical right and hypothesized how these frames fit together into a consistent moral 
worldview that prioritizes the issues of same-sex marriage and abortion in their political 
activism.  Now the key question is:  How is my model of shifting conformity to 
ideological frames mobilized around these political issues?  And how does the model 
relate to other key political issues on the right?  In this chapter, I will discuss how the 
model is mobilized with conservative evangelicals.  In addition, I will look at why the 
issues of same-sex marriage and abortion have emerged as preeminent, as opposed to 
other moral issues involving seemingly similar facets, such as adultery or pornography.  
Finally, I will look at how (or if) my model applies to two other political issues as well:  
capital punishment and healthcare reform.   
 
MOBILIZATION THROUGH CLASSIFICATION 
 The ideological frames that I identified in the analysis were:  Moral 
Purity/Innocence, Personal Responsibility, and Obedience to Authority.  I also identified 
the sense of crisis as the engine animating the use of these frames, and the liberal elite as 
the foil for the application of cultural boundaries.  These frames fit together to form an 
idealized norm of family identity, or a family archetype, in the evangelical mind.  In 
chapter 5, we looked at how the three themes emerge from the texts and in chapter 3, I 
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hypothesized how these fit together for a concrete worldview and talked about the cycle 
of political mobilization (see Figure 5).   
We see the rhetoric of the preborn on unborn child in much of the messaging 
around abortion.  And the institution of marriage is consistently presented as the 
foundational element of the idealized family in human society.  We have seen how these 
concepts are articulated, but the key to understanding the mobilization of evangelicals 
around the frames is found in the classification of individuals, groups, or institutions.   
 Since the ideological frames I present are directly connected to theological 
orthodoxy, conformity of thought is the principal idea and mechanism for preserving 
boundaries.  The classifications I observe in conservative evangelical attitudes are:  1) 
conforming (honorable), 2) nonconforming (shameful), and 3) potentially conforming 
(redeemable).  The evangelical world is a world of shame and honor; personal 
redemption is the path out of shame to a place of honor before God.  Because of this 
redemptive dynamic inherent in evangelical thought, the formation of the “other” is not 
just us vs. them, it is us, them, or potentially us.  It is the potentially us category of status 
that provides the impetus for social and political evangelization to the conservative 
evangelical moral worldview.  People, groups, and institutions can be redeemed to a 
place where they become innocent, responsible, and obedient to God as evangelicals 
argue was divinely intended.  However, when a group, institution, or individual fights 
actively against this moral worldview, they are deemed shameful.  Certain groups, 
especially organizations such as the ACLU or Planned Parenthood, become icons and 
rhetorical symbols of this shame.  For the evangelical right, these organizations will 
never fall into the redeemable classification.  
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 In his book Culture Shift, Albert Mohler describes the evangelical mindset in 
reference to living in the culture: 
An honest evaluation reveals that many of the most cherished assumptions of our 
culture are in direct conflict with the teachings of Christ.  We cannot accept the 
idea that we are what we consume and possess. We cannot accept the denial of 
human dignity that underlies this culture’s acceptance of the destruction of human 
life in the womb and in the laboratory.  We cannot buy in to the cherished myth of 
autonomous individualism, and we cannot compromise with a worldview based 
on the assumption that truth is relative or socially constructed.  At the same time, 
we remember that our Lord gave His church an evangelistic commission – to be 
witnesses of the gospel. Every single person we will try to reach with the gospel is 
embedded in some culture.  Understanding the culture thus becomes a matter of 
evangelistic urgency. (2011a, xii-xiii) 
 
In this segment of text, we see several elements I am talking about.  The culture is in 
conflict with the call to obedience to the holy teachings of Christ.  But even in the midst 
of counter-cultural beliefs, Mohler brings in the evangelistic urgency of being witnesses 
to those who might convert and conform to the correct way.  The evangelistic 
commission of the church is extended into the realm of political transformation through 
social activism on the key issues of the day.  Mohler frames the discussion around 
homosexuality as well.  He frames the battle over same-sex relational acceptance in 
Desire and Deceit: 
Those who oppose the normalization of homosexuality have indeed been 
presented as backwoods, antiquated, and dangerous people, while those advancing 
the cause are presented as forces for light, progress, and acceptance.  
Conservative Christians have been presented as proponents of hatred rather than 
as individuals driven by biblical conviction.  The unprecedented success of this 
public-relations strategy helps to explain everything from why America has 
accepted homosexual characters and plotlines in prime-time entertainment to the 
lack of outrage in response to same-sex marriage in Massachusetts.  At least we 
know what we are up against.  Biblical Christians must continue to talk about 
right and wrong even when the larger world dismisses morality as an outdated 
concept.  We must maintain marriage as a nonnegotiable norm – a union of a man 
and a woman – even when the courts redefine marriage by fiat.  At the same time, 
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we must take into account the transformation of the American mind that is now so 
devastatingly evident to all who have eyes to see. (2008, 101-102) 
 
This passage brings out so many interesting elements of the messaging around same-sex 
marriage.  The us (conservative Christians) is defended against the demonization of the 
homosexual agenda, claiming that Christians are defamed as “proponents of hatred.”  His 
contrast to that assessment points back to the legitimate authority – they are actually 
“driven by biblical conviction.”  As he continues, he references two favorite 
nonconforming, shameful themes for the evangelical right – the entertainment industry 
and the courts.  The entertainment industry is the enemy because they have promoted 
“homosexual characters and plotlines” while the courts have “redefined marriage by fiat.”  
Mohler calls back to the concept of external sources of morality by labeling those that 
believe as he does “Biblical Christians” and painting those who disagree with the 
particular moral worldview as dismissing morality as “an outdated concept.”  In 
acknowledging that the battle is for the “transformation of the American mind,” he also 
hints that individuals can be seen as redeemable even in the midst of this cultural change.  
This “redeemability” is a shifting phenomenon.  Take the reparative gay conversion 
therapy movement that took hold in the 1990s and early 2000s.  The rhetoric around this 
movement presented LGBTQ individuals as redeemable and potentially conforming and 
presented options for a therapy group that supposedly would convert them back to 
heterosexuality.  As these have lost influence, the rhetoric has shifted back to target 
LGBTQ leaders as enemies of a biblical morality and a shameful them to be battled at all 
costs.  Dobson writes about this movement in Bringing up Boys: “I would be less than 
honest if I didn’t admit that homosexuality is not easily overcome and that those who try 
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often struggle mightily.  But it would be equally dishonest to say that there is no hope for 
those who want to change.  Credible research indicates otherwise” (2001, 117).  
Dobson’s tone here is one of the “struggles” and “hope for change” for gay men and 
lesbian women.  While still forcefully opposing the idea of the legitimacy of 
homosexuality, the rhetoric toward the men and women involved in this therapy is highly 
focused on redemption and potential conformity to the heterosexual ideal.  This 
perception of gay and lesbian “ordinary” people as redeemable does not extend to gay 
rights leaders, however.  Conservative evangelicals continue to view the movement 
leaders as shameful and nonconforming.  When leaders of the reparative therapy 
movement drop out and denounce the movement, however, they are turned against 
quickly and become shameful and nonconforming once again.  A good example of this is 
the immediate attack on Alan Chambers, the leader of Exodus International when it 
should down.  Michael Brown, a leader in conservative evangelical circles and a 
columnist for Charisma News, said this of Chambers after the collapse of Exodus: 
There is always a danger when one person becomes the face of a movement or 
denomination. When Alan Chambers offered an apology to the LGBT community 
for alleged harm done to them through Exodus International, he was not speaking 
for thousands of ex-gays or for hundreds of churches and ministries that are 
involved in ministering to homosexual men and women. He was speaking for 
himself (and perhaps for members of his board, some staff and some Exodus-
affiliated ministries).  Of course, the secular and gay media are presenting this as 
far more than the apology of one man—first, because it helps discredit the entire 
ex-gay movement, and second, because in recent years, Alan has increasingly 
become the face of Exodus and, by extension, of a vast and diverse movement.  
This is a real shame, and we need to guard against the “one man (or one woman) 
speaks for us all” mindset. (Brown 2013, par. 2) 
 
Brown ended up serving on the board of advisors for the Restored Hope Network, which 
became the “new” Exodus in the wake of its demise.  This organization continues to try 
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to do gay reparative therapy for gays.  The movement also continues to have an 
organization that focuses on the “scientific” side of the equation, the Alliance for 
Therapeutic Choice and Scientific Integrity (formerly NARTH).  
 On the abortion front, Planned Parenthood, abortion-providing physicians, and 
other pro-choice advocacy groups are the shameful them to be opposed.  The mother 
considering an abortion on the other hand, is highly redeemable and the primary target 
for convincing about the moral problems with it.  In Alcorn’s book, he has an entire 
appendix dedicated to “Fifty Ways to Help Unborn Babies and Their Mothers” (2000, 
343).  The messaging is that the mother must be saved from her own bad decision before 
she makes it; saved from her irresponsible behavior and the inevitable lifelong personal 
guilt and shame prolife advocates insist will be the consequences of that decision.  Even 
in rhetoric around an abortion that has occurred, the mother is usually not the target of 
anti-abortion activists; it is usually the clinic or the doctor that performed the procedure.  
This opposition against the shameful them can manifest itself in blockades of clinic doors 
and other protests.   
 Evangelical right leaders decry the new sexual tolerance of the culture and make 
connections between lust, pornography, and homosexual identity.  Mohler states: “Our 
society has institutionalized lust, weaving the patterns of illicit sexual desire throughout 
culture’s interplay of media, entertainment, status, and advertising.  Lust is now part and 
parcel of the modern vision of the good life” (2008, 20).  Here he points to the liberal 
media as well as the entertainment industry, typical thems to be opposed vehemently.  
Whether it be academic elites that are corrupting students’ minds in the universities, or 
Hollywood elites that are filling the culture with perverse ideas, the image of the 
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powerful corrupting elite provides a forceful symbol of shame and deviance from the 
ways of God.  Hollywood and academia are typically not seen as redeemable institutions; 
they are seen as the enemy which cannot be trusted and must be guarded against by 
limiting liberal education or certain media consumption for children.10 
 
IDEAL TYPES 
 In chapter 3, I discussed the symbols of the unborn child, the homosexual, and the 
institution of marriage as ideal types of the ideological frames. I want to reemphasize that 
it is the perfect fit that these types have to the frames that make them such compelling 
symbols and ultimately make these political issues the ones that mobilize evangelicals so 
effectively, however selective that application of the frames may be.  The unborn child 
represents an innocence and moral purity, uncompromised by human mistakes, a perfect 
pre-obedient, pre-responsible state.  The fetus is fully dependent and reliant on the 
mother, not subject yet to tests of responsibility but appropriate to its place.  The same 
applies for the institution of marriage- it is the most pure and innocent structure, 
foundational under God’s authority, and the example of expressing sexuality within 
God’s structures of responsibility.  For the conservative evangelical moral worldview, 
homosexuality, on the other hand, represents an opposite type:  extraordinarily impure 
shame and guilt, irresponsibility, and disobedience to God.  These simple symbols 
                                                
10 An exception to this view of secular academia is the existence of evangelical 
universities and colleges like Wheaton.  Evangelical places of higher education have 
become a lauded alternative by conservative evangelical leaders looking to shield young 
people from those institutions that have “abandoned” their heritage as religious 
institutions and succumbed to the secular liberal culture.  (Marsden 1991) 
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become powerful expressions of a basic way of thinking about ethics in the world.  They 
trigger the boundaries and elicit the passion because they fit the frames that emerge from 
atonement theology and the workings of the evangelical mind.   
Are there any other ideal types that may also fit the ideological frames well?  
Why have the issues of same-sex marriage and abortion become preeminent while issues 
such as adultery or pornography have not mobilized evangelicals to the same extent?  
Adultery and pornography certainly inspire concern among evangelicals, but they have 
not seen the same level of passionate advocacy as the opposition to same-sex marriage 
and abortion.  What is it that is different about these issues?  I believe the key is found in 
the power of the archetype of family itself.  Family is not just an idea to evangelicals; it is 
a metaphor for one’s eternal inclusion in a relationship with God and one’s most 
important identity.  The evangelical believer’s public calling is to make families more 
conforming to God’s ways and, in so doing, to transform the culture itself.  The family is 
the basic unit of social structure in the evangelical mind, and the symbol of family is 
extraordinarily powerful. 
I argue, then, that because the heterosexual, monogamous family is an archetype, 
the most divergent or adherent symbols to this idealized family norm drive action and 
mobilize the evangelical right.  While the actions of one’s unfaithfulness in adultery or 
one’s consumption of porn certainly provide a challenge to the core frames of moral 
purity/innocence, personal responsibility, and obedience to authority, these behaviors do 
not hold the same power as the symbolic identities of the unborn child or homosexual or 
the powerful symbol of the institution of marriage.  While the calling to purity and 
responsibility is the same, the contrast of symbolic identities is most powerful in the ideal 
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types I have identified, thus these issues activate evangelical moral and political 
commitment like no others.  There is a sense of threat and taboo in the juxtaposition of 
symbols that creates a deeper level of anxiety within the evangelical mind. This anxiety 
activates these political issues in a different way. 
Could opposing polyamory or another symbolic identity also emerge as a more 
central moral cause in the future?  Perhaps.  Those issues that contain strong symbolic 
identities with a sharp contrast to the ideological frames would be candidates to emerge 
as key political issues as well.  At this point, the perceived threat to the family archetype 
from identities such as polyamory have not reached the same level as the other identities.  
As polyamory gains more cultural acceptance, I would argue that this could change 
quickly. 
What does the model look like when applied to other issues that evangelicals may 
take a position on?  I will look at two other issues in particular, beginning with capital 
punishment.   
 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT  
 Conservative evangelicals like to present themselves as consistently being 
biblically prolife, especially when they talk about abortion.  I have framed this as pro-
innocence rather than prolife, and the issue of capital punishment is one of the best 
examples of why this distinction is important.  A 2016 Pew Research Poll speaks to the 
death penalty question. While non-white Catholics tend to oppose both abortion and the 
death penalty, white evangelicals were by far the strongest religious identity supporting 




Figure 7:  Pew Research Survey on the Death Penalty  
The only identity with a greater percentage of support for the death penalty was 
politically identifying as a Republican, with 72 percent support.  The position on the 
death penalty makes perfect sense in light of the ideological frames I have presented.  
Convicted felons are another deep symbol of the flip side of the ideological frames:  
irresponsible behavior, rebellion against authority, and guilt.  Any potential errors in 
convictions or other factors do not sway the evangelical need to see the shameful, 
nonconforming opponent of God’s ways punished for their sins.  Defending innocence 
means making murderers pay for their crimes with a likewise punishment of death.  
There is no room for redemption or potential change with death row inmates according to 
this worldview.  The evangelical tendency to see all misdeeds as individual affairs with 
no social component also factors into the view of the prison system and the court 
decisions.  This black and white view of the law does not allow for arguments about bias 
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within the criminal justice system, especially relating to race.  All of this adds up to a 
strong preference in support of the death penalty among evangelicals for the same reason 
as they oppose abortion and same-sex marriage:  the defense of innocence and the God-
ordained destruction of the guilty and shameful. 
 
HEALTHCARE REFORM 
 With the advent of the Affordable Care Act in 2010, health care law changed in 
the United States, expanding coverage for millions of Americans and providing subsidies 
for those who could not afford coverage.  Conservative evangelical leaders have been 
some of the most vocal opponents of the law.  Why is this the case?  Wouldn’t expanding 
health care access to millions of people be a positive and moral effort? 
 Matthew Sutton’s book, American Apocalypse, proposes that the apocalypticism 
present in modern evangelicalism is at the root of this perspective.   He argues that end 
times thinking and millennial theology shape evangelical thought on issues such as health 
reform, civil rights, and environmental policy.  He contends that there is a pressing 
expectation of the end times and the second coming of Christ, the social improvements 
become secondary to the worldview of evangelicals. 
 Healthcare law is a complex issue, and I think the conservative evangelical 
perspective is less clear-cut than on issues of abortion or marriage.  However, I do 
believe my model holds some explanatory power for the conservative evangelical 
perspective on healthcare reform.  This application is primarily around the frame of 
personal responsibility. Conservative evangelicals believe strongly that each individual 
(and especially the head of a household) has the responsibility to provide the needs for 
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themselves and his or her family.  This is a command from God and a factor of obedience 
to the legitimate authority of God as handed down through the Bible.  The idea that the 
government mandates and subsidizes the purchase of an issue that would normally be up 
to the individual to be responsible to provide pushes up against the ideological frames.  
The government is not seen as a legitimate source of authority and nurturance in the 
evangelical mind.  Government programs try to take the place of God’s church in 
providing for people’s needs.  It is a question of reliance for needs on an authority that is 
not God.  This is seen as irresponsible rather than independently responsible.  This 
reliance is seen as a moral issue because it shirks responsibility by leaning on the corrupt 
government for needs that should only come from the legitimate place of authority in 
one’s life, God and God’s holy church.  Interestingly, Vice President Mike Pence, a hero 
of the evangelical right, focused on this exact theme in promoting the Republican attempt 
to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act.  In a speech to Focus on the Family in 
June 2017, Pence stated:   
And I can promise you, President Trump and I will not rest and we will not 
relent until we repeal and replace Obamacare and give the American people the 
kind of world-class healthcare they deserve, built on freedom, personal 
responsibility, free market competition, and state-based reform.  That's the 
American way to meet our healthcare needs in the 21st century.  (Pence 2017)  
 
 This argument is also partially supported in what I found from different 
evangelical thinkers.  Tony Perkins, the head of the Family Research Council, focused 
more on the clauses regarding free birth control but also touches on the free market in his 
remarks from 2013: 
Obamacare is not the typical political virus that spreads from Washington, D.C. 
infecting the body politic. This is a rare strain of 'flesh-eating bacteria' that if not 
stopped and stopped now threatens the very life of our Republic.  We need to 
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defund Obamacare but also need to add conscience protections. Obamacare will 
subsidize abortion and lead to health care rationing, and defunding would stop 
that. But defunding alone will not stop legal mandates like the HHS mandate 
against religious businesses, charities and non-profits and religious universities, 
so adding conscience protections is essential as well. Religious employers should 
not be discriminated against because they oppose abortifacients or contraceptives. 
(Perkins 2013, par. 2-3) 
 
 Key to his comments here are the phrases “health care rationing” and “conscience 
protections”.  Perkins and other conservative evangelicals portrayed the Affordable Care 
Act as taking away the influence of the free market by big government.  He also ties the 
abortion argument in by focusing on the requirement for businesses to provide 
contraceptives. This emphasis on free market and personal responsibility pervades 
evangelical rhetoric on healthcare and other government programs.  While all aspects of 
my model may not necessarily directly correlate, the concept of personal responsibility 
seems to be at the center of their worldview regarding this issue as well. 
 
MOBILIZATION AND IDENTITY 
 In conclusion, I argue that the juxtaposition of symbolic identity lies at the center 
of political mobilization for the evangelical right.  Forces of threat and taboo empower 
the cycle which activates energy around the issues of same-sex marriage and abortion.  
The symbol of the idealized family provides a powerful image through which to view 
potential public moral commitments.  While other issues may arise in the future, my 









CHAPTER SEVEN:  CONCLUSION 
 
 Theology is at the heart of the moral worldview and the political action of the 
evangelical right.  Their moral worldview, indoctrinated in the pews and emboldened by 
their media consumption, leads to a political perspective that is held almost as sacred as 
their theology itself.  In this sense, to be a conservative evangelical believer is to be an 
American patriot, defined most clearly through the lens of the issues of same-sex 
marriage and abortion.  My theory articulates how the theology translates directly into a 
fiercely held political identity. 
 
POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS 
 The discussion of a topic with such broad implications would not be complete 
without acknowledgement of potential limitations of this theory and the research behind 
it. By choosing to look at rhetoric from leaders only within the evangelical right 
movement, I have tried to capture the motivating impetus behind the political passions 
there; however, this analysis is not exhaustive.  I chose leaders that are at the forefront of 
evangelical life, but not all leaders can be equally reflected in this examination.  There 
are subjective choices of organizations (e.g., Focus on the Family, Family Research 
Council, the Southern Baptist Convention) and leaders (e.g., James Dobson, Tony 
Perkins, Albert Mohler) that may or may not reflect the broad consensus of evangelical 
opinion.  While I made every effort to examine the texts without bias, there is always a 
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chance that a theme or key insight might be missed.  Every effort has been made to be 
accurate in following the arguments of the authors, but subjective judgments will always 
come in when coding these texts.  In addition, the bulk of authors examined tend to be 
from the Colorado Springs evangelical area or from the South.  There could be a regional 
factor to points of view regarding these political issues that is not being accounted for in 
the analysis (Silk & Walsh 2011).   
 In addition to possible regional factors in perspective, there are also potential 
differences due to race, gender, class, or age.  My inquiry focuses heavily on the 
implications of theology on a group of people that are predominantly white.  Theology is 
not formed in a vacuum; race, gender, and class differences shape theology and readings 
of the Bible.  The theory does not give a large place to race in the construction of the 
political ideology, and there is always the chance that this factor plays a larger role in the 
importance of these issues.  The same goes for gender, and gender is a particularly 
important issue with same-sex marriage.  Are there differences in the way men or women 
evangelicals look at same-sex marriage?  How does gender fluidity and the evangelical 
penchant to deny this fluidity factor into perspectives?  And do evangelical women hold 
any different position than evangelical men regarding abortion?  Even if they do hold a 
different perspective, is there permission within the subculture for them to own or 
communicate this perspective?  Does it matter for evangelical women that the discussion 
is about a woman’s body?  Class (and education level) is another important factor.  Do 
white collar evangelicals hold the same perspectives as blue collar evangelicals?  How 
does education level affect one’s perspective on biblical literalism and external authority?  
And what about age?  Do millennials hold identical perspectives on these political issues 
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and, if not, are they less connected to the ideological frames?  Does church attendance 
matter to reinforcing the belief system?  How do conservative evangelical millennials 
shift perspectives (if at all) when they do not attend church as regularly?  Does regular 
church attendance affect political perspectives on these issues in general? 
 In addition to these factors, we have seen the role of cultural crisis and 
cataclysmic rhetoric in the elite framing in the previous chapters.  Is this rhetoric 
connected to apocalyptic theology (dealing with the end times)?  How many of the 
churches that would describe themselves as predominantly conservative evangelical teach 
end times millennial theology as part of their essential message?  Is the sense of 
inevitable societal demise a factor in the susceptibility of evangelical believers to the 
cultural crisis message?  This would be an interesting element to investigate as part of 
further research as well.    
 All of these factors are potential limitations to the project and do suggest that 
further study could be warranted.  This study should likely be conducted at the level of 
the people “in the pews”; everyday non-elite participants who self-identify as 
evangelicals.   
 
METHODOLOGIES FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
 While these are all legitimate potential limitations, I found the rhetoric from 
evangelical leaders to be quite consistent and focused predominantly on theological 
motivations for political action.  A survey of conservative evangelical congregational 
participants (in different denominations across different national regions) could be one 
way to investigate the frames and whether they resonate at the congregational level as 
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fully as at the level of political leader. This survey would need to interrogate the 
underlying motivations for the political perspective without leading the answers.  Perhaps 
a Likert scale-centered approach that examined different motivations would provide the 
best feedback.  It would be very important to balance other demographic factors to make 
sure that the data provides an accurate overall picture of these perspectives at the non-
elite level.  Race, gender, class, and age need to be taken into account.  And another 
challenge in doing these surveys is that not all self-identified conservative evangelicals 
are going to be attending congregations that identify in this way.  How do you reach these 
people?  The survey might also be more effective in looking at active participants in 
groups like Focus on the Family.  Activists on this front would certainly have the passion 
for the political issues and a survey could look at whether the theological motivations are 
at the core of their commitments there.  This would cross congregational and 
denominational boundaries, but might also leave out a number of evangelicals who aren’t 
involved in these parachurch organizations.  Having a broader selection of participants 
within congregations would potentially allow for greater diversity in position on these 
issues and the ability to see if differences in core theological tenets might help explain 
any differences. 
 
IMPACT IN THE FIELD AND FUTURE STUDY 
 My theory contributes to the scholarly discussion on evangelical subcultural 
identity and motivation by providing an alternate vision of the role of theological 
orthodoxy in political identity.  It takes the “onion” view of culture (Wellman) and 
Swidler’s concept of cultural tools and melds these together, particularly highlighting 
	
 127 
how ideological commitment comes about in the evangelical mind.  By focusing on the 
concept of the evangelical subculture’s moral worldview, my theory grounds evangelical 
social and political action firmly in a reaction to the theology of substitutionary 
atonement and downplays other social and structural factors.   My model demonstrates 
how theology directly generates moral claims that then become political commitments.  I 
take the theological themes that dominate evangelical thought and explain how these 
themes form frames that limit choices and adhere to an idealized symbol of family 
identity.  The cycle of mobilization I propose delineates how these frames (and the ideal 
types that emerge from them) work together to provide order and structure to the 
evangelical moral world.  My model also provides a new concept of how evangelicals 
classify and set boundaries between themselves and the other; a trinary with potentiality 
included, rather than the typical framing of us and them.  Future scholarly work would 
likely want to investigate the validity of the ideological frames and symbols at the non-
elite level: regular church attenders in conservative evangelical congregations.  Exploring 
the perspectives of ordinary church attenders could be particularly enlightening to see if 
some of the presuppositions of my research hold true at the parishioner level. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLITICAL ACTION  
 The model provides a strong basis not only for future research endeavors, but also 
for understanding how to advance or oppose conservative evangelical political 
commitments.  For conservative evangelical leaders, understanding more clearly which 
symbols and arguments most resonate with the theological tenets of the people can help 
to hone the message and advance the cause more efficiently.  Some arguments may be 
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more effective than others, and understanding how the movement of other individuals 
and groups between potentially conforming and non-confirming categories can motivate 
engagement or detachment can help leaders to craft messages that bring about the most 
productive political action.  By understanding the most persuasive themes, leaders can 
emphasize the importance of things like personal responsibility as a God-given necessity 
to encourage more activism on the issues by those who may not be as engaged.   
 For more progressive political leaders, the model provides a different opportunity; 
the chance to examine the bases of the ideological frames and challenge these ideas as a 
more foundational approach to changing minds on the political issues.  For example, one 
of the central frames is obedience to authority.  This authority is framed as an external 
legitimate authority for the evangelical believer- God as interpreted through the Bible.  If 
this is a central idea at the heart of the political commitment, then either challenging the 
believer to move the source of authority to an internal evaluation (education on 
conscience and ethics) or perhaps more likely, reinterpreting the external source of 
authority (challenging biblical literalism as the only way to interpret the Bible) would be 
a key approach to changing the political belief.  Or on the front of personal responsibility, 
the frame could be reinterpreted to expand the understanding of what responsibility 
entails.  Perhaps responsibility is not individual, but corporate at the core.  By 
challenging a framing that involves honor and shame around responsibility, progressive 
educator activists could break the automatic tie between the idea and the conclusion.  The 
pivotal point here is that until the ideological frame can be loosened, the thinking will not 
be changed.  The frames constrict the number of choices and the cultural tools that can be 
used to evaluate the issues (Swidler 1986).  Whether motivating conservative action or 
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more liberal political action, education is at the center of understanding, reinforcing, or 
changing the foundational beliefs. 
  
 IN CONCLUSION 
 The issues of same-sex marriage and abortion continue to be highly passionate 
and divisive political hot buttons in American society, and particularly with the election 
of President Donald Trump and the appointment of a new Supreme Court judge in 2017.  
The culture wars rhetoric and the level of political polarization continue to grow.  By 
examining the critical symbols of the unborn child, the homosexual, and the institution of 
marriage, we have identified ideal types of the evangelical right’s moral worldview.  
Evangelicals perceive the legalization of same-sex marriage and abortion as the ultimate 
destruction of innocence, of responsibility, and of legitimate authority, calling them to an 
existential battle for the ethical salvation of our culture.  They hold on to an idealized 
norm of family as a symbolic, structural, and constant imperative in an ever-changing 
culture around them.  Understanding the evangelical moral worldview and the theological 
basis for their closely held commitments can illuminate the cultural context we find 
ourselves in and provide a roadmap forward for those who would take a position on these 





Abramowitz, Alan I.  Voice of the People: Elections and Voting in the United States.  
New York:  McGraw-Hill, 2004.  
 
–––.  The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American 
Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010.  
 
Adorno, Theodor W., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford.  
The Authoritarian Personality.  Oxford, UK: Harpers, 1950.  
 
Alcorn, Randy.  ProLife Answers to ProChoice Arguments.  Colorado Springs, CO:  
Multnomah Publishers, 2000.   
 
Alexander-Moegerle, Gil.  James Dobson’s War on America.  Amherst, NY:  Prometheus 
Books, 1997. 
 
Allen, Bob.  “Huckabee Defends Praise of Revisionist Historian.”  Christian Century 
128, no. 9 (2011): 19. 
 
Allport, Gordon W., and J. M. Ross.  “Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice.”  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 5 (1967): 432-443. 
 
Altemeyer, Bob.  Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-Wing Authoritarianism.  
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1988.  
 
–––. The Authoritarian Specter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.  
 
Ammerman, Nancy T.  Bible Believers: Fundamentalists in the Modern World.  New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987.  
 
–––.  Baptist Battles: Social Change and Religious Conflict in the Southern Baptist 
Convention.  New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995.  
 
–––.  Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives.  New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007.  
 
–––.  Southern Baptists and the New Christian Right. Review of Religious Research 50 
(October 2008):  69-91.  
 
Ammerman, Nancy T., and Arthur E. Farnsley. Congregation & Community. New 




Aune, Kristin.  “Between Subordination and Sympathy:  Evangelical Christians, 
Masculinity, and Gay Sexuality,” in Contemporary Christianity and LGBT 
Sexualities, edited by Stephen Hunt, 39-49.  Burlington, VT:  Ashgate, 2009. 
 
Bailey, David C.  “Enacting Transformation: George W. Bush and the Pauline 
Conversion Narrative in a Charge to Keep.”  Rhetoric & Public Affairs 11, no. 2 
(2008):  215-41.  
 
Bailey, Jennifer L.  “American Conservative Protestants and Embedded Literacy,” in 
Fundamentalism in the Modern World Vol. 2:  Fundamentalism and 
Communication, edited by Ulrika Martensson, Jennifer Bailey, Priscilla Ringrose, 
and Asbjorn Dyrendal, 147-168.  New York:  I. B. Taurus, 2011. 
 
Bailey, Sarah P.  “Evangelical Moderates:  Are They Becoming Less Conservative?  Or 
Are They Just Saying So?”  Christianity Today 52, no. 11 (2008):  16-17. 
 
–––.  Battle Fatigue.  Christianity Today 53, no. 1 (2009):  11. 
 
–––.  “Refocusing on the Family:  Like Many Evangelical Organizations That Were Built 
in the Past 50 Years, Focus on the Family is Attempting to Thrive – and Survive – 
Past Its Founder.”  Christianity Today 55, no. 7 (2011):  20-26. 
 
–––.  2012.  “Mass Appeal:  Evangelicals Copy More of Catholic Playbook.”  
Christianity Today 56, no. 4 (2012):  16. 
 
Balmer, Randall H.  Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory: A Journey into the Evangelical 
Subculture in America.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.  
 
–––.  “A Pentecost of Politics”:  Evangelicals, Public Discourse, and American Culture.”  
Union Seminary Quarterly Review 47, no 1-2 (1993):  15-28. 
 
–––.  Blessed Assurance: A History of Evangelicalism in America. Boston: Beacon Press, 
1999.  
 
–––.  Thy Kingdom Come: How the Religious Right Distorts the Faith and Threatens 
America - An Evangelical's Lament. New York: Basic Books, 2006.  
 
Balmer, Randall H., and Lauren F. Winner.  Protestantism in America.  New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002.  
 
Bartkowski, John P.  “Spare the Rod...Or Spare the Child? Divergent Perspectives on 
Conservative Protestant Child Discipline.”  Review of Religious Research 37, no. 2  




–––.  “Distant Patriarchs Or Expressive Dads: The Discourse and Practice of Fathering in 
Conservative Protestant Families.”  Sociological Quarterly 41, no. 3 (2000):  465-
85.  
 
–––.  The Promise Keepers: Servants, Soldiers, and Godly Men. New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 2004.  
 
Bartkowski, John P., and Christopher G. Ellison.  “Divergent Models of Childrearing in 
Popular Manuals: Conservative Protestants Vs. the Mainstream Experts.”  Sociology 
of Religion 56, no. 1 (1995):  21-34.  
 
Bartkowski, John P., and Lynn M. Hempel.  “Sex and Gender Traditionalism among 
Conservative Protestants: Does the Difference make a Difference?”  Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion 48, no. 4 (2009):  805-16.  
 
Barton, David.  America’s Godly Heritage.  Aledo, TX:  WallBuilders, 2009. 
 
Barton, David, and John Pevoto.  “The American Heritage Series.”  10 DVD set.  
Directed by John Pevoto.  Aledo, TX:  WallBuilders, 2007.   
 
Bathija, Sandhya.  “Answering the Call:  Evangelist Lou Engle Rallies Evangelical Youth 
on Behalf of the Religious Right.”  Church & State 61, no. 9 (2008):  202-3. 
 
Bean, Lydia, Marco Gonzalez, and Jason Kaufman.  “Why Doesn't Canada have an 
American-Style Christian Right? A Comparative Framework for Analyzing the 
Political Effects of Evangelical Subcultural Identity.”  Canadian Journal of 
Sociology 33, no. 4 (2008):  899-943.  
 
Bebbington, David W.  Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to 
the 1980s.  Boston:  Unwin Hyman, 1989.  
 
Beck, James R.  “Evangelicals, Homosexuality, and Social Science.”  Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 40, no. 1 (1997):  83-97. 
 
Bellah, Robert N.  “Civil Religion in America.”  Journal of the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences 96, no. 1 (1967):  1-21.  
 
Bellah, Robert N.  Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life.  
Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1985.  
 
–––.  The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in a Time of Trial.  New York:  
Seabury Press, 1975.  
 
Bellah, Robert N., and Phillip E. Hammond.  Varieties of Civil Religion.  San Francisco: 




Bercovitch, Sacvan.  The Puritan Origins of the American Self.  New Haven, CT:  Yale 
University Press, 1975.  
 
–––.  The American Jeremiad.  Madison:  University of Wisconsin Press, 1978.  
 
 
Berger, Peter L.  The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. 
New York:  Anchor Books, 1967.  
 
–––.  The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics.  Grand 
Rapids, MI:  W.B. Eerdmans, 1999.  
 
Bivins, Jason.  “The Religion of Fear:  Conservative Evangelicals, Identity, and 
Antiliberal Pop.”  Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 8, no. 2 (2007):  81-
103. 
 
Blue, Miranda.  “Tony Perkins: ‘Blood On Our Streets’ Because Of Gay Marriage, 
Family ‘Confusion’.”  Right Wing Watch.  January 12, 2016.  Accessed April 20, 
2017.  http://www.rightwingwatch.org/post/tony-perkins-blood-on-our-streets-
because-of-gay-marriage-family-confusion/.   
 
Boston, Rob.  “The Religious Right After Falwell:  Fundamentalist Political Movement is 
Less Visible but More Powerful Than Ever.”  Church & State 60, no. 7 (2007a):  
148-150. 
 
–––.  “Party Poopers?  James Dobson, Religious Right Allies Threaten to Dump GOP if 
Presidential Nominee Fails ‘Family Values’ Test.”  Church & State 60, no. 10 
(2007b):  220-223. 
 
–––.  “Power Struggle:  With James Dobson Inching Toward Retirement and Others Off 
the Scene, Many Wonder Who Will Fill the Religious Right’s Bully Pulpit.”  Church 
& State 62, no. 5 (2009a):  105-109. 
 
–––.  “Texas Tall Tale:  Religious Right Cowboy David Barton’s Fixin’ to Rewrite the 
Social Studies Textbooks in the Lone Star State (and Maybe Yours Too).”  Church 
& State 62, no. 7 (2009b):  151-154. 
 
–––.  “Return of the Dubious Duo:  Religious Right Has-Beens Ralph Reed and Randall 
Terry are Trying for a Resurrection.”  Church & State 62, no. 8 (2009c):  178-180. 
 
–––.  “Ralph Reed, Born Again:  Ronald Reagan Trumps Jesus at Faith & Freedom 
Conference, as Religious Right Operatives Seek to Lure Churches into Another 




–––.  “Congressional Con Game:  Talking Issues but Pushing Candidates, the Faith & 
Freedom Coalition Proselytizes for the GOP.”  Church & State 64, no. 7 (2011b):  
151. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre.  Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action.  Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998.  
 
Bourdieu, Pierre, and Jean C. Passeron.  Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture.  
Sage Studies in Social and Educational Change, vol. 5.  Beverly Hills:  Sage 
Publications, 1977.  
 
Brasher, Brenda E.  Godly Women: Fundamentalism and Female Power.  New 
Brunswick, NJ:  Rutgers University Press, 1998.  
 
Brewer, Mark D.  “The Evolution and Electoral Impact of White Evangelicals' Party 
Images.”  Conference Papers -- Midwestern Political Science Association (2008): 1.  
 
Brewer, Mark D., Rogan Kersh, and R. E. Petersen.  “Assessing Conventional Wisdom 
about Religion and Politics: A Preliminary View from the Pews.”  Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion 42, no. 1 (2003):  125-36.  
 
Bridges, Jerry.  The Pursuit of Holiness.  Colorado Springs, CO:  NavPress, 2006. 
 
–––.  Respectable Sins: Confronting the Sins We Tolerate.  Colorado Springs, CO:  
NavPress, 2007. 
 
Brody, David, Wendy Wright, and David P Gushee.  “What Place do Christians Have in 
the Tea Party Movement?  Mixing Jesus Into Populist Politics.”  Christianity Today 
54, no. 10 (2010):  54-55. 
 
Brown, Michael. "6 lessons from the collapse of Exodus International." Charisma News. 
June 24, 2013. Accessed April 19, 2017.  http://www.charismanews.com/opinion/in-
the-line-of-fire/39991-6-lessons-from-the-collapse-of-exodus-international. 
 
Bruce, Steve.  Politics and Religion.  Malden, MA:  Polity; Distributed in the USA by 
Blackwell Publishers, 2003.  
 
Burack, Cynthia, and Jyl J. Josephson.  “Origin Stories:  Same-Sex Sexuality and 
Christian Right Politics.”  Culture and Religion 6, no. 3 (2005):  369-392. 
 
Burdette, Amy M., Christopher G. Ellison, and Terrence D. Hill.  “Conservative 
Protestantism and Tolerance Toward Homosexuals: An Examination of Potential 




Burlein, Ann.  Lift High the Cross: Where White Supremacy and the Christian Right 
Converge.  Durham, NC:  Duke University Press, 2002.  
 
Campbell, David E.  “Religious ‘Threat’ in Contemporary Presidential Elections.”  
Journal of Politics 68, no. 1 (2006):  104-15.  
 
Carney, Thomas F.  Content Analysis; a Technique for Systematic Inference from 
Communications. Winnipeg:  University of Manitoba Press, 1972.  
 
Carwardine, Richard.  Evangelicals and Politics in Antebellum America. New Haven, 
CT:  Yale University Press, 1993.  
 
Cassino, Dan.  “Changing the Subject: Abortion and Symbolic Masculinities Among 
Young Evangelicals.”  Journal of Men, Masculinities, and Spirituality 1, no. 3 
(2007):  201-214. 
 
Chambers, Lindsey.  “An Evangelical Perspective.”  Dialogue 42, no. 4 (2009):  119-123. 
 
Chandler, Marthe A., and Ted G. Jelen.  Abortion Politics in the United States and 
Canada: Studies in Public Opinion.  Westport, CT:  Praeger, 1994.  
 
Christian Century.  “Polls Find Shifts by Young Evangelicals.”  Volume 124, no. 22 
(2007):  14-15.  
 
Claassen, Ryan L., and Andrew Povtak.  “The Christian Right Thesis: Explaining 
Longitudinal Change in Participation among Evangelical Christians.”  Journal of 
Politics 72, no. 1 (2010):  2-15.  
 
Cobb, Michael.  “God Hates Cowboys (Kind Of).”  GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian & Gay 
Studies 13, no. 1 (2007):  102-105. 
 
Coe, Kevin, and David Domke.  “Petitioners Or Prophets? Presidential Discourse, God, 
and the Ascendancy of Religious Conservatives.”  Journal of Communication 56, no. 
2 (2006):  309-30.  
 
Colson, Charles W.  God & Government:  An Insider’s View on the Boundaries Between 
Faith & Politics.  Grand Rapids, MI:  Zondervan, 2007. 
 
–––.  Born Again.  4th ed.  Grand Rapids, MI:  Chosen Books, 2008. 
 
Colson, Charles W, and Catherine Larson.  “We Must Not Despair:  It’s Not the Time to 
Withdraw From Politics.”  Christianity Today 54, no. 10 (2010):  57. 
 
Colson, Charles W, and Nancy Pearcey.  “Evangelicals are Not an Interest Group.” 




Colson, Charles W, and Timothy George.  “An Improbable Alliance:  Catholics and 
Evangelicals Used to Fight Over Religious Liberty:  Not Anymore.”  Christianity 
Today 55, no. 4 (2011):  58. 
 
Cook, David, Richard Land, Tom J. Nettles, K. H. Hollman, Jerry Johnson, Russell 
Moore, R. A. Mohler, et al.  “How High the Wall? a Debate on the Separation of 
Church and State.”  Henry Institute Forum, VHS videocassette, Vol. 1, 2003. 
 
Corley, Kathleen E, and Karen Jo Torjesen.  “Sexuality, Hierarchy, and Evangelicalism.”  
Theological Students Fellowship Bulletin 10, March-April 1987:  23-27. 
 
Dalahoyde, Melinda, Clenard H Childress, Jr., and Charmaine Crouse Yoest.  “Pro-Life’s 
Next Moment:  Political Change is Giving the Abortion Lobby and Upper Hand.  
What’s the Best Action for Pro-Life Christians to Take Next?”  Christianity Today 
53, no. 10 (2009):  56-57. 
 
Demerath, N. J.  Crossing the Gods: World Religions and Worldly Politics.  New 
Brunswick, NJ:  Rutgers University Press, 2001.  
Diamond, Sara.  Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right.  Boston:  South 
End Press, 1989.  
 
–––.  Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United 
States - Critical Perspectives.  New York:  Guilford Press, 1995.  
 
–––.  Not by Politics Alone: The Enduring Influence of the Christian Right.  New York:  
Guilford Press, 1998.  
 
Diekema, Douglas S.  “Abortion and the Language of Morality.”  Christian Scholar’s 
Review 17, no. 2 (1987):  171-188. 
 
Djupe, Paul A., and Laura R. Olson.  Religious Interests in Community Conflict: Beyond 
the Culture Wars.  Waco, TX:  Baylor University Press, 2007.  
 
Dobson, James C.  Focus on the Family. Vol. 12 cassettes. Waco, TX: Word, Education 
Products Division, 1978.  
 
–––.  The New Dare to Discipline. Rev. ed. of Dare to Discipline.  Carol Stream, IL:  
Tyndale House Publishers, 1996. 
 
–––.  Life on the Edge:  The Next Generation’s Guide to a Meaningful Future.  Nashville:  
Word Publishers, 2000. 
 




–––.  Marriage Under Fire: Why We Must Win This War.  Sisters, OR:  Multnomah 
Publishers, 2004a.  
 
–––.  The New Strong-Willed Child: Birth Through Adolescence.  Rev. ed. of The Strong-
Willed Child.  Carol Stream, IL:  Tyndale House Publishers, 2004b. 
 
–––.  Bringing Up Girls: Practical Advice and Encouragement for Those Shaping the 
Next Generation of Women.  Carol Stream, IL:  Tyndale House Publishers, 2010. 
 
Dobson, James C., and Kathleen K. Rutledge.  “Dobson on the Gay Marriage Battle.”  
Christianity Today 49, no. 1 (2005):  60. 
 
Domke, David S.  God Willing? Political Fundamentalism in the White House, the "War 
on Terror" and the Echoing Press.  London:  Pluto Press, 2004. 
 
Domke, David S., and Kevin M. Coe.  The God Strategy: How Religion Became a 
Political Weapon in America.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 2008.  
 
Dowland, Seth.  “‘Family Values’ and the Formation of a Christian Right Agenda.” 
Church History 78, no. 3 (2009):  606-31.  
 
Dunnett, Dolores E.  “Evangelicals and Abortion.”  Journal of the Evangelical 
Theological Society 33, no. 2 (1990):  215-225. 
 
Earll, Carrie G.  “What the Bible Says About the Beginning of Life.”  




Ellison, Christopher G., John P. Bartkowski, and Michelle L. Segal.  “Conservative 
Protestantism and the Parental use of Corporal Punishment.”  Social Forces 74, no. 3 
(1996):  1003-28.  
 
Emerson, Michael O., and Christian Smith.  Divided by Faith: Evangelical Religion and 
the Problem of Race in America.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 2000.  
 
Engeman, Thomas S., and Michael P. Zuckert.  Protestantism and the American 
Founding.  Loyola Topics in Political Philosophy.  Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2004.  
 
Erzen, Tanya.  Straight to Jesus:  Sexual and Christian Conversions in the Ex-Gay 




Evans, William B. "Evangelicals and Obamacare." The Aquila Report. November 08, 
2013. Accessed April 20, 2017. http://theaquilareport.com/evangelicals-and-
obamacare/.  
 
Falwell, Jerry.  Listen, America!  Garden City, NY:  Doubleday, 1980. 
 
–––.  “Perspective:  America’s Shameful State.”  Chicago Tribune, April 16, 1982. 
 
–––.  “Protect Unborn’s Right To Life.”  USA Today, April 10, 1989. 
 
–––.  The New American Family:  The Rebirth of the American Dream.  Nashville:  
Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1992. 
 
–––.  “Leave, Mr. President, or Ask For Forgiveness.”  USA Today, March 12, 1998. 
 
–––.  “I’d Do It All Again.”  Christianity Today 43, no. 10 (1999):  50-51. 
 
Feder, Lester.  “The Devil in the Details.”  Columbia Journalism Review 47, no. 1 
(2008):  18-20.  
 
Ferguson, Kathy E.  “Bringing Gender into the Evangelical-Capitalist Resonance 
Machine.”  Political Theology 12, no. 2 (2011):  184-194. 
 
Fetner, Tina.  How the Religious Right Shaped Lesbian and Gay Activism.  Social 
Movements, Protest, and Contention, vol. 31.  Minneapolis:  University of 
Minnesota Press, 2008.  
 
Finke, Roger, and Rodney Stark.  The Churching of America, 1776-1990: Winners and 
Losers in our Religious Economy.  New Brunswick, NJ:  Rutgers University Press, 
1992.  
 
Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams , and Jeremy Pope.  Culture War?: The Myth of a 
Polarized America.  New York:  Pearson Education Press, 2006.  
 
FitzGerald, Frances.  “The Evangelical Surprise.”  New York Review of Books 54, no. 7 
(2007):  31-4.  
 
Focus on the Family.  The Heritage of Focus on the Family:  Our Founder and 
Foundational Values, Mission and Guiding Principles.  Colorado Springs, CO:  
Focus on the Family, 2010. 
 
Foucault, Michel.  Discipline and Punish:  The Birth of the Prison.  Trans. Alan 




–––.  Language, Counter-memory, Practice.  Ed. Donald F. Bouchard.  Trans. Donald F. 
Bouchard and Sherry Simon.  Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1977b. 
 
–––.  The History of Sexuality:  An Introduction.  Vol. 1. Trans. Robert Hurley.  New 
York:  Vintage, 1978. 
 
Frame, Randall L.  “The Evangelical Closet:  Conservative Christianity’s Struggle With 
Homosexuality May Be More Common Than Many Like to Admit.”  Christianity 
Today 34, no. 16 (1990):  56-57. 
 
Fredrickson, George M.  Racism: A Short History.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University 
Press, 2002.  
 
Gallagher, Sally K.  Evangelical Identity and Gendered Family Life.  New Brunswick, 
NJ:  Rutgers University Press, 2003.  
 
Gallagher, Sally K., and Christian Smith.  “Symbolic Traditionalism and Pragmatic 
Egalitarianism.”  Gender & Society 13, no. 2 (1999):  211-33.  
 
Galli, Mark.  “Is the Gay Marriage Debate Over?  What the Battle for Traditional 
Marriage Means for Americans – and Evangelicals.”  Christianity Today 53, no. 7 
(2009):  30-33. 
 
Gay, Craig M.  “Evangelicals in Search of a Political Theology,” in Between Relativism 
and Fundamentalism, 56-101.  Grand Rapids, MI:  Eerdmans, 2010. 
Gay, D. A., C. G. Ellison,  & D. A. Powers. “In Search of Denominational Subcultures:  
Religious Affiliation and “Pro-Family” Issues Revisited.”  Review of Religious 
Research 38, no. 1 (1996), 3-17. 
Gibson, David.  “Antiabortion Analogy is Flawed but Popular.”  Christian Century 128, 
no. 25 (2011):  17. 
 
Giroux, Henry A.  “Beyond Belief: Religious Fundamentalism and Cultural Politics in 
the Age of George W. Bush.”  Cultural Studies ó Critical Methodologies 4, no. 4 
(2004):  415-425. 
 
Glaser, Barney G., and Anselm L. Strauss.  The Discovery of Grounded Theory; 
Strategies for Qualitative Research.  Chicago:  Aldine Publishers, 1967.  
 
Goodstein, Laurie.  “The Architect of the ‘Gay Conversion’ Campaign.”  New York 




Gorney, Cynthia.  “Abortion’s Untold Story:  How Journalist Cynthia Gorney Has 
Helped Both Sides of the Abortion Debate to View the Other Side Honestly.”  
Christianity Today 42, no. 5 (1998):  84-87. 
 
Graham, Billy.  Ask Billy Graham:  The World’s Best-Loved Preacher Answers Your 
Most Important Questions.  Compiled by Bill Adler.  Nashville:  Thomas Nelson 
Publishers, 2010. 
 
Greeley, Andrew M., and Michael Hout.  The Truth about Conservative Christians: What 
They Think and What They Believe.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2006.  
 
Green, John C.  Religion and the Culture Wars: Dispatches from the Front.  Lanham, 
MD:  Rowman & Littlefield, 1996.  
 
Green, John C., Mark J. Rozell, and Clyde Wilcox.  The Christian Right in American 
Politics: Marching to the Millennium.  Washington, DC:  Georgetown University 
Press, 2003.  
 
Greenawalt, Kent.  Religious Convictions and Political Choice.  New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988.  
 
Griffith, R. Marie.  God's Daughters: Evangelical Women and the Power of Submission.  
Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1997.  
 
Gushee, David P.  “Evangelicals and Politics: A Rethinking.”  Journal of Law and 
Religion 23, no. 1 (2007-2008):  1-14. 
 
–––.  The Future of Faith in American Politics:  The Public Witness of the Evangelical 
Center.  Waco, TX:  Baylor University Press, 2008. 
 
–––.  “What the Torture Debate Reveals About American Evangelical Christianity.”  
Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 30, no. 1 (2010):  79-97. 
 
Gushee, David P., and Justin Phillips.  “Moral Formation and the Evangelical Voter:  A 
Report From the Red States.”  Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 26, no. 2 
(2006):  23-60. 
 
Guthrie, Stan.  “We’re Not Finished:  Abortion is Not Simply One Item on Our Social 
Agenda.”  Christianity Today 52, no. 5 (2008):  66. 
 
Gyertson, David J.  Salt & Light: A Christian Response to Current Issues.  Dallas:  Word 
Publishers, 1993.  
 
Hagee, John.  Day of Deception:  Separating Truth From Falsehood in These Last Days.  




Hagelin, Rebecca. "Abortion's Slippery Slope: When People aren't ‘Persons’."  Townhall. 




Hal, James A.  “Fundamentalist Political Power in America.”  Free Inquiry 25, no. 2 
(2005):  12-13.  
 
Hall, Peter D.  “The Decline, Transformation, and Revival of the Christian Right in the 
United States,” in Evangelicals and Democracy in America, Vol II, edited by Steven 
Brint and Jean Reith Schroedel, 249-279.  New York:  Russell Sage Foundation, 
2009. 
 
Harris, Fredrick C.  Something Within: Religion in African-American Political Activism.  
New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.  
 
Harvey, Paul.  Freedom's Coming: Religious Culture and the Shaping of the South from 
the Civil War through the Civil Rights Era.  Chapel Hill, NC:  University of North 
Carolina Press, 2005.  
 
Hatcher, Andrea.  “A Comparative Study of American and English Evangelicals.”  
Conference Papers – Midwestern Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 
2009:  1-31. 
 
Hedges, Chris.  “Religion of Despair.”  New Statesman 136, no. 4829 (2007):  32-35. 
 
Hertzke, Allen D.  Representing God in Washington: The Role of Religious Lobbies in 
the American Polity.  Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988.  
 
Hetherington, Marc J., and Jonathan D. Weiler.  Authoritarianism and Polarization in 
American Politics.  New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
 
Himmelstein, Jerome L.  To the Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism.  
Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1990.  
 
Hoffmann, John P, and Sherrie Mills Johnson.  “Attitudes Toward Abortion Among 
Religious Traditions in the United States:  Change or Continuity?”  Sociology of 
Religion 66, no. 2 (2005):  161-182. 
 
Hoffmeier, James K., ed.  Abortion:  A Christian Understanding and Response.   Grand 




Horner, S. Sue.  “Trying to be God in the World:  The Story of the Evangelical Women’s 
Caucus and the Crisis Over Homosexuality,” in Gender, Ethnicity, and Religion, 
edited by Rosemary Radford Ruether, 99-124.  Minneapolis:  Fortress Press, 2002. 
 
Horowitz, Michael.  “Two Tests for Evangelical Action.”  Christianity Today 49, no. 9 
(2005):  72-3.  
 
Howe, Daniel Walker, Sheila Suess Kennedy, Kevin Phillips, and Winnifred Fallers 
Sullivan.  “Religion and Politics on the American Scene.”  Forum in Religion and 
American Culture 18, no. 1 (2008):  1-26.  
 
Huckabee, Mike.  Character Makes a Difference:  Where I’m From, Where I’ve Been, 
What I Believe.   Nashville:  B & H Publishing Group, 2007. 
 
–––.  Do the Right Thing:  Inside the Movement That’s Bringing Common Sense Back to 
America.  New York:  Sentinel Publishers, 2008. 
 
–––.  “The Landmarks of Liberty.”  Truth That Transforms Radio Program with Dr. D. 
James Kennedy.  Truth in Action Ministries compact disc (CD), 2011. 
 
Hughes, Sheila Hassell.  “Homosexuality and Group Boundaries in Contemporary 
Evangelical Feminism: A Historical Perspective.”  Quarterly Review 14, no. 2 
(1994):  135-159. 
 
Hunter, Floyd.  Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers.  Chapel Hill, 
NC:  University of North Carolina Press, 1953.  
 
Hunter, James D.  “Religion and Political Civility: The Coming Generation of American 
Evangelicals.”  Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 23, no. 4 (1984):  364-81.  
 
–––.  Evangelicalism: The Coming Generation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987.  
 
–––.  Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America.  New York: BasicBooks, 1991.  
 
Hunter, James D., and Alan Wolfe.  Is there a Culture War?: A Dialogue on Values and 
American Public Life.  Pew Forum Dialogues on Religion and Public Life. 
Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2006.  
 
Hunter, James D., and Christopher Benson.  “Faithful Presence:  James Davison Hunter 
Says Out Strategies to Transform Culture Are Ineffective, and the Goal Itself is 
Misguided.”  Christianity Today 54, no. 5 (2010):  32-36. 
 
Ingersoll, Julie.  “Mobilizing Evangelicals:  Christian Reconstructionism and the Roots of 
the Religious Right,” in Evangelicals and Democracy in America, Vol II, edited by 
	
 143 
Steven Brint and Jean Reith Schroedel, 179-208.  New York:  Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2009. 
 
Jackson, Harry R, Jr, and Tony Perkins.  Personal Faith, Public Policy.  Lake Mary, FL:  
Frontline Publishers, 2008. 
 
Jelen, Ted G.  The Political Mobilization of Religious Beliefs.  New York: Praeger, 1991.  
 
–––.  “Protestant Clergy as Political Leaders: Theological Limitations.”  Review of 
Religious Research 36, no. 1 (1994):  23.  
 
–––.  Perspectives on the Politics of Abortion.  Westport, CT:  Praeger, 1995.  
 
Jelen, Ted G., and Clyde Wilcox.  Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: The 
One, the Few, and the Many.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.  
 
Johnson, Byron R.  “The Good News About Evangelicals:  Evangelicalism Isn’t 
Shrinking, and the Young are not Becoming Liberals, Reports Byron Johnson.”  
First Things 210 (2011):  12-14. 
 
Jost, John T., and Sidanius, Jim.  “Political psychology key readings,” in Psychology 
Press [database online], 2004.  Available from 
http://www.netlibrary.com/urlapi.asp?action=summary&v=1&bookid=111155/. 
 
Kennedy, D James.  What if America Were a Christian Nation Again?  Nashville:  
Thomas Nelson Publishers, 2003. 
 
–––.  Why I Believe.  Nashville:  W Publishers, 2005. 
 
Kiecolt, K. J., and Hart M. Nelsen.  “Evangelicals and Party Realignment, 1976-1988.”  
Social Science Quarterly (University of Texas Press) 72, no. 3 (1991):  552.  
 
Killian, Mitchell, and Clyde Wilcox.  “Do Abortion Attitudes Lead to Party Switching?”  
Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 4 (2008):  561-73.  
 
Knippenberg, Joseph M.  “The Personal (is not?) the Political:  The Role of Religion in 
the Presidency of George W. Bush,” in Civil Religion in Political Thought, edited by 
Ronald Weed and John von Heyking, 262-279.  Washington, DC:  Catholic 
University of America Press, 2010. 
 
Knoll, Benjamin R.  “And Who is My Neighbor?  Religion and Immigration Policy 
Attitudes.”  Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 48, no. 2 (2009):  313-31.  
 
Kramnick, Isaac, and R. L. Moore.  The Godless Constitution: The Case Against 




Krippendorff, Klaus.  Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology.  The Sage 
Comm. Text Series, vol. 5.  Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980.  
 
LaHaye, Beverly.  The New Spirit-Controlled Woman.  Eugene, OR:  Harvest House 
Publishers, 2005. 
 
LaHaye, Tim.  “How Do We Live Now in Light of Eternity?”  Left Behind Biblical 
Prophecy Series (DVD).  Tim LaHaye’s Prophecy Institute:  Emi Cmg Distribution, 
2009. 
 
Lahaye, Tim, and Beverly LaHaye.  The Act of Marriage:  The Beauty of Sexual Love.  
Grand Rapids, MI:  Zondervan, 1998. 
 
Lakoff, George.  Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think.  Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002.  
 
–––.  Don’t Think of an Elephant! : Know Your Values and Frame the Debate.  White 
River Junction, VT:  Chelsea Green Publishers, 2004. 
 
Leo, John.  “Coercion on Campus.”  US News and World Report 128, no. 19 (2000):  13. 
 
Lewis, Robert.  Raising a Modern-Day Knight: A Father's Role in Guiding His Son to 
Authentic Manhood.  Colorado Springs, CO:  Focus on the Family; Distributed in the 
USA and Canada by Word Books, 1997.  
 
Lewis, Andrew R., and Dana H. de Bernardo.  “Belonging without Belonging: Utilizing 
Evangelical Self-Identification to Analyze Political Attitudes and Preferences.”  
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 49, no. 1 (2010):  112-26.  
 
Liebman, Robert C., Robert Wuthnow, and James L. Guth.  The New Christian Right: 
Mobilization and Legitimation.  Hawthorne, NY: Aldine Publishers, 1983.  
 
Lincoln, C. E.  Race, Religion, and the Continuing American Dilemma.  Rev ed.  New 
York:  Hill and Wang, 1999.  
 
Lindsay, D. Michael.  Faith in the Halls of Power: How Evangelicals Joined the 
American Elite.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.  
 
–––.  “Ties That Bind and Divisions That Persist: Evangelical Faith and the Political 
Spectrum.”  American Quarterly 59, no. 3 (2007):  883-909.  
 
–––.  “Politics as the Construction of Relations:  Religious Identity and Political 
Expression,” in Evangelicals and Democracy in America, Vol II, edited by Steven 
	
 145 
Brint and Jean Reith Schroedel, 305-330.  New York:  Russell Sage Foundation, 
2009. 
 
Long, Michael G., ed.  The Legacy of Billy Graham: Critical Reflections on America’s 
Greatest Evangelist.  Louisville, KY:  Westminster John Knox Press, 2008. 
 
Lucas, Sean M.  “God and Country American Style.”  Westminster Theological Journal 
69, no. 1 (2007):  185-197. 
 
Luker, Kristin.  Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood.  California Series on Social 
Choice and Political Economy.  Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984.  
 
MacArthur, John.  Fundamentals of the Faith.  Chicago:  Moody Publishers, 2009a. 
 
–––.  Right Thinking in a World Gone Wrong:  A Biblical Response to Today’s Most 
Controversial Issues.  Eugene, OR:  Harvest House Publishers, 2009b. 
 
–––.  “God’s Plan for the Gay Agenda.”  Grace to You website article, 2012.  
http://www.gty.org/resources/articles/a170/. 
 
Magnuson, K T.  “What Does Contraception Have to Do With Abortion?  Evangelicals v. 
Augustine and Roe v. Wade.”  Southern Baptist Journal of Theology 7, no. 2 (2003):  
54-67. 
 
Maguire, Brendan, and Georgie A. Weatherby.  “The Secularization of Religion and 
Television Commercials.”  Sociology of Religion 59, no. 2 (1998):  171-178.  
 
Marley, David J.  “Ronald Reagan and the Splintering of the Christian Right.”  Journal of 
Church and State 48, no. 4 (2006):  851-868. 
 
Marsden, George M.  Fundamentalism and American Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth 
Century Evangelicalism, 1870-1925.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.  
 
–––.  Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism.  Grand Rapids, MI:  
Eerdmans, 1991.  
 
–––.  Evangelicalism and Modern America.  Grand Rapids, MI:  Eerdmans, 1984.  
 
Marshall, Paul A.  “The Problem With Prophets:  In Their Zeal for Social Change, Some 
Evangelical Activists Stand on Shaky Biblical Ground.”  Christianity Today 50, no. 
9 (2006):  90-94. 
 
Marty, Martin E.  Modern American Protestantism and its World: Historical Articles on 




–––.  Protestantism and Regionalism.  New York: K.G. Sauer, 1992b.  
 
–––.  Theological Themes in the American Protestant World.  New York: K.G. Sauer, 
1992c.  
 
Matthews Jr., Ronald.  “Evangelical Sub-Cultures and Public Policy Issues.”  Conference 
Papers -- Northeastern Political Science Association (2008):  1.  
 
Mazur, Eric M.  The Americanization of Religious Minorities: Confronting the 
Constitutional Order. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.  
 
McCann, Chuck.  “With God on our Side: George W. Bush and the Rise of the Religious 
Right.”  Library Journal 131, no. 6 (2006):  127.  
 
McDermott, Monika L.  “Religious Stereotyping and Voter Support for Evangelical 
Candidates.”  Political Research Quarterly 62, no. 2 (2009):  340-54.  
 
Macgillivray, I. K.  “Religion, Sexual Orientation, and School Policy: How the Christian 
Right Frames Its Arguments.”  Educational Studies 43 (2008):  29-44. 
 
Mead, Walter R.  “God's Country?”  Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (2006):  24-43.  
 
–––.  “Born Again.”  Atlantic Monthly 301, no. 2 (2008):  21-4.  
 
Merolla, Jennifer L., Jean R. Schroedel, and Scott Waller.  “Evangelical Strength and the 
Political Representation of Women and Gays.” in Evangelicals and Democracy in 
America, Vol I, edited by Steven Brint and Jean Reith Schroedel, 159-186.  New 
York:  Russell Sage Foundation, 2009. 
 
Meyer, Joyce.  Battlefield of the Mind:  Winning the Battle in Your Mind.  Nashville:  
FaithWords Publishers, 1999. 
 
Miller, Donald E.  Reinventing American Protestantism: Christianity in the New 
Millennium.  Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1997.  
 
Mills, C. W., and Alan Wolfe.  The Power Elite.  Rev. ed.  New York:  Oxford University 
Press, 2000.  
 
Mockabee, S. T.  “A Question of Authority: Religion and Cultural Conflict in the 2004 
Election.”  Political Behavior 29 (2007):  221-248. 
 
Mohler, R Albert, Jr.  Desire and Deceit:  The Real Cost of the New Sexual Tolerance.  




–––.  The Disappearance of God:  Dangerous Beliefs in the New Spiritual Openness.  
New York:  Random House Publishers, 2009. 
 
–––.  Culture Shift:  The Battle for the Moral Heart of America.  Colorado Springs, CO:  
Multnomah Books, 2011a. 
 
–––.  “Marriage Betrayed.”  Focus on the Family Radio Broadcast (compact disc).  
Colorado Springs, CO:  Focus on the Family, 2011b. 
 
–––.  “Engaging the Culture:  Marriage and Religious Liberties.”  Focus on the Family 
Radio Broadcast (compact disc).  Colorado Springs, CO:  Focus on the Family, 
2012a. 
 
–––.  The Conviction to Lead:  25 Principles for Leadership That Matters.  Ada, MI:  
Bethany House Publishers, 2012b. 
 
Moon, Ruth.  “Has Same-Sex Marriage Debate Helped Pro-Life Advocacy?”  
Christianity Today 56, no. 1 (2012):  14. 
 
Moore, Barrington.  Moral Purity and Persecution in History.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton 
University Press, 2000.  
 
Morone, James A.  Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History.  New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003.  
 
–––.  “Jefferson's Rickety Wall: Sacred and Secular in American Politics.”  Social 
Research 76, no. 4 (2009):  1199-1226.  
 
Neuhaus, Richard J.  That Evangelical Manifesto.  Institute of Religion & Public Life, 
2008a.  
 
–––.  “The Public Square:  A Continuing Survey of Religion, Culture, and Public Life.”  
First Things 183 (2008b): 65-80. 
 
Newman, Mark.  Getting Right with God: Southern Baptists and Desegregation, 1945-
1995.  Religion and American Culture. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
2001.  
 
Newman, Simon P.  “One Nation Under God: Making Historical Sense of Evangelical 
Protestantism in Contemporary American Politics.”  Journal of American Studies 41, 
no. 3 (2007):  581-97.  
 
Nivola, Pietro S., and David W. Brady.  Red and Blue Nation?: Characteristics and 
Causes of America's Polarized Politics.  Washington, DC:  Brookings Institution 




Noll, Mark A.  Religion and American Politics: From the Colonial Period to the 1980s.  
New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.  
 
–––.  American Evangelical Christianity: An Introduction.  Malden, MA:  Blackwell 
Publishers, 2001.  
 
–––.  God and Race in American Politics: A Short History.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton 
University Press, 2008.  
 
Noll, Mark A., David W. Bebbington, and George A. Rawlyk.  Evangelicalism: 
Comparative Studies of Popular Protestantism in North America, the British Isles, 
and Beyond, 1700-1990.  Religion in America Series.  New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 1994.  
 
Olasky, Marvin.  Abortion Rites:  A Social History of Abortion in America.  Wheaton, IL:  
Crossway Books, 1992. 
 
Olsen, Ted, and Jim Wallis.  “Where Jim Wallis Stands:  The Long-Time Activist on 
Abortion, Gay Marriage, Iraq – and Biblical Authority.”  Christianity Today 52, no. 
5 (2008):  52-55, 57, 59. 
 
Olson, Laura R., and Ted G. Jelen.  The Religious Dimension of Political Behavior: A 
Critical Analysis and Annotated Bibliography.  Bibliographies and Indexes in 
Religious Studies, vol. 47.  Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1998.  
 
Olson, Laura, and Adam Warber.  “Belonging, Behaving, and Believing.”  Political 
Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008):  192-204.  
 
Olson, Wyatt.  “Onward, Christian Soldiers:  TV Preacher D. James Kennedy and His 
Religious Right Cohorts Want to ‘Reclaim America For Christ’ – and the GOP.”  
Church & State 57, no. 1 (2004):  8-13. 
  
Pargament, Kenneth I., and Crystal L. Park.  “Merely a Defense?  The Variety of 
Religious Means and Ends.”  Journal of Social Issues 51, no. 2 (1995):  13-32. 
 
Palin, Sarah.  America By Heart:  Reflections on Family, Faith, and Flag.  New York:  
HarperCollins Publishers, 2010. 
 
Patrikios, Stratos.  “American Republican Religion?  Disentangling the Causal Link 




Pence, Mike.  “Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Focus on the Family 40th 




Perkins, Tony.  “Getting Involved With Your Community.”  Truth That Transforms 
Radio Program with Dr. D. James Kennedy.  Truth in Action Ministries compact 
disc, 2011. 
 
–––.. "FRC's Tony Perkins: Obamacare Threatens Very Life of Republic." FRC. August 




Perkins, Tony, D. J. Kennedy, Ake Green, Christine Sneeringer, Richard Land, Danny 
Nalliah.  “Hate Crimes Laws Censoring the Church and Silencing Christians.”  Vol. 
1 videodisc (DVD).  Coral Ridge Ministries Media and Family Research Council.    
Fort Lauderdale, FL:  Coral Ridge Ministries Media, 2007.  
 
Perkins, Tony, and Gary Bauer.  “Current Issues Facing the Family.”  Focus on the 
Family Radio Broadcast (compact disc).  Colorado Springs, CO:  Focus on the 
Family. 
 
Perkins, Tony, Gary Cass, Frank Pavone, Walid Phares, Frank Wright, and Christine 
Sneeringer.  “We Can Change America:  Six Cutting Edge Christian Leaders on 
Reclaiming America for Christ.”  Center for Reclaiming America.  Truth in Action 
Ministries compact disc, 2007. 
 
Perkins, Tony, Gary DeMar, Mat Staver, and Jordan Lorence.  “Pastors, Pulpits, and 
Politics:  Christian Rules of Engagement.”  Truth in Action Ministries videodisc 
(DVD), 2011.   
 
Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. “U.S. Religious Landscape Survey.”  
Pewforums.com.  http://religions.pewforum.org/reports/. 
 
Proctor, Melissa.  “Picturing Palin’s Faith.”  Religion in the News 11, no. 3 (2009):  8-9, 
28. 
 
Putnam, Robert D.  The Comparative Study of Political Elites.  Contemporary 
Comparative Politics Series.  Englewood Cliffs, NJ:  Prentice-Hall, 1976.  
  
–––.  Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.  New York:  




–––.  “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century - the 
2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture.”  Scandinavian Political Studies 30, no. 2 (2007):  
137-74.  
 
Raschke, Carl.  “Evangelicals in the Public Square.”  Society 46, no. 2 (2009):  147-54.  
 
Reed, Ralph.  Politically Incorrect: The Emerging Faith Factor in American Politics.  
Dallas: Word Publishers, 1994.  
 
–––.  Active Faith: How Christians are Changing the Soul of American Politics.  New 
York: The Free Press, 1996.  
 
Religion News Service,  “Evangelicals Lament Politicization of Faith.”  Christian 
Century 125, no. 11 (2008):  16. 
 
Rhodes, Jeremy.  “Choosing Sides:  An Exploration of Role Conflict Among Evangelical 
Democrats.”  Sociology of Religion 72, no. 1 (2011):  28-49. 
 
Rice, Jim , and Jeannie Choi.  “The Meaning of ‘Life.’”  Sojourners Magazine 37, no. 10 
(2008):  10-11. 
 
Rimmerman, Craig A., and Clyde Wilcox.  The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage.  Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 2007.  
 
Robertson, Pat.  The Turning Tide:  The Fall of Liberalism and the Rise of Common 
Sense.  Nashville:  Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1993. 
 
–––.  "God's Word: Thou Shall Not Murder."  PatRobertson.com. n.d. Accessed April 20, 
2017. http://www.patrobertson.com/teaching/shallnotmurder.asp. 
 
–––.  Bring It On: Tough Questions, Candid Answers.  Nashville:  Thomas Nelson 
Publishers, 2002.  
 
–––.  The Ten Offenses:  Reclaim the Blessings of the Ten Commandments.  Nashville:  
Thomas Nelson Publishers, 2008. 
 
Robinson, Carin.  “Cross-Cutting Messages and Political Tolerance: An Experiment 
using White Evangelical Protestants.”  Conference Papers -- Midwestern Political 
Science Association (2008):  1-53.  
 
Roof, Wade Clark.  Contemporary American Religion.  New York:  Macmillan 
Reference USA, 2000.  
 
Roof, Wade C., and William McKinney.  American Mainline Religion: Its Changing 




Ross, Bobby.  “The New Boycotts:  Online Petitions Effective, But Not By Numbers.”   
Christianity Today 55, no. 10 (2011):  17-18. 
 
Rozell, Mark J.  “Political Marriage of Convenience?  The Evolution of the Conservative 
Catholic-Evangelical Alliance in the Republican Party,” in Catholics and Politics, 
27-42.  Washington, DC:  Georgetown University Press, 2008. 
 
Ryden, David.  “Is the Good Book Good Enough: Evangelical Perspectives on Public 
Policy.”  Conference Papers -- Midwestern Political Science Association (2008): 1.  
 
Saha, Santosh C.  Religious Fundamentalism in the Contemporary World: Critical Social 
and Political Issues.  Lanham, MD:  Lexington Books, 2004.  
 
Sargisson, Lucy.  “Religious Fundamentalism and Utopianism in the 21st Century.”  
Journal of Political Ideologies 12, no. 3 (2007):  269-87.  
 
Schaeffer, Francis A.  A Christian Manifesto.  Wheaton, IL:  Crossway Books, 2005. 
 
Schlafly, Phyllis.  The Supremacists:  The Tyranny of Judges & How to Stop It.  Dallas, 
TX:  Spence Publishing Company, 2004. 
 
–––.  “Examining Feminism.”  Truth That Transforms Radio Program with Dr. D. James 
Kennedy.  Truth in Action Ministries compact disc, 2011. 
 
Segers, Mary C., and Ted G. Jelen.  A Wall of Separation?: Debating the Public Role of 
Religion.  Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998.  
 
Shibley, Mark A.  Resurgent Evangelicalism in the United States: Mapping Cultural 
Change since 1970.  Columbia, SC:  University of South Carolina Press, 1996.  
 
Sider, Ronald J.  “Bearing Better Witness:  Ron Sider Believes that Evangelicals Need to 
Rethink What They Say and Do About Gay Marriage.”  First Things 208 (2010):  
47-50. 
 
Singleton, Royce.  Approaches to Social Research.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 
1988.  
 
Smidt, Corwin E.  “‘Praise the Lord’ Politics:  Social Characteristics and Political Views 
of American Evangelical and Charismatic Christians.”  Sociological Analysis 50, no. 
1 (1989):  53-72. 
 
–––.  Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good.  Waco, TX:  Baylor 




Smith, Buster G., and Byron R. Johnson.  “The Liberalization of Young Evangelicals: A 
Research Note.”  Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 49, no. 2 (2010):  351-
360. 
 
Smith, Charles P.  Motivation and Personality:  Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis.  
New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1992.  
 
Smith, Christian.  Disruptive Religion:  The Force of Faith in Social-Movement Activism.  
New York:  Routledge, 1996.  
 
–––.  Christian America?:  What Evangelicals Really Want.  Berkeley, CA:  University 
of California Press, 2000.  
 
–––.  Moral, Believing Animals: Human Personhood and Culture.  New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 2003.  
 
Smith, Christian, and Michael Emerson.  American Evangelicalism: Embattled and 
Thriving.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1998.  
 
Smith, Rogers M.  “An Almost Christian Nation?  Constitutional Consequences of the 
Rise of the Religious Right,” in Evangelicals and Democracy in America, Vol I, 
edited by Steven Brint and Jean Reith Schroedel, 329-355.  New York:  Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2009.  
 
Soper, J. C.  Evangelical Christianity in the United States and Great Britain: Religious 
Beliefs, Political Choices.  New York:  New York University Press, 1994.  
 
Southern Baptist Convention, and Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission. Faith & 
Family Values.  Nashville:  Southern Baptist Convention, 2005.   
 
Stackhouse Jr., John G.  “A Variety of Evangelical Politics.”  Christianity Today 52, no. 
11 (2008):  52-57.  
 
Stark, Rodney.  The Rise of Christianity:  How the Obscure, Marginal Jesus Movement 
Became the Dominant Religious Force in the Western World in a Few Centuries.  
San Francisco, CA:  HarperSanFrancisco, 1997.  
 
Stark, Rodney, and Roger Finke.  Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion.  
Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 2000.  
 
Starks, Brian, and Robert V. Robinson.  “Two Approaches to Religion and Politics: 
Moral Cosmology and Subcultural Identity.”  Journal for the Scientific Study of 




Stenner, Karen.  The Authoritarian Dynamic.  Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and 
Political Psychology.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.  
 
Strozier, Charles B.  Apocalypse: On the Psychology of Fundamentalism in America. 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1994.  
 
Swartz, David R.  “The New Left and Evangelical Radicalism.”  Journal for the Study of 
Radicalism 3, no. 2 (2009):  51-79.  
 
Swidler, Ann.  “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.”  American Sociological 
Review 51, no. 2 (1986):  273-86.  
 
Terry, Randall.  “Accessory to Murder:  The Enemies, Allies, and Accomplices to the 
Death of Our Culture.”  Nashville:  Wolgemuth & Hyatt Publishers, 1991. 
 
Terry, Randall, Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and D. James Kennedy.  Operation Rescue.   
New Kensington, PA:  Whitaker House Publishers, 1989. 
 
Thomas, Jeremy N, and Daniel V. A. Olson.  “Evangelical Elites’ Changing Responses to 
Homosexuality.”  Sociology of Religion 73, no. 3 (2012):  239-272. 
 
Todd, Nathan R., and Katherine S. Ong.  “Political and Theological Orientation as 
Moderators for the Association Between Religious Attendance and Attitudes Toward 
Gay Marriage for White Christians.”  Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 4, no. 
1 (2012):  56-70. 
 
Van Geest, Fred.  “Changing Patterns of Denominational Political Activity in North 
America: The Case of Homosexuality.”  Review of Religious Research 49, no. 2 
(2007):  199-221.  
 
VanDerWerff, Jeffrey A.  “Contemporary Pagan Corruptions:  Why ‘How’ is as 
Important as ‘What’ for Evangelicals in Politics.”  Perspectives 25, no. 2 (2010):  
12-16. 
 
Venker, Suzanne, and Phyllis Schlafly.  Flipside of Feminism:  What Conservative 
Women Know – and Men Can’t Say.  Denver, CO:  Windom Publishing Company, 
2011. 
 
Via, Dan O., and Robert A. J. Gagnon.  Homosexuality and the Bible: Two Views. 
Minneapolis:  Fortress Press, 2003.  
 
Wadsworth, Nancy D.  “Reconciling Fractures: The Intersection of Race and Religion in 
United States Political Development,” in Race and American Political Development, 
edited by Julie Novkov, Joseph Lowndes and Dorian T. Warren, 312-336.  New 




Wald, Kenneth D., and Clyde Wilcox.  “Getting Religion: Has Political Science 
Rediscovered the Faith Factor?”  American Political Science Review 100, no. 4 
(2006):  523-9.  
 
Waldman, Steven.  Founding Faith: Providence, Politics, and the Birth of Religious 
Freedom in America.  New York:  Random House, 2008.  
 
Waldman, Steven, and John C. Green.  “Tribal Relations.”  Atlantic Monthly 297, no. 1 
(2006):  136-42.  
 
Warner, R. Stephen.  New Wine in Old Wineskins: Evangelicals and Liberals in a Small-
Town Church.  Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1988.  
 
Warren, Rick.  The Purpose Driven Life:  What on Earth am I Here For?.  Grand Rapids, 
MI:  Zondervan Publishers, 2002. 
 
Watson, Justin.  The Christian Coalition: Dreams of Restoration, Demands for 
Recognition.  New York:  St. Martin's Press, 1997.  
 
Weaver, John David.  “Unpardonable Sins:  The Mentally Ill and Evangelicalism in 
America.”  Journal of Religion and Popular Culture 23, no. 1 (2011):  65-81. 
 
Weber, Max.  The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.  Talcott Parsons, and 
Anthony Giddens, translators.  New York:  Routledge, 1992.  
 
Weber, Max, and Edward Shils.  The Methodology of the Social Sciences.  Chicago: Free 
Press, 1949.  
 
Weber, Robert P.  Basic Content Analysis.  2nd ed.  Newbury Park, CA:  Sage 
Publications, 1990.  
 
Wedeen, Lisa.  “Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science.”  American 
Political Science Review 96, no. 4 (2002):  713-728.  
 
Wehner, Peter.  “Among Evangelicals, A Transformation.”  National Review 59, no. 24 
(2007):  30-2.  
 
Weisberg, Jacob.  “What Happened to Family Values?”  Newsweek 152, no. 11 (2008):  
41. 
 
Wellman, James K.  Evangelical Vs. Liberal: The Clash of Christian Cultures in the 




White, Christopher.  “21st-Century Evangelicals Revisit Contraception and Abortion.”  
Human Life Review 38, no. 2 (2012):  5-11. 
 
Whitehead, Deborah.  “Feminism, Religion, and the Politics of History.”  Journal of 
Feminist Studies in Religion 27, no. 2 (2011):  3-9. 
 
Wilcox, Clyde.  “Evangelicalism, Social Identity, and Gender Attitudes among Women.”  
American Politics Quarterly 19, no. 3 (1991):  353-363.  
 
–––.  God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America.  Baltimore:  
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.  
 
–––.  “The March of the Values Voter.”  The Wilson Quarterly 32, no. 1 (2008):  8.  
 
–––.  “Of Movements and Metaphors:  The Coevolution of the Christian Right and the 
GOP,” in Evangelicals and Democracy in America, Vol II, edited by Steven Brint 
and Jean Reith Schroedel, 331-356.  New York:  Russell Sage Foundation, 2009. 
 
Wilcox, Clyde, and Carin Larson.  Onward Christian Soldiers?.  Boulder, CO:   
Westview, 2006.  
 
Wilcox, W. B.  “Conservative Protestant Childrearing: Authoritarian Or Authoritative?”  
American Sociological Review 63, no. 6 (1998):  796-809.  
 
Wilcox, W. B., Mark Chaves, and David Franz.  “Focused on the Family? Religious 
Traditions, Family Discourse, and Pastoral Practice.”  Journal for the Scientific 
Study of Religion 43, no. 4 (2004):  491-504.  
 
Wilford, Justin.  “Scales of Religio-Political Action: the Local and the ‘Civil’ in 
Contemporary US Evangelicalism.”  Culture and Religion 12, no. 3 (2011):  277-
302. 
 
Willard, Dallas.  “The Failure of Evangelical Political Involvement,” in God and 
Governing, edited by Roger N. Overton, 74-91.  Eugene, OR:  Pickwick 
Publications, 2009. 
 
Williams, Rhys H.  Cultural Wars in American Politics: Critical Reviews of a Popular 
Myth.  New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1997.  
 
–––.  “Politicized Evangelicalism and Secular Elites:  Creating a Moral Other.” in 
Evangelicals and Democracy in America, Vol II, edited by Steven Brint and Jean 
Reith Schroedel, 143-178.  New York:  Russell Sage Foundation, 2009. 
 
Wills, Garry.  Under God: Religion and American Politics.  New York:  Simon and 




Wolfe, Alan. “Religion and American Life.”  Chronicle of Higher Education 53, no. 15 
(2006):  B11.  
 
Wolfson, Elijah. "Texas Republican Party Adopts Discredited 'Reparative Therapy' for 




Worthen, Molly.  “The Reformer:  How Al Mohler Transformed a Seminary, Helped 
Change a Denomination, and Challenges a Secular Culture.”  Christianity Today 54, 
no. 10 (2010):  18-25. 
 
Wulff, D. M.  Psychology of religion: Classic and contemporary views.  New York: 
Wiley, 1991.  
 
Wuthnow, Robert.  The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith since 
World War II.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1988.  
 
–––.  The Struggle for America's Soul: Evangelicals, Liberals, and Secularism.  Grand 
Rapids, MI:  Eerdmans, 1989.  
 
–––.  America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity. Princeton, NJ:  Princeton 
University Press, 2005.  
 
Wuthnow, Robert, and John H. Evans.  The Quiet Hand of God: Faith-Based Activism 
and the Public Role of Mainline Protestantism.  Berkeley, CA:  University of 
California Press, 2002. 
 
 Zerubavel, Eviatar.  The Fine Line: Making Distinctions in Everyday Life.  Chicago:  




APPENDIX A:  METHODS STATEMENT 
 
 In looking for potential primary sources for the textual analysis, I included 
particular criteria.  I wanted to examine texts from authors leading the most influential 
groups on the evangelical right and also include the most seminal texts used in training 
people for the cause.  Firstly, I wanted to capture texts from the leadership of influential  
entities on the evangelical right.  I identified Focus on the Family, the Family Research 
Council, and the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) as three of the most important entities 
in this regard.  Two of these are “parachurch” organizations, engaged in public policy and 
advocacy, while the other is the single biggest predominantly white evangelical 
denomination in America.   I chose James Dobson, the psychologist and founder of Focus 
on the Family as well as Tony Perkins, the head of the Family Research Council, as the 
key leaders of these two influential parachurch organizations.  Because of my belief that 
the denominational influence of the SBC has not been sufficiently represented in previous 
research in the field, I wanted to make sure to include a published leader and ethical thinker 
from within the SBC as one of the authors to examine.  The leader I chose was Albert 
Mohler, president of Southern Baptist Theological Seminary.  Out of the numerous 
published works from Perkins, Dobson, and Mohler, I chose those sources that spoke most 
directly to same-sex marriage and abortion as key ethical concerns.  Secondly, it became 
clear the seminal text for pro-life activist training in America was Randy Alcorn’s book 
ProLife Answers to ProChoice Arguments.  This book has been used by both parachurch 
and church groups alike to train activists for how to counter arguments and represent the 
pro-life position.  By choosing the leading thinkers within the parachurch and 
denominational world, as well as the leading text for abortion opponents, I hoped to capture 
	
 158 
the most read texts as a representative sample for what may be influencing evangelical non-
elite political actors.   
 I used Researchware, Inc.’s HyperRESEARCH program on an Apple Macintosh 
computer to code the chapters within the selected texts and identify the key themes and 
terms, looking to highlight the author’s intention with each passage.  After capturing the 
chapters, I grouped these themes together where they fit, examining whether certain themes 
were actually a subset of others and how the arguments fit together.  After distilling the 
coding, the seven themes emerged that I mention previously in the text: moral 
purity/innocence, personal responsibility, and obedience to authority, the liberal elite as the 
enemy, the distrust of the American legal system, science and genetic moral arguments, 
and the culture war crisis.  I highlight all of these findings in Chapter 5. 
 
